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Summary   
 
The East Asian ‘developmental state thesis’ (hereafter, DST) was suggested to explain the East 
Asian development states (i.e. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore), where the role of the 
state has been very significant in producing ‘the East Asian economic miracle.’ However, the 
natural world has received little attention in DST scholarship. It is ironic that nature as a resource 
is intrinsically important to national economic development in East Asia, but research related to 
this issue is nonexistent. In particular, water, among the natural resources, is crucial because it is 
the backbone of economic growth in contexts that include hydroelectric power, industrial water 
for factories and residential water.  
 
Since the 1960s, the Korean state has been active in pursuing various water resource 
development policies. For example, the Ten Year Water Resource Development Plan (1965) was 
designed to comprehensively develop water resources, including flood control and water 
utilization. The Specific Multipurpose Dam Act (1966) was a special law aiming at smoother and 
more efficient construction of multipurpose dams, replacing the River Act, which focused on 
flood control. The establishment of the Korea Water Resource Development Corporation 
(KWRC) (1967), which assumed the responsibility of water management from the extant river 
authorities, strongly advocated the construction of multipurpose dams. Based on the description 
thus far, the DST appears useful for explaining the role of the state in water resource 
development. However, understanding the context at this level is superficial. We must 
understand state-nature relations to properly explain how water resource development policies 
were established and pursued by the Korean developmental state. This thesis aims to explore 
how the Korean state played a key role in developing the discursive and material construction of 
nature.      
 
This thesis is theoretically informed by recent development of the literature on the social 
construction of nature and the state-nature relation. Recently, there is increasing attention to the 
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debate on critical hydro-politics in studies of water resource development and policy. 
Conventionally, water is regarded as a pure and natural substance in the form of H₂O, detached 
from human society, but water should be seen as ‘social nature’ that is the assemblage of 
materiality and discursivity of human and non-human factors. The state plays a particularly 
prominent role in establishing the relationship between water and society. However, existing 
literature on hydro-politics does not sufficiently theorize the role of the state in hydro-politics. 
Recent studies of ‘state-nature’ relations emphasize the significance of the state role in the social 
construction of nature and argue that the state develops an intimate relationship with nature for 
its politico-economic ends using spatial strategies, such as framing, centralization and 
territorialisation.  
 
The ‘state-nature’ literature can be effective in exploring the state-nature relations in the contexts 
of the East Asian development states. However, the DST is theoretically limited in explaining the 
state-nature relations. First, the DST tends to consider the state to be a gathering of a handful of 
bureaucrats who have plan-rationality and a pre-ordained separation from society. Second, the 
DST pays less attention to the dialectic link between society and nature in describing the process 
of capitalist production, and this may overgeneralize the episteme that all nature is equal to a pre-
given ‘resource.’ Third, DST tends to be insensitive to interaction between the path-dependency 
of a developmental state and emergent changes (e.g., democratization and neoliberalization).  
 
Based on the above problem orientation, by focusing on the water resource policy of the Korean 
developmental state (1961-2015), the analytic focus is to explore the ways in which the state-
nature relationship as a ‘second nature’ is materially and discursively produced by social forces 
that pursue their own political and economic ends by acting in and through the state. More 
detailed research questions are as follows:  
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A) What were the state’s intentions in advocating a certain water resource policy?  
B) How was the relationship between the state and nature constructed?  
C) How did the former regime’s state-nature relationship impact the latter regime, and what 
changed this relationship under the latter regime?  
D) How does this perspective help us rethink the developmental state vis-à-vis nature?  
 
Based on these analyses, this thesis emphasizes the significance of the state role in hydro-
politics, and suggests to see hydro-politics in terms of materially and discursively contested 
interactions among social forces acting in and through the state.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Until recently, the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project (hereafter, 4 Rivers Project), a state-led 
Green Growth strategy for substantial re-engineering of the country’s natural landscape and 
hydrological system, has been one of the most hotly debated environmental issues in South 
Korean society. In 2008, the Lee Myung-Bak government (2008-2013) began to implement the 4 
Rivers Project. However, Korean civil society groups, including environmental activists, 
environmentally friendly religious groups and scientists, have strongly opposed the project, 
arguing that it would cause immense ecological destruction rather than environmental 
restoration. Because of the gravity of the issue, The New York Times and the journal Science (The 
New York Times 2009; Normile 2010) covered the project in depth. According to Science, the 
project, which includes “building 16 dams, dredging 570 million cubic meters of sand and gravel 
to deepen nearly 700 kilometers of riverbed, renovating two estuarine barrages, and constructing 
bike trails, athletic field, and parks along the waterways”, would cause significant environmental 
destruction and is “one of the costliest engineering projects in the country’s history,” with 
expected spending of at least US$19 billion (Normile 2010: 1568; see Figure 23).  
 
Despite the strong criticism from civil society, the Lee Myung-Bak regime aggressively pursued 
the implementation of the project. Why was President Lee so aggressive in promoting this 
project? Some might answer this question by connecting this ambitious construction project to 
his personal experiences, including being involved in constructing critical national infrastructure 
projects such as the Gyeongbu (Seoul-Busan) Expressway as the former CEO of the Hyundai 
Engineering and Construction Corporation. However, rather than interpreting this project as a 
result of the Lee regime’s policy direction or ideological preferences, I consider the project in 
relation to the historical legacies of the Korean developmental state and emergent neoliberal 
properties. 
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1. The state-nature relations in a developmental state: The South Korean 
water resource policy    
The East Asian ‘developmental state thesis’ (hereafter, DST), which has been offered by the 
scholars, such as Johnson (1982), Deyo (1987a), Wade (1990) and Woo-Cumings (1999), was 
suggested to explain the East Asian development states (i.e. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore), where the role of the state has been very significant in producing ‘the East Asian 
economic miracle’ (World Bank 1994). However, the natural world has received little attention 
in DST scholarship. It is ironic that nature as a resource is intrinsically important to national 
economic development in East Asia, but research related to this issue is nonexistent. In 
particular, water, among the natural resources, is crucial because it is the backbone of economic 
growth in contexts that include hydroelectric power, industrial water for factories and residential 
water.  
 
Since the 1960s, the Korean state has been active in pursuing various water resource 
development policies. For example, the Ten Year Water Resource Development Plan (1965) was 
designed to comprehensively develop water resources, including flood control and water 
utilization. The Specific Multipurpose Dam Act (1966) was a special law aiming at smoother and 
more efficient construction of multipurpose dams, replacing the River Act, which focused on 
flood control. The establishment of the Korea Water Resource Development Corporation 
(KWRC) (1967), which assumed the responsibility of water management from the extant river 
authorities, strongly advocated the construction of multipurpose dams (KWRC 1994; Lee 2005). 
Based on the description thus far, the DST appears useful for explaining the role of the state in 
water resource development. However, understanding the context at this level is superficial. We 
must understand state-nature relations to properly explain how water resource development 
policies were established and pursued by the Korean developmental state. This thesis aims to 
explore how the Korean state played a key role in developing the discursive and material 
construction of nature.      
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This thesis is theoretically informed by recent development of the literature on the social 
construction of nature and the state-nature relation. Recently, there is increasing attention to the 
debate on critical hydro-politics in studies of water resource development and policy (Sneddon 
and Fox 2006, 2011; Biro 2007; Harris and Alatout 2010). Conventionally, water is regarded as a 
pure and natural substance in the form of H ₂O, detached from human society, but, as 
Swyngedouw and others already noted (Swyngedouw 1999, 2007, 2013a, 2013b; Bakker 2003a; 
Gandy 2008), water should be seen as ‘social nature’ that is the assemblage of materiality and 
discursivity of human and non-human factors. The state plays a particularly prominent role in 
establishing the relationship between water and society, such as in Israel and India (Alatout 
2008; Klingensmith 2007). However, existing literature on hydro-politics does not sufficiently 
theorize the role of the state in hydro-politics. Recent studies of ‘state-nature’ relations 
emphasize the significance of the state role in the social construction of nature and argue that the 
state develops an intimate relationship with nature for its politico-economic ends using spatial 
strategies, such as framing, centralization and territorialization (Whitehead et al. 2007; for  
details, see Chapter 2).  
 
The ‘state-nature’ literature can be effective in exploring the state-nature relations in the contexts 
of the East Asian development states. However, the DST is theoretically limited in explaining the 
state-nature relations. First, the DST tends to consider the state to be a gathering of a handful of 
bureaucrats who have plan-rationality and a pre-ordained separation from society. Second, the 
DST pays less attention to the dialectic link between society and nature in describing the process 
of capitalist production, and this may overgeneralize the episteme that all nature is equal to a pre-
given ‘resource.’ These limitations occlude consideration of the dynamics of making nature as a 
resource for rapid development, compared with advanced Western countries that took more time 
to achieve development. With this mindset, the DST cannot properly address the complex and 
dynamic conflict, contestation and compromise that occur at and across multiple geographical 
scales in the process of transforming nature into a resource. Third, DST tends to be insensitive to 
interaction between the path-dependency of a developmental state and emergent changes (e.g., 
democratization and neoliberalization). There have been two contrasting approaches to the 
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characterization of the Korean developmental state after political and economic liberalization. 
One approach is that of the neo-statists, who emphasize the point that the developmental state 
still alive under the influence of globalization and democratization, and that the role of the state 
in driving the national economy is as important as ever (Weiss and Hobson 1995; Weiss 1998, 
2003). The other perspective is that the developmental state has waned, as unveiled actors such 
as civil society and the large Korean conglomerate (chaebol) have emerged (Chang 1998; Kim 
1999; Minns 2001; Pirie 2005). In my view, both approaches share a common problem in that 
they both concentrate solely on the state either “before” political and economic liberalization, 
like the former approach, or “after” liberalization like the latter approach, in which a 
consideration of the close interactions between the past and the present of the Korean 
developmental state is neglected. Alternatively, influenced by a strategic-relational approach to 
the state that views the state as a site of political contestations among social forces as suggested 
by Jessop (1990), this study explores the way in which the South Korean water policy has been 
dynamically (re-)constructed by continuing political contestations among diverse social forces 
acting in and through the state and nature in the face of emergent changes. Lastly, and related to 
the third point, the relationship between DST and neoliberalism in respect of nature should be 
elaborated. Theoretically, neoliberal nature literature and the DST are effective for 
comprehending recent neoliberal nature projects in developmental states. In recent years, many 
geographers have examined the ways that neoliberal nature has been (re-)produced as the 
outcome of dialectic interactions between inherited regulatory frameworks and emergent 
neoliberal impetuses at multiple geographic scales, which contrast with a mainstream view that 
regards neoliberal mechanisms as homogeneous on a global scale (for seminal extensive reviews, 
Castree 2008a, 2008b). It is important that neoliberal nature research pay particular attention to 
capturing the linkages between local path-dependence and its relationship with extra-local path-
breaking momentum in situ rather than prioritizing global over local momentum. Acknowledging 
the fruitfulness of the literature that has focused on the variegated landscape of neoliberal nature, 
I view that the role of the state in forming this nature should be theoretically and empirically 
more clarified and diversified in the existing research. When exploring East Asian neoliberal 
nature projects, dissecting the state’s role is very significant in that the developmental state form 
affects not only ‘the East Asian Miracle’ (World Bank 1994) in the 1970s and 1980s but also the 
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globalization and neoliberalism in the country today (Hill et al. 2012). This economic miracle 
and transplantation of neoliberalism are depends on political contestations among diverse social 
forces, such as national bureaucrats, politicians, civil societies and local communities, acting in 
and through the state (Park 2005a; Hill et al. 2012). Even though DST scholars emphasize the 
state’s role in driving economic growth, there has been analytic silence around the relationship 
between the state and nature. Namely, both debates may help each make up the other’s weak 
points, such as the state’s role and the linkage between the state and nature, while strengthening 
my argument: the active role of the state is decisive in producing neoliberal nature in the context 
of East Asian developmental states (what I term the “neoliberalized developmental state-
nature”).  
 
2. Main research questions  
Based on the above problem orientation, by focusing on the water resource policy of the Korean 
developmental state (1961-2015), the analytic focus is to explore the ways in which the state-
nature relationship as a ‘second nature’ (Smith 1984) is materially and discursively produced by 
social forces that pursue their own political and economic ends by acting in and through the 
state. More detailed research questions are as follows:  
A) What were the state’s intentions in advocating a certain water resource policy?  
B) How was the relationship between the state and nature constructed?  
C) How did the former regime’s state-nature relationship impact the latter regime, and what 
changed this relationship under the latter regime?  
D) How does this perspective help us rethink the developmental state vis-à-vis nature?  
 
Based on these analyses, this thesis emphasizes the significance of the state role in hydro-
politics, and suggests to see hydro-politics in terms of materially and discursively contested 
interactions among social forces acting in and through the state.  
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3. Structure of the thesis  
The thesis is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 1 is this introduction. In Chapter 2, I first 
note the inadequacy of DST in explaining state-nature relations and the necessity of exploring 
the recent literature on the strategic relational approach to the state and its interactions with 
nature. The chapter ends with a research framework for discussing state-nature relations in the 
Korean developmental state.  
Chapter 3 discusses the methodological concerns in the DST literature and presents the methods 
used for fieldwork, such as literature review, data collecting and interviews.      
Chapter 4 focuses on the water resource policy of the Park Jung-Hee regime (1961-1979). 
During this period, the Park regime (mainly the Ministry of Construction (MOC) and the 
KWRC) established the modern Korean waterscape for the first time by centralizing and 
nationalizing local nature in the form of the “Four Major Rivers” hydro-scale.   
Chapter 5 explores the water resource policy of the Chun Doo-Hwan regime (1980-1987). 
Despite the fact that the Park regime and the Chun regime had the same authoritarian natures, 
President Chun had less justification than did President Park because under the Park regime, 
South Korea accomplished significant economic growth, and civil society was impatient for 
democratization as the next stage of economic growth at that time. The Chun regime thus 
produced different state-natures, such as the “Ten Major Rivers” hydro-scale and the Peace Dam, 
to avoid a legitimacy crisis.     
Chapter 6 focuses on the water resource policy in the 1990s and the early 2000s, and reveals that 
the path-dependency of the state-driven water resource policy under the former authoritarian 
regime did not disappear even after democratization. For instance, the MOC and the KWRC, 
which had grown under the past authoritarian regimes, created a ‘water scarcity state’ thesis to 
gain legitimacy for continuing dam construction.  
Chapter 7 shows through a case study of the Lee Myung-Bak regime’s (2008-2013) 4 Rivers 
Project that the active role of the state is decisive in producing a neoliberal nature in the context 
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of East Asian developmental state (what I term the “neoliberalized developmental state-nature 
relationship”), contrary to the dominant neoliberal creed that the minimal state is a prerequisite 
for vitalizing neoliberalism.  
Chapter 8 is the conclusion which summarizes the main results as well as revisiting the main 
research questions. I also propose some future research agendas.  
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II. STATE-NATURE RELATIONS IN A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION FOR THE ANALYSIS    
 
This chapter is organized in eight sections. In the first and second sections, I note the inadequacy 
of the DST in explaining state-nature relations and suggest the necessity of exploring the recent 
development of literature on the strategic relational approach to the state and its state-nature. The 
third and fourth sections introduce key arguments of state-nature relation literature and its 
conceptual weakness that insufficiently considers a multi-scalar perspective. From the fifth to the 
seventh sections, I focus on the transformation of state-nature relations, in particular in the face 
of economic and political liberalization, including the neoliberal turn. Finally, in the last section, 
I establish a research framework of state-nature relations in East Asian developmental states to 
concretize this theoretical debate in an empirical case study. 
 
1. The implications of a SRA for comprehending the Korean developmental 
state  
The DST emphasizes that the state can play a significant role in national economic growth, 
particularly when it is composed of bureaucrats who are autonomous from social forces and act 
on the basis of plan-rationality in East Asia, such as what occurred between the 1960s and the 
1970s (Johnson 1982; Deyo 1987a; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Woo-Cumings 1999). The DST 
scholars have used special terms, such as “plan-rationality” of national bureaucrats (Johnson 
1982), “state infrastructural strength” (Weiss 1998) and “governing the market” (Wade 1990), to 
emphasize the “role of the state” in realizing the “East Asian Miracle” (World Bank 1994). 
These concepts are commonly based on the episteme that the state and its officials are 
independent from society, including private interests. In other words, along with a (neo-) 
Weberian reading of the state, DST scholars assume that state policy is designed in terms of the 
plan-rationality of national bureaucrats (Weber 1946). This perspective has provided useful 
alternative ways of thinking and policy-making on national development, raising meaningful 
challenges to the dominant, neoclassical economics-based development model, which assumes 
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that more freedom in the market and reductions in state intervention are beneficial to economic 
development.  
 
However, the DST has been criticized for its (neo-)Weberian readings of the state that 
presuppose the separation of the state and society and see the state only as a gathering of a small 
number of bureaucrats who have plan rationality. In this sense, increasing numbers of critical 
geographers have highlighted the inability of the DST to detect the dynamic interactions between 
the state and society and the role of the varied social forces that could affect state actions from 
within and outside of the state (Park 1998, 2008; Glassman 1999; Hwang and Park 2014). For 
example, Park (1998) reveals that diverse social forces such as capital and labor had a deep 
impact on the state’s housing development policies in South Korea and Singapore. 
 
In other words, because of its state-centric perspective (i.e. territorial trap), the DST is limited in 
explaining the dynamic and contested interactions occurring at multiple scales that surround the 
East Asian development process (Glassman, 1999; Park, 2013b; Glassman and Choi, 2014).
1
 
According to Park (2013b: 184-186), the state-centric perspective of the DST underestimates 
other scales, such as global or local, as a unit of analysis. The state-centric perspective awards 
epistemological priority to national actors, such as national bureaucrats or national capital, over 
non-national actors such as local people. The SRA would be helpful in addressing these 
limitations. 
 
                                                          
1
 For example, Johnson (1982: 22-23) has heavily focused on bureaucrats, arguing that “in the plan-
rational system, [policy] change will be marked by internal bureaucratic disputes, factional infighting, and 
conflict among ministries”. 
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Jessop (1990) criticizes both Miliband and Weber
2
, pointing out that the economic (Miliband) 
and political (Weber) aspects of the state do not necessarily and firmly constitute the final form 
of the state, although both aspects are intertwined in the form of a “formal unity” (Jessop 1990: 
198). Jessop suggests a SRA that considers that the state form should be supplemented by 
continuing accumulation strategy, which is defined as a particular economic growth model such 
as Atlantic Fordism, and a hegemony project, such as the “democratic welfare state” of the Chun 
regime (see Chapter 5), which unifies different types of capital, under a particular hegemonic 
faction for initiating certain accumulation strategies,
3
 driven by social forces to sustain the 
‘substantive unity’ of the state form (Jessop 1990: 198).  
 
In this sense, the state requires hegemony projects as well as physical violence means to achieve 
stable and long-term statecraft that includes supporting general accumulation in the capitalist 
system (Harvey 1982). Thus, we should see that even under a dictatorship, certain state actions 
are the outcome of interactions among diverse actors beyond the static boundary of state-society 
rather than considering these actions a pure result of a dictatorship’s interests or of state 
bureaucrats’ plan rationality. 
 
In summary, from a SRA perspective, the DST has limitations, which may occlude the multi-
dimensionality of the authoritarian regime. First, the DST views that the state is operated based 
on state bureaucrats’ independence from society, while downplaying the state’s hegemonic 
practices to gain legitimacy from the people. Second, and in relation to the first limitation, the 
                                                          
2 In modern social science over the past fifty years, there have been two contrasting approaches to the 
state (Brenner et al. 2008). One is Max Weber’s reading that regards the state, which is detached from 
society, as a gathering of a small number of bureaucrats (Weber 1946). The other perspective is the neo-
Marxist approach, such as that of Ralph Miliband (1968), who considers the capitalist state an ‘executive 
committee of the bourgeoisie’. 
3 Accumulation strategy and hegemony projects may overlap, but accumulation strategy is mainly related 
to economic phenomena beyond the national scale, such as Atlantic Fordism, whereas hegemony projects 
are more focused on non-economic aims on a national scale (Jessop 1990: 198-201). 
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resultant state-civil society dichotomy tends to block the dynamics between the state and society 
in the formative process of state actions.  
 
Even though the SRA emphasizes dialectic interactions between accumulation strategy and 
hegemony projects in principle, existing empirical studies tend to lean towards state-led 
capitalist accumulation per se or economic readings of the state (with the exceptions of Jessop 
and Oosterlynck (2008) and Oosterlynck (2010)). In this dissertation, among various state 
actions, the production of state-nature can be explained well in terms of the logics of hegemony 
projects as well as with accumulation strategy, which will supplement the lack of empirical 
research that supports the SRA. 
 
2. Coupling the developmental ‘state’ with ‘nature’  
Additionally, I illuminate another problem with the DST: the inability of the DST to understand 
state-nature relations. Similar to neoclassical economics and Weberian industrial locational 
theory, the DST tends to overlook the process of transforming nature into resources for capitalist 
production. Chalmers Johnson (1982), the founder of the DST, emblematically explained the 
relationship between nature and the Japanese developmental state as follows: 
 
[B]oth types of systems [plan rationality and market rationality] are concerned with 
“externalities,” … an example would be the unpriced social costs of production such as 
pollution. … Accordingly, Japan persisted with high-speed industrial growth long after the 
evidence of very serious environmental damage had become common knowledge (Johnson, 
1982: 22, italics added). 
 
Although Johnson emphasizes the differences between economy systems by dividing the 
differences between the plan rationality of the DST and market rationality of neoclassical 
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economics, epistemologically, he notes that, with regard to nature, there is no difference between 
both systems in that the calculations for both systems do not include nature in the name of 
‘externalities’, while partly considering environmental aspects, such as pollution, as necessary 
by-products of high-speed industrial growth. In addition, it is assumed that there is a practical 
reason for DST scholars’ downplay of the transformation of nature into resources. The majority 
of the economic growth of developmental states has been based on export-oriented 
industrialization due to a shortage of natural resources such as petroleum. Hence, DST scholars 
did not need to consider the transformation of nature into resources at length. However, as shown 
in this work on water, this does not mean that no relation exists between developmental states 
and nature. To reduce this gap in knowledge, more case studies are needed. Therefore, we find 
that there is no room for a discussion on the ways in which nature and the state are closely 
connected with each other by political contesting social forces in the process of national 
economic development. Although several environmental scholars have studied the impact of 
developmental states’ economic development on nature, they have primarily concentrated on the 
state’s destruction of nature without exploring the cause, process and ways that this outcome 
occurs (Cho, 2003; Koo, 2003). This situation calls our attention to the state-nature relationship 
in the developmental state.  
 
3. The implications of state-nature relations literature  
State-nature relations literature (for extensive reviews, see Whitehead et al. 2007) questions the 
separation between the state and nature.
4
 Basically, state-nature relation scholars do not view 
nature as the material world per se or a pristine realm. Instead, they understand nature, which is 
mixed with human art, science and technology, as social product (Whitehead et al. 2007: 13-14; 
                                                          
4 Although the relationship between the state and nature has been debated since the 16th century by 
authors such as Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Whitehead et al, 2007), I focused more on 
the relationship between the ‘modern’ state and nature. Whitehead et al. (2007) regard the recent 
definition of ‘state-nature’ as a relatively ‘modern’ phenomenon, different from relationships before the 
era of capitalism and modernism. The difference between the pre-modern and modern state-nature 
relationship should definitely be studied in the future. 
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see also Whatmore 2002). In fact, this perspective is not new in the debate on the ‘social 
construction of nature’ (Smith 1984; Eder 1996). At issue is the hyphen (-) between the state and 
nature (see Figure 2). According to Whitehead et al. (2007: 14), “states and natures are not pre-
given, already completed entities, but continually emerging realities,” which means that we must 
focus upon how each nature and state influence each other and are closely interconnected, rather 
than seeing the state and natures as separate, established entities. In particular, they suggest three 
mechanisms to explain the specific relation between modern states and natures (Whitehead et al. 
2007). First, framing is “a process that involves the ‘bracketing off’ of the things and objects 
interacting in a certain context” (Callon 1998: 249, quoted in Whitehead et al. 2007: 14). The 
state tries to frame nature in various forms from physical territorial barriers to property rights and 
engineering infrastructures. Therefore, nature becomes abstract, and its local ecological context 
is dissipated (Whitehead et al. 2007: 15). In the process of framing nature, centralization and 
territorializaton are the modern state’s decisive actions to influence and control nature. 
Centralization involves building up standardized knowledge about nature, such as soil survey 
and environmental statistics, and the creation of a ‘field of power’ that natures are governed by 
the state (Whitehead et al. 2007: 16; see also Elden 2007).  
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Figure 2: The formation of state-nature relations. 
 
Here, the debate on the territorialization of nature must be explored in more detail for empirical 
study.
5
 In general, territorialization is a spatial strategy to control space and the resultant human 
activity (Sack 1986; Wainwright and Robertson 2003). More concretely, by constructing a 
geographical boundary, people are divided into ‘us here’ and ‘them there’. Within a certain 
boundary, diverse groups must converge into one group, ‘us’, while excluding others based on 
                                                          
5 Although divided into three parts (i.e. framing, centralization and territorialization) conceptually, the 
three mechanisms actually are intermingled. 
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factors such as gender and class (see also Cox 1999). Thus, territorialization of nature involves 
attempts to marshal not only nature, but also human-nature interactions such as nationalizing 
water at the local level in the name of national economic development. For example, 
Vandergeest (1996) explores the way in which a forest in Thailand is designated a national 
territory by a state entity, such as the Forestry Department, and how modern maps are created 
that erase locally-recognized properties and show forest falling under territorial sovereignty. In a 
similar vein, by focusing on Seattle’s climate governance, Rice explores how the 
territorialization of carbon made it possible to govern people as ‘good carbon citizens’ within 
Seattle’s jurisdictional ‘carbon territory’ (Rice 2010). I also reveals the ways in which the ‘Four 
Major Rivers’ hydro-scale as a national scale was constructed by the South Korean state during 
the 1970s to avoid local opposition and to promote export-oriented industrialization (see Chapter 
4). As these studies have shown, among various actors, the state is a leading driver for the 
territorialization of nature because it has enough people and resources to territorialize certain 
areas, such as through map-making and establishing territorial administration. 
 
Although I agree with the basic literature on territorialization of nature, I argue that there are 
some points that remain vague and beg more clarification. First, most studies tend to assume that 
territorialization of nature is a kind of transforming nature into a territory (e.g., forest or water as 
territory per se) (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Vandergeest 1996; Braun 2000; Wainwright and 
Robertson 2003). However, this could conceal the availability of different types of 
territorialization of nature. I would argue for another type of territorialization of nature. Nature 
could be involved in territorialization process as a catalyst in maintaining the already-established 
territorial tension. For example, as revealed below, water that cut across a military boundary 
could intensify the national-territorial tension between North and South Korea (see Section 6 of 
Chapter 5). Second, we also need to excavate veiled motives for territorialization of nature. 
Existing studies have mainly concentrated on either capitalist accumulation or nation-building in 
fostering state territorialization of nature (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Vandergeest 1996; 
Braun 2000; Wainwright and Robertson 2003; Rice 2010; Peluso and Vandergeest 2011). 
However, it is possible that the government can drive territorialization of nature, as reflected in 
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not only the impetus of capital accumulation and nation-building but also political motivation in 
the face of certain political crises. In a similar way, Swyngedouw recently showed that high-
volume desalination plants were mobilized in Spain as ‘hydro-social fix’ to avoid political and 
ecological crises (Swyngedouw 2013a). As explained below, in the case of authoritarian regimes, 
the territorialization of water could be effective to curb potential resistance, such as the Gwangju 
Democratisation Movement (e.g., the Peace Dam, see Section 6 of Chapter 5), and to integrate 
one people. Finally, it primarily focuses on the ‘internal’ territorialization of the state 
(Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Isager and Ivarsson 2002; Wainwright and Robertson 2003). In 
other words, with the exceptions of the Middle East and the Nile (Amery 2002; El-Fadel et al. 
2003; Harris and Alatout 2010), it assumes that territorialization of nature mainly occurs within 
an established national boundary, which ignores the possibility that, given inter-state tensions, 
territorialization of nature beyond national boundaries can take place. In summary, these 
processes help us to understand how the hyphen in ‘state-nature’ relationships can sustain its 
linkage today.  
 
To avoid any misunderstanding, it needs to be clarified that the term state-nature does not mean 
that the state can control or conquer all of nature and correctly estimate the state-nature’s effect 
and direction. Fundamentally, because of the unpredictability of nature, the state continually 
encounters various difficulties sustaining certain state-nature relations.
6
 Namely, it emphasizes 
that the specific state-nature relationship is constantly constructed and reconstructed by social 
forces that pursue their various political and economic ends acting in and through the state and 
nature, rather than a pre-given state-nature. However, the state-nature relation literature still 
insufficiently explores the point that concrete spatial strategy and process make it possible to 
control and connect with the nature and human-nature interactions. The scale concept is 
meaningful for narrowing this interval.  
                                                          
6
 In a similar sense, by focusing on debates on the creation of markets for wetland services in the U.S., 
Robertson and Wainwright (2013) point out that the U.S. government faces an unexpected difficulty in 
calculating accurate value of wetland. 
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4. Observing state-nature relations from a multi-scalar perspective 
The state-nature relation literature lacks the multi-scalar perspective
7
 in explaining the formative 
process of certain state-natures. The literature focuses on the production of the state-nature on 
the national scale as the sole unit of analysis. Meanwhile, the literature downplays the possibility 
that various scaled natures, such as regional nature, can exist in diverse scales and that theses 
scaled natures impact the construction of certain state-natures (Hwang and Park 2013: 360). In 
my view, a key reason for this neglect is because the empirical studies narrowly focus on state-
building or nationalism per se initiated by the state (see the chapters of Whitehead et al. 2007; 
Alatout 2008; Harris and Alatout 2010). State-nature relation scholars are more interested in 
national state form than capitalist state form where various social forces compete for their 
political and economic interests. In reality, both state forms cannot be separated from one 
another, as I will explain later.  
 
In this sense, as many noted, the politics of scale is important for comprehending societal 
conflicts because when a social force located at a particular scale attempts to mobilize other 
forces at different scales for their own ends, they can take advantage of relevant scale language, 
such as local or global scale (Cox 1998; MacKinnon 2011). Similarly, certain dominant scaled 
natures are the product of contest, conflict and compromise among social forces at multiple 
scales (Sneddon et al. 2002; Biro 2007; Harris and Alatout 2010). The production of scaled 
nature is influenced not only by dominant social forces such as national bureaucrats and big 
capital but also by less powerful actors such as local communities and civil society (Biro 2007: 
23-27). In other words, if there is a ‘scalar mismatch’ (Hwang 2014: 86) between local 
community and national government needs, the development of state-nature relations could be 
                                                          
7
 In this section, I cannot present the context of the existing broad debate on hydro-scale in human 
geography (Swyngedouw 2007; Sneddon and Fox 2011). However, I need to mention briefly that hydro-
scales are discursively and materially constructed and transformed by interactions between human 
activities and nature, instead of confining hydro-scales to the pristine first nature (Smith 1984).  
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affected. In sum, the existing state-nature literature is inclined to simplify spatially complicated 
relations of state-nature and one-sidedly emphasize the role of the state per se in capturing 
untamed nature.  
 
Considering the necessity of observing state-nature relations from a multi-scalar perspective, I 
think that the developmental state can use the politics of scale to frame and control natures in 
accordance with the state’s particular accumulation strategy and hegemony project.  
 
5. Changing state-nature relations in a developmental state after political 
and economic liberalization: Accept or reject the term ‘developmental 
State’ to selective policy areas?  
In this section, I concentrate more on literature covering the transformation of the Korean 
developmental state in the face of the political and economic liberalization that occurred between 
the 1990s and the early 2000s. In particular, it is important to note that existing studies have 
several limitations in capturing the dynamics of the Korean state in this period.  
 
First, existing literature assumes that before the 1980s, the Korean state possessed “a high degree 
of autonomy” (Minns 2001: 1027) insulated from private interests (for similar views, Chang 
1998; Kim 1999; Pirie 2005). Under this condition, according to the literature, the Korean state 
was able to realize the “East Asian Miracle.” However, this view cannot explain why social 
forces, such as state officials and national capitalists, that existed before the 1980s continued to 
compete with each other after the 1980s. In fact, the argument that a “high degree of autonomy” 
of the Korean state existed between the 1960s and the 1970s is taken to be nearly mythical, as 
revealed in recent empirical studies (B.-G. Park 2003; Gimm 2013; Glassman and Choi 2014; 
Hwang and Park 2014). For example, Hwang and Park (2014) show that, contrary to DST 
scholars’ expectation that the Gumi Industrial Complex in South Korea was developed by the 
rational planning of the national bureaucrats in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the place-
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dependent local actors in Gumi, the Korean-Japanese businessmen and the national parliament 
members all had a key role in promoting the development of the industrial complex. The 
consideration of these unveiled facts is significant for avoiding the overgeneralized perspective 
that it was not until political and economic liberalization in the 1980s that various social actors 
became involved actively in conflict against the government. Put simply, even before the 1980s, 
political contestations had already appeared among diverse social forces surrounding certain 
state policies.   
 
Second, this approach declares “the decline of the developmental state” (Chang 1998; Kim 1999; 
Minns 2001) rapidly after the 1980s under the influence of political and economic liberalization 
and the economic crisis, which omits the necessity of exploring the way in which the path-
dependency (or legacy)
8
 of the developmental state affected what Pirie (2005) calls “the new 
Korean state”. I agree with the criticism of Linda Weiss (Weiss and Hobson 1995; Weiss 1998, 
2003), who emphasizes “the role of the state” per se, as an example of a rigid perspective on the 
changing developmental state faced with globalization (see Kim 1999: 443-444; Minns 2001: 
1026; Pirie 2005: 26). However, such critiques also share a flaw with Weiss. Namely, these 
authors pay excessive attention to the new bottles called “the new Korean state” (Pirie 2005) 
while overlooking the old wine (i.e. the legacy of developmental state).  
 
I acknowledge that drastic changes (e.g., the rise of civil society and the prevalence of neoliberal 
ideology in policy making, etc.) took place in the mode of regulation of the Korean state. 
However, this does not mean that all of the past institutions, norms and people (such as state 
officials) were swept away to history at the democratic transition. The past and the present do not 
                                                          
8
 The origin of the path-dependency of the Korean developmental state could be traced back to the time of 
Japanese rule or the Late Chosun Dynasty. In actuality, the sprouting of the Korean modernization is still 
debated (cf. Shin and Robinson 1999). This issue is beyond the realm of the present study. Here, I intend 
to focus on the former authoritarian regimes’ path-dependency between the 1960s and the 1980s, 
although I do not deny the possibility that even the authoritarian regimes could have been influenced by 
the former politico-economic systems (cf. Kim 2009). 
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follow a zero-sum relationship. It is insufficient to recognize what renowned Korean political 
scientist Jang-Jib Choi (2002) calls ‘democracy after democratization’ (J.-J. Choi 2002) in South 
Korea. Although J.-J. Choi (2002) does not deny the importance of abrupt changes from below in 
promoting the 1987 democratization, he argued that how the current Korean democracy became 
conservative democratization from above after the 1987 democratization should also be 
considered (see also Doucette 2010).
9
 In agreement with J.-J. Choi (2002), I argue that not only 
new factors, but also old factors, should be dynamically and periodically considered in analyzing 
democratized Korean society today. In this vein, several scholars have been recently focusing on 
the dialectic relationship between the legacies, such as state-led developmentalism, and new 
changes, such as globalization and democratization, of the developmental states because even 
during drastic changes, such as the IMF reform, the Korean state still plays an important role in 
planning, implementing and sustaining national economic development (Lee and Han 2006; Lim 
2010; Park and Saito 2012). Building upon the work of Lim (2010) and Park and Saito (2012), I 
focus on the path-dependency of the developmental state’s impact on the current state’s water 
policy.   
  
Finally, the realm of empirical studies is very limited in showing the changing characteristics of 
the Korean developmental state, although there has recently been an increase in the number of 
case studies on the subject (e.g., Lee and Han 2006; Lim 2010). Pirie notes that “certain state-
institutionalists [including Linda Weiss] have been guilty of fetishizing and exaggerating the 
significance of selected areas of strategic activism by the state” (Pirie 2005: 27, italic added). 
Methodologically, I agree with Pirie’s indication. However, Pirie also tends to fetishize and 
exaggerate the current Korean state to support his argument that “a new, unambiguously 
                                                          
9 Several Korean social scientists used the term ‘87 regime’ to emphasize political and economic changes 
during this period, such as an amendment to the constitution calling for a direct presidential election 
system and national-level wage agreements between labor and capital to explain this great transformation 
(Park 2001; Sonn 2009; Cho and Seo 2009). While I do not deny the significance of these changes in 
1987, this does not imply that the political and economic structure that existed before 1987 disappeared 
completely after 1987. 
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neoliberal state is developing within Korea” (Pirie 2005) by selecting central bank reform and 
the creation of an independent financial regulator as evidence for his argument. Thus, one may 
question whether there is any methodological difference between Weiss and Pirie.  
 
Pirie then notes that “Neoliberalism essentially involves the creation of a ‘new’ state which seeks 
to support the functioning of market disciplines and the commodification of ever greater areas of 
social and economic life” (Pirie 2005: 27, italics added). However, during the period between the 
1990s and the 2000s, the water sector, one of most significant areas of social and economic life, 
did not experience transplantation of market disciplines or commodification in Korea, in contrast 
to the experiences of the First and Third worlds (cf. Bakker 2003a, 2003b; Budds and 
McGranahan 2003). Perhaps, it can be said that Pirie’s analysis also suffered from a rushed 
generalization. I do not intend to criticize Pirie’s limited empirical selection. Instead, the point is 
that we should not accept or reject the concept of the developmental state based on personal taste 
and a rush to judgment. Despite the political and economic liberalization that seemingly created 
“the new Korean state” (Pirie 2005), why was the water policy not transformed to a more 
liberalized (or neo-liberal) system? To answer this question, broader case studies are needed in 
terms of specific spatial-temporal contexts. The water policy issue can supplement the lack of 
empirical research to reveal dynamics of the Korean developmental state. 
 
6. Penciling the state’s role into the map of nature’s neoliberalism  
Although I briefly address the economic liberalization and globalization that occurred between 
the 1990s and the early 2000s in the above section, we need to more specifically consider 
neoliberalism and its relationship with state-nature relations in the context of a developmental 
state during the period between the 2000s and the present because even after the 2007–2008 
global financial crisis originated from the U.S., it was difficult to forecast that neoliberalism 
would soon become extinct (Peck et al. 2010). Even in cases of nature’s neoliberalism, varying 
neoliberal landscapes have been continually produced (Castree 2008a; Bakker 2010). Therefore, 
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based on the existing neoliberal nature literature, I attempt to theorize neoliberal nature in a 
developmental state in the sixth and seventh sections.           
 
For ten long years, critical geographers have been challenging the dominant perspective that 
regards neoliberalism as a singular, abstract and homogeneous economic ideology and model for 
privatization, marketization, deregulation and the “hollowing out” of the state by arguing that 
“actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore 2002) appears as a dialectic amalgam 
between path-dependence stemming from extant institutions, norms and people and emergent 
neoliberal and market-oriented properties. Following this perspective, which  emphasizes the 
necessity of contextualizing and reifying neoliberalism on the ground, there have been fruitful 
studies on the neoliberalism of nature in which the capital and the state attempt to conserve or 
degrade the biophysical world and even to create new natures for capital accumulation (Castree 
2008a: 150; for reviews, Castree 2008a, 2008b; Bakker 2010). Although they do not deny that 
the so-called “unholy trinity” (the IMF, World Bank and WTO) has a significant impact on 
nature—particularly in the Third World (Peet 2003; Hartwick and Peet 2003)—researchers have 
strived to reveal that actually existing neoliberal nature involves complexities, contingencies and 
entanglements among varyingly scaled human and non-human actors and factors by its 
encountering biophysical entities in situ, that is, not reducible to homogeneous neoliberal 
projects driven mainly by the “unholy trinity” on a global level (Castree 2008a; Bakker 2010).   
 
In essence, as Castree (2008a, 2008b) and Bakker (2009, 2010) noted, geographers in this field 
acknowledge that abstraction works that draw commonalities and differences among different 
case studies are needed to answer the question of how commonalities and differences in 
neoliberal nature are defined. For this work, based on the published articles on nature’s 
neoliberalism, Castree attempted to draw an “abstract map” (Castree 2008a: 149-150) showing 
the current variegated landscapes of neoliberal nature around the world while suggesting future 
research agendas. In particular, given a situation in which neoliberalism would not easily become 
extinct in the near future because of its adaptability to changes, such as that of “zombies” (Peck 
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2010; Peck et al. 2010), it is meaningful to pencil some missing points to Castree (2008a)’s map. 
In explaining the state’s role in the mechanism of neoliberal nature, Castree observed two types: 
1) off-loading the state’s extant responsibilities to the private sector and/or civil society, mainly 
in Keynesian welfare states, and 2) minimizing state responsibilities by encouraging privatization 
in the public sector, as shown in underdeveloped and developing countries that have not yet 
established welfare policies (2008a: 149). Both types represent only a “roll-back” of the state, 
which may underscore the aspect of the “roll-out” mechanism that involves the state’s active role 
in promoting nature’s neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell 2002). Additionally, this categorization of 
the state may unintentionally strengthen the perspective of neoliberalists who promulgate the 
state’s demise, such as Ohmae (1995) and Friedman (2006).  
 
Here, we need to problematize Castree (2008a)’s view on the state in two ways. First, Castree 
tends to see the state in the narrow sense as a “monolithic” government composed of national 
bureaucrats who are insulated from social forces, rather than seeing the state as a site of political 
contestations among social forces (Jessop 1990). In explanations of the mechanisms of off-
loading or minimizing the state’s responsibilities, it appears that social forces such as the private 
sector and civil society merely follow national bureaucrats’ decisions without interactions, such 
as conflict or compromise, between them, although Castree did mention the terms “Marxist and 
neo-Marxist theory of the state” (2008a: 148). In actuality, on the surface, designating states’ 
“roll back” or “roll out” actions as results is not particularly important because based on the 
changing situations, a “roll back” mechanism could dynamically transform into a “roll out” and 
vice versa. More fundamentally, the point is that we should recognize that the state’s specific 
role, e.g., “rolling back” or “rolling out,” is the outcome of contested interactions among various 
social forces acting within and through the state. Exceptionally, Bakker (2002) reveals political 
contestations among national bureaucrats, private corporations, civil societies and local 
communities surrounding the state’s actions in introducing the logic of the market to water-
resources management in Spain (see also Mansfield 2007; Roberson and Wainwright 2013).   
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Second, and related to the first point, in Castree’s (re-)view, the driving force of nature’s 
neoliberalism is inclined to economic impetus per se for maximizing profit given that he also 
accepted Bakker (2009: 1783)’s comment on his article (Castree 2009: 1791-1792). Although 
certain neoliberal nature projects are clear wastes of money as well as examples of 
environmental destruction, the projects could be started irrespective of maximizing profits from 
the perspective of capital in general. For instance, how and why was it possible to implement this 
project? To answer this question, we need to find more diverse motivations for neoliberal nature 
projects. As mentioned above, Castree tends to view the state as an economically determined 
entity in that the motivation for off-loading or minimizing the state’s responsibilities is based on 
economic calculations in accordance with cost-benefit analyses. However, as Jessop (1990) 
notes, the state as a capitalist state tends to follow the logic of accumulation, whereas the state as 
a national state must guarantee the general, non-economic interests of the national population to 
sustain the current state form (see also Oosterlynck 2010). As examples of non-economic factors, 
a regime’s legitimacy crises (e.g., military coups) or regional vs. local tensions that originated 
from uneven regional development may lead to neoliberal nature projects. In this sense, an 
economic deterministic view may impede capturing the various rationales behind enigmatic 
neoliberal nature projects. Thus, it is important to excavate the individual and social economic 
and non-economic factors that could affect the state’s actions in relation to the nature’s 
neoliberalism. 
 
In summary, to better comprehend the state’s role in promoting nature’s neoliberalism, the 
state’s role should be more diversified and elaborated on in order to locate the missing point on 
Castree (2008a)’s map. The need to see the state as a site of political contestation among social 
forces and to emphasize the relationship between economic and non-economic factors is also 
applied to conceptualizing what I called the “neoliberalized developmental state-nature” in the 
next section. 
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7. Neoliberalized developmental state-nature?: Bridging neoliberalism of 
nature into the East Asian developmental state 
Before I conceptualize the term “neoliberalized developmental state-nature”, I briefly introduce 
what “developmental neoliberalism” means. As with neoliberalism, developmentalism is an 
economic ideology, and the two ideologies are mutually exclusive because developmentalism 
emphasizes the state’s role in accomplishing economic growth, whereas neoliberalism adheres to 
a view that guaranteeing an individual’s economic activity as homo economicus in a free market 
and curbing the state’s intervention in the market are prerequisites for economic growth. 
However, as Hill et al. (2012: 8) noted, “neoliberalism and developmentalism exist in pure form 
only in the imagination.” As introduced above, “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and 
Theodore 2002) appears in the form of a hybrid in practice. Even in the context of East Asian 
developmental states, a hybrid between developmentalism and neoliberalism may exist. 
Although developmentalism is in stark contrast with neoliberalism in the sphere of ideology, 
they also share common orientations, i.e. prioritizing economic growth and capital accumulation 
over other values such as equity, distribution and environmentalism (Hill et al. 2012: 15), 
resulting in “developmental neoliberalism.”10 Next, the starting point for understanding nature’s 
neoliberalism in East Asia is understanding the “state-nature” relationship in the context of 
developmental neoliberalism. 
 
To realize the so-called “East Asian Miracle” (World Bank 1994), the transformation of local 
nature into “state-nature” (Whitehead et al. 2007) was significant because developmental states 
needed nature as a resource for rapid industrialization at the early stages of economic 
                                                          
10 After the 1997 East Asian economic crisis, in Korea, there were political conflicts between national 
bureaucrats, who had protectionist and interventionist orientations, and the newly rising neoliberal 
reformers, who were based on the principle of laissez-faire in establishing special economic zones (SEZs) 
in which the government relaxed the existing domestic regulations to attract foreign investment. As a 
result, the government selectively, not throughout the entire territory, decided to establish the SEZs in the 
2000s. This could be seen as a negotiated outcome between the inherited developmental state regulatory 
frameworks and the emergent neoliberal properties for new growth (Park 2005a) that shows the 
mechanism of developmental neoliberalism.  
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development (cf. Chapter 4). Spatially, nature as a potential resource exists at the local level. 
Because of this spatial characteristic, local communities may oppose the government’s 
safeguarding of local nature as the sources for their livelihood. In other words, local nature is not 
a pre-given resource for national economic growth. Additionally, most developmental states 
were authoritarian regimes with less political legitimacy, although each country’s specific 
situation was different (Deyo 1987b; Cheng 1990). Thus, the regimes strove to overcome these 
lacks of legitimacy by accomplishing fast economic growth. In this situation, by centralizing 
(e.g., environmental statistics) and/or territorializing (e.g., treating local forests as national 
territories) local nature, producing a state-nature could be an effective means of erasing local 
opposition and interest and gaining legitimacy from the national population at the same time, as 
was shown in the case of the producing the “Four Major Rivers” hydro-scale at national scale in 
South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
However, certain state-nature relationships do not have the durability to maintain their statuses in 
perpetuity. For example, political and economic liberalization may significantly affect existing 
hegemonic state-nature relationships. The “East Asian Miracle” did not always benefit countries 
uniformly. Instead, this miracle was based on uneven development in which some regions were 
more developed than others, which facilitated local and regional development-based territorial 
politics and spatial tensions among regions (Fukui and Fukai 1996; Hsu 2011; Park 2011). In 
many cases, underdeveloped regions and state-nature spaces overlapped with each other (cf. 
Chapter 4). Thus, it is estimated that the activation of civil society and “local-dependent actors” 
(Cox and Mair 1988) could have problematized the extant hierarchical state-nature relationships 
that infringed on local interests by demanding the decentralization of undemocratically 
centralized governance.  
 
Surely, it is not the case that all legacies of the developmental state will soon weaken because 
certain social forces—national bureaucracies (e.g., the Ministry of Construction (MOC)), 
national capital and politicians—that benefited and grew under the authoritarian regimes are 
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stronger than other actors such as the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and can sustain their interests by camouflaging their democratic and 
environmental gestures in its policies without fundamentally changing the inherited regulatory 
framework (see also Park 2011). If the developmental states face more severe challenges (e.g., 
the 1997 East Asian Crisis) that demand neoliberal-styled major surgery, it would appear to be 
necessary for those states to accept the precepts of neoliberalism, such as privatization, 
marketization, deregulation and minimalism in public sectors. In this situation, dominant social 
forces may selectively accept marketization and/or deregulation while avoiding sweeping 
privatization of the public sector by acting in and through the state and nature. In other words, it 
is possible that the state’s “roll out” becomes very decisive in implanting the logics of 
marketization and commodification into local nature in the name of national economic growth, 
which may be referred to as the “neoliberalized developmental state-nature.” 
 
8. Establishing a research framework of state-nature relations in the 
Korean developmental state    
On the above theoretical basis, I suggest the following research framework. This framework is 
organized in three stages corresponding to each period i.e. stage 1 (Chapter 4), stage 2 (Chapter 
5) and stage 3 (Chapters 6 and 7).    
 
8.1. Stage 1: The birth of state-nature relations in the Korean state    
In general, East Asian developmental states made accumulation strategy, which is defined as a 
particular economic growth model, such as export-oriented industrialization, and hegemony 
projects such as ‘Modernization of the Fatherland’ of the Park Jung-Hee regime, which unifies 
different types of capital (i.e. financial and industrial), under a particular hegemonic faction for 
initiating certain accumulation strategies (Jessop: 1990: 198). Corresponding to the accumulation 
strategies, the developmental state can drive spatial fixes on nature from building infrastructure 
such as dams to supporting the genetically modified organism industry (Harvey 1982; Castree 
2008a). At an early stage of industrialization, the state needs nature as a resource, such as water 
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for hydroelectric power or coal for thermal power to produce electricity. The state’s particular 
policy on hydroelectric power or thermal power is selective and depends on different strategies, 
such as an integrated system of water or electric resource development, and political 
contestations among different social forces beyond the realm of the idealized plan-rationality.  
 
However, it is not easy to change nature into a ‘resource’ for the state because nature is not a pre-
given state-nature. Epistemologically, in many cases local people had considered natural 
elements such as water to be local assets for their living communities, local nature as free or 
public goods, not economic goods. Materially, local people, with the institutional support of the 
state, owned property rights for the nearby riverside and their living space. Under these 
conditions, it is highly possible that the state may face conflicts at the local level when the state 
introduces spatial fixes such as building multipurpose dams. In particular, given the urgent need 
for a developing state to achieve fast economic growth, opposition against the regime can be 
more intense than for developed countries and at the same time negatively impact economic 
development.
11
 East Asian economic growth has been labeled a ‘miracle’ (World Bank 1994) in 
part because East Asian countries achieved the miraculous growth in only approximately three 
decades instead of the two centuries that developed countries required. For instance, Table 1 
indicates the high velocity industrialization of the Park regime compared to growth in other 
developing countries.  
 
Table 1: Average real annual growth rate of the manufacturing sector, 1960s-1980s. 
Korea (A) Developing countries (B) A/B 
20.3% 6.6% 307% 
Source: World Bank (1983) quoted in Sonn (2006: 223) 
                                                          
11
 In contrast to this argument, I do not deny the fact that there were fierce, though sporadic, political 
debates held under conditions of slow-paced economic development in developed countries.  
46 
 
This ‘compressed industrialization’ process (Chang 2010) involved strong restrictions on labor 
and civil rights that likely caused East Asian states to face local and national popular resistance. 
In this situation, potential conflict would have complicated the developmental state’s efforts to 
bring about rapid ‘miracle’ growth.  
 
The establishment of a state-nature relationship could be an alternative to reduce possible 
conflict at the local and national levels. Therefore, through actions for the centralization and 
nationalization of nature (e.g., making a special act or establishing a special national agency) and 
discursive actions (e.g., newspaper articles or schools book), the state must reframe nature as a 
nationalized economic good. In addition, the state needs more abundant and stable water for 
industry to support the change in accumulation strategy from light industry-based import 
substitution industrialization to export-oriented industrialization with heavy and chemical 
industries. In this situation, the possibility of social conflict and criticism of a state’s water 
resource policy still may exist on the local level. As a capitalist state, the state tends to follow the 
logic of accumulation. However, this does not mean that the state necessarily reflects the interest 
of a particular dominant capitalist class. As a national state, the state also must secure the non-
economic, general interest of the people to sustain the existing state form (Jessop 1990). 
Therefore, the state can use politics of scale to drive water policy smoothly and to establish 
political legitimacy. Through a variety of material (e.g., building dams) and discursive actions 
(e.g., creating maps or making speeches), local nature may become state-nature, such as in the 
case of the ‘Four Major Rivers’ hydro-scale for national economic development, which may 
erase local interests and resistance.  
 
8.2. Stage 2: The transformation of state-nature relations in the Korean state 
before political and economic liberalization   
The reason a capitalist state attempts to form intimate relationships with water is to sustain the 
stable accumulation of a national economy. For example, the Park Jung-Hee regime framed 
water as “nationalized economic goods” and constructed the “Four Major Rivers” hydro-scale to 
guarantee the provision of abundant water and electricity to industrial complexes in accordance 
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with the change of the accumulation strategy from import substitution to export-oriented 
industrialization, as described in Chapter 4. At that time, these state actions were very effective 
in curbing possible social conflicts at the local and national levels that may have prevented state-
led accumulation. However, particular state-nature relationships are not permanent but are 
transformed continually by both unpredictable human and nonhuman factors. In particular, given 
the situation in which the latter regime followed the previous authoritarian political system 
without democratization, the latter regime could have less justification than the former, which 
could have continually undermined the regime’s political legitimacy and encouraged people’s 
pent-up desire for democracy during the regime’s tenure. Acknowledging this contingent 
condition, I focus more on the changing state-nature relationships in the latter authoritarian 
regime at a specific level.  The regime had two options to escape from its legitimacy crisis: 1) the 
politics of distribution or 2) territorializing nature.   
 
Although water is constructed as state-nature, according to the logic of accumulation, it is still 
part of the everyday lives of people. When people’s safety cannot be guaranteed due to water-
related natural disasters, such as floods or droughts, everyday life can be overcome with social 
conflicts even under the authoritarian regimes.
12
 In particular, during the rapid industrialization 
(known as the ‘East Asian Miracle’), the developmental state with limited financial capacity 
could invest their resources in several major rivers, such as building a large scale multi-purpose 
dam, while neglecting most small and mid-sized basins. In this scenario, it is highly likely that 
small and mid-sized basins would be vulnerable to natural disasters because disaster preparations 
                                                          
12  To avoid any misunderstanding, it needs to be clarified that this thesis’s main purpose is not to 
introduce the exceptionality of a particular authoritarian regime’s water politics in comparison with other 
general capitalist state forms. Historically, it has been assumed that if a despotic monarch can manage 
hydraulic civilization well, she/he can sustain her/his despotism stably. The genesis of this idea can be 
found in Karl Wittfogel (1957). However, by suggesting a number of counter-examples to Wittfogel’s 
thesis, we find that there is not necessarily a relationship between grand hydraulic infrastructures and 
despotic rule (Zimmerer 1991: 444-445; Swyngedouw 2007). Therefore, I view the particular relationship 
between water and politics as the product of political contestation among social forces acting in and 
through the state and nature, rather than seeing a pre-given, inevitable relationship. 
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in these areas would not be carried out
13
, which can bring about social reactions at the local and 
national levels and eventually may prevent capital accumulation. Therefore, the state can 
exercise alternative actions, such as changing the focus of policies from large-scale multipurpose 
dams to mid-sized single-purpose dams, to decrease the risk of natural disaster. More 
specifically, the production of state-nature could be related to the politics of distribution in the 
context of the developmental state. According to Park (2013a: 1120), the spatial patterns of East 
Asian countries’ development were uneven from region to region because of the state’s spatial 
selectivity in favoring certain regions for half a century. Therefore, the politics of distribution 
was important to sustain the existing political economic systems in these countries (Park 2008: 
52-53). In this sense, a state with less political legitimacy, such as the Chun Doo-Hwan regime, 
may construct state-nature that aims at “balanced development” or “welfare” to relieve 
discontent in the region, as we will see in the example of the “Ten Major Rivers” hydro-scale 
project.  
 
However, if the regime had faced the situation that the politics of distribution had an obvious 
limit in gaining legitimacy, it could have considered new measures to improve the entire 
situation. For instance, water that cut across a military boundary could have served as a catalyst 
in intensifying the existing national-territorial tensions between both coterminous countries in 
the form of a flood attack scenario, which could have been referred to as the territorialization of 
water. In an atmosphere of increased territorial tension, people would show more concern about 
an external enemy than they would criticize their regime’s legitimacy, as we will see in the case 
of the Peace Dam.   
 
 
                                                          
13 Besides, the construction of multipurpose dams in big rivers could worsen the situation of small and 
mid-sized basins. 
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8.3. Stage 3: The transformation of state-nature relations in the Korean state after 
political and economic liberalization 
Even though water policy is constructed by the government, water is used by the people in 
everyday life for their lives at the same time. When people could not drink clean water, the realm 
of everyday life could become space of social conflicts. In this sense, it is highly possible that 
rapid export-oriented industrialization, including heavy and chemical industries, lead to water 
pollution at the cost of nature that can bring about social reactions at the local and national 
levels. Therefore, the state should exercise alternative actions, such as establishing more 
environmentally friendly water governance, to decrease water pollution, which could change 
existing water policy orientation. Under this condition, democratization could accelerate the 
transformation of the state from an authoritarian one to a democratic and environmental one. 
However, this does not mean that the prior influential actors, who benefited from the extant 
developmental state system, gave up their interests or were totally replaced. These actors could 
guarantee their interests by using spatial strategies. Here are several examples. First, the use of a 
localization strategy is one example. Localization literally means that the national government 
materially hands over authority to the local governance structures while discursively 
emphasizing the local scale rather than national scale. Seemingly, localization would be the 
outcome of democratization. However, localization could be used as a Trojan horse of dominant 
social forces utilized to safeguard their interests. Second, and related to the first mechanism, new 
state-natures could be produced. Some might argue that after economic and political 
liberalization, certain state-natures would be decomposed into more localized and democratized 
natures for local residents because state-nature per se is regarded as an outdated legacy of past 
authoritarian regimes. However, extant influential actors such as the Ministry of Construction 
could utilize climate change and its related natural phenomena in rationalizing a new state-
nature, as will be shown in the cases of “the water scarcity state” (Chapter 6) and the Four Major 
Rivers Restoration Project (Chapter 7). In particular, given a situation in which uneven regional 
development is intense, it is possible that by using “localization,” local actors legitimize the 
production of a new state-nature for each local economy.    
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As Whitehead et al. (2007: 17) indicated, a case study including geographical complexity and 
temporal diversity of state-nature relations at a less abstract level is needed. Therefore, I will 
examine the water resource policy of the Korean developmental state as a concrete case study. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY AND FIELDWORK  
 
This chapter is organized in three sections. In the first section, I suggest that DST scholars 
consider not only the epistemological perspective but also the methodological dimension to 
effectively exploit the less territorially trapped DST research. For this purpose, I first ascertain 
the reality of territorially trapped DST by focusing on the data used by DST scholars. Second, I 
classify newly discovered geographic data that have been used according to spatial scale and 
evaluate its implications and limits. Third, I debate the potential synergy between the DST and 
the cultural political economy to deepen the methodological progress. Finally, I propose a future 
research agenda. In the second and third sections, I introduce research methods used for 
fieldwork, such as literature review, data collecting, interviews, etc.   
 
1. Territorially trapped East Asian developmental state thesis and its 
methodological escape         
 
1.1.  Introduction  
Although acknowledging the fruitfulness of the DST, from the late 1990s to the present, there 
has been an increasing amount of geographic literature that is critical of the DST because it 
argues that the DST is caught in a ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew 1994) (also known as ‘embedded 
statism’ (Taylor 1996) or ‘methodological nationalism’ (Brenner 2004)) in which the state is 
regarded as a pre-given entity that is isolated from society, and the national scale is prioritized 
over other geographic scales to make national actors and factors stand out in the process of 
economic development. Using a multi-scalar approach that focuses on diverse actors located on 
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multiple geographic scales and their contingent interactions, geographers have demonstrated that 
certain state actions were the outcome of political contests among social forces of various scales 
acting in and throughout the state (Park 1998, 2013; Glassman 1999; Glassman and Choi 2014; 
Hwang and Park 2014; Hwang forthcoming).  
  
I certainly acknowledge that ontological realities are inevitably more complex than what any 
specific epistemological framing can capture. Thus, even a multi-scalar approach necessarily 
involves ‘complexity reduction’ to the social world (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008; Sum and 
Jessop 2013). However, despite the potential danger of ‘complexity reduction’ that may miss 
some actors, the multi-scalar approach is still meaningful because it continually attempts to 
reveal veiled actors and factors that describe the realities of the multi-scalar processes of East 
Asian economic development and that exceed the territorially trapped economic imagery of the 
existing DST research.  In this vein, Hwang and Park (2014) refute DST scholars’ belief that 
national bureaucrats’ plan rationality decisively affected Korean economic development by 
suggesting the counter-example of the establishment process of the Gumi Industrial Complex in 
the late 1960s and the early 1970s, which was one of the largest in Korea. According to Hwang 
and Park (2014), the development of the Gumi Industrial Complex was rendered possible not by 
national bureaucrats alone but also by diverse actors on various scales from the local to the 
global, such as Korean-Japanese businessmen, local growth coalitions, and others. 
 
In agreeing with the above critical premise, in this section, I suggest another avenue to deepen 
the debate. The target of geographers’ criticism of the DST tends toward the realm of 
epistemology, while there is much less concern about research methodology, even though 
epistemology and methodology are, in fact, intermingled (cf. Hay 2005). In this section, I 
emphasize that scholars should consider not only epistemological aspects but also 
methodological dimensions to exploit the less territorially trapped DST research. In terms of 
methodology, it has been determined that DST scholars heavily depended on national data, such 
as statistics and maps produced by government institutions, central government documents and 
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national newspapers and downplayed other materials. Therefore, it is necessary to understand 
how these researchers became caught in this territorial trap and what types of data contributed to 
it.  
 
The territorial trap should be viewed not only as a data problem but also as a socially constructed 
outcome created by certain social actors such as national bureaucrats and social scientists. 
According to Häkli (2001), with the cooperation of social scientists, governments – primarily in 
Europe – utilized maps and statistics to effectively territorialize local subjective worlds while 
simultaneously taking the objective modern state for granted. In other words, the state 
intentionally created a territorial trap for the building of the modern state. In a similar sense, the 
existing DST literature paid less attention to the context behind the territorial trap and actually 
blocked explanations about the state’s practices (e.g., advertising phrases such as ‘attaining GDP 
per capita of ＄20,000!’), masked actual conditions of uneven development on sub-national 
scales and blocked the debate on alternative, denationalized development models when 
constructing a certain hegemonic mechanism, i.e., ‘GDPism’ (Sum 2013).  
 
This methodology-based problem orientation could also be applied to the multi-scalar approach. 
Unearthing various scaled data from the global to the local scale is necessary to prove the 
effectiveness of the multi-scalar approach because, without reasonable data, the multi-scalar 
approach is less persuasive. Thus, it is meaningful to trace how and with what types of data 
geographers escape the territorial trap.  
 
More specifically, in this section, I first show that the existing DST literature is caught in a 
territorial trap in terms of methodology by examining the data used by DST scholars. Second, 
after reading about recent multi-scalar approaches based on geographic critiques of the DST, I 
classify newly discovered geographic data according to spatial scale and evaluate the data’s 
implications and limits. Third, I briefly debate the potential synergy between the DST and the 
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cultural political economy (CPE), as suggested by Ngai-Ling Sum and Bob Jessop, to deepen the 
methodological progress. The CPE could be effective in deconstructing a taken-for-granted 
territorial trap and revealing the various rationales of social actors behind the territorial trap by 
increasing the understanding that GDP, and more accurately ‘GDPism’ (Sum 2013), functions as 
a hegemony project, which is the production of co-evolution between semiotic and extra-
semiotic aspects, not simple figures. In conclusion, I propose a future research agenda to exploit 
the less territorially trapped DST research. Based on these analyses, this section emphasizes that 
interdisciplinary research using a multi-scalar methodology and epistemology is required to 
better explain economic development in East Asia. 
 
It is further noted that most of the material presented herein is focused on South Korea because 
of my position as a Korean scholar and the access this position grants me to Korean data and 
scholarship. 
 
1.2. Territorially trapped East Asian developmental state literature  
As shown in the criticisms of the DST (for a review, see Park 2013), epistemologically, the 
existing DST literature is focused on national actors acting on a national scale, which is a focus 
that blocks considering supra- and sub-national actors and factors. When reading the DST 
literature, one can find national actors, such as Japan’s MITI (Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry) (Johnson 1982), South Korea’s EPB (Economic Planning Board) (Amsden 1989) and 
Taiwan’s CEPD (Council on Economic Planning and Development) (Wade 1990), which 
commonly insulate the economic bureaucracy from private interests in the context of East Asia. 
To prove the economic miracle led by the MITI, EPB and CEPD, DST scholars used time-
sequential changes of key economic indicators, such as GDP, GNP (gross national product) and 
the share of manufacturing in GDP provided by international and national organizations (e.g., 
UN Statistical Yearbook, World Development Report and Bank of Korea National Income 
Accounts). Several DST scholars who had learned the Korean language and/or received 
assistance from Korean scholars could access the Korean (mostly national) written data (cf. 
54 
 
Amsden 1989; Evans 1995). Even in terms of methodology, it is obvious that such scholars 
function within a territorial trap by having to depend on national data.
14
   
 
Then, why are DST scholars caught in a territorial trap and for what purpose? This question is 
important because it is closely related to the methodological issue. To answer this question, I 
concentrate on Peter Evans, one of the DST scholars. Evans (1995) discusses the methodological 
concerns of DST research in the second chapter of his book Embedded Autonomy. According to 
Evans, DST scholars problematize methodological individualism because methodological 
individualism that emphasizes the logic of atomistic and asocial individual motivation, which is 
supported by neo-utilitarianism and neoclassical economics, views the state as ‘an aggregation of 
individual maximizers’ (Evans 1995, 36), which is a perception that cannot explain ‘institutional 
effects’ beyond individual interests (Evans 1995, 28). While their problem orientation is shared 
with some geographers, DST scholars only recognize national actors while downplaying the 
spatial differences among the various scaled actors and factors that change the institutional 
effects. Their criticism of methodological individualism is extended to the necessity of a 
‘comparative institutional approach’ (Evans 1995) as follows.  
 
‘Lack of a comparative perspective was also a natural consequence of fascination with the 
asocial logic of individual decisions. As long as individual choices could be predicted from a 
simple set of universalistic motivational assumptions, and as long as the aggregation of 
individual choices was sufficient to predict organizational outcomes, a generic theory of how 
state managers behaved would suffice. If historically derived institutional patterns define 
individual interests and constrain the way they are pursued, then ‘one size fits all’ diagnoses will 
not work’ (Evans 1995, 29). 
 
                                                          
14 International data published by international organizations should be considered national data 
in that these materials are inclusive of each government’s data. 
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This paragraph shows that the main aim of DST research is to extract commonalities and 
differences to historically conceptualize the East Asian developmental states (i.e., what Cumings 
(1984, 38) calls ‘a regional phenomenon,’ not an individual country phenomenon) and prevent 
falling into the ‘one size fits all’ category, as occurred with the general capitalist state (for 
similar opinions, see Cumings, 1984; Amsden 1989, Chapter 3; Wade 1990, Chapter 10). I posit 
that DST scholars and geographers are not oil and water in that the multi-scalar-approach-based 
critique of the DST also ultimately requires a comparative analysis of developmental states. 
Additionally, most of the key DST literature was published as single-authored monographs 
rather than in the form of journal articles. These monographs devoted a great number of pages to 
the introduction of national data and the authors’ interpretation of that data. As such, it could be 
said that the existing DST research represents the first stage in finding the arteries and veins of 
developmental states, although the existing research has an apparent clogged artery – the 
territorial trap. As for the second stage, recent works are attempting to detect capillaries located 
at various geographic scales in an effort to reduce the state-centered clogged artery.         
                  
1.3.  Escaping from the territorial trap through a multi-scalar approach 
Two decades ago, John Agnew noted ‘the possibility of seeing the territorial state and its power 
as dependent on the interaction between global and local (including state-territorial) processes of 
political-economic structuration’ (1994, 66, italics added) to avoid the territorial trap. Following 
Agnew’s argument, this section reviews how hidden data can help DST research escape the 
territorial trap. Three scaled data sources – local, global and national data – are involved. 
 
First, let us consider local data. The existing DST literature assumes that local politics and 
practices in South Korea did not exist before the democratization of the late 1980s due to the 
ruthless oppression of the people by authoritarian regimes. The fact that the Park Jung-Hee’s 
Military Revolutionary Committee dissolved the nation’s local assemblies shortly after the 
military coup of May 1961 supports this assumption (Gimm 2013, 1154). However, contrary to 
the state-centered assumption, several geographers recently discovered active local politics and 
movements, including regionalism (Park 2003; Gimm 2013), competition for state-led industrial 
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complexes (Park and Choi 2014; Choi 2014; Hwang and Park 2014) and local communities’ 
opposition to government policies, such as the displacement of residents due to the construction 
of industrial complexes (Chang 2014) and large-scale multipurpose dams (Hwang forthcoming). 
Such opposition significantly affected the state’s decision making.  
 
The authors used local newspapers as the primary sources for their data, as these papers 
contained information that was specific to the local areas and included the main local actors and 
organizations as well as their motivations and activities, as opposed to the national newspaper, 
which focused on national bureaucrats, politicians and issues specific to the capital. In addition 
to the local newspapers, researchers accessed and used local materials published by local interest 
groups such as local chambers of commerce (e.g., Gimm 2013; Park and Choi 2014).  
 
The key reason that local data from the 1960s and 1970s have been hidden in the DST research is 
that most of the local data are confined to specific areas, such as local university libraries, 
chambers of commerce and newspaper offices, although some of the local newspapers are stored 
at the National Assembly Library in Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Compounding the 
problem of accessing the data is the fact that the local data are not digitized. Therefore, a 
substantial amount of time is required to locate evidence and data, as all searches must be 
conducted manually. Accordingly, without financial support, it would be difficult to remain at a 
single research site and excavate local data that is coated with dust within a limited amount of 
time. According to the acknowledgements cited in many of the research articles, most of the 
researchers/authors were supported by a government-financed research foundation, such as the 
National Research Foundation of Korea (Gimm 2013; Chang 2014; Park and Choi 2014; Gimm 
and Kim 2014; Hwang and Park 2014) or the German Research Foundation (Hwang 
forthcoming). Moreover, they hired research assistants who could quickly and efficiently locate 
the requisite data. Given that most DST scholars are Anglophone, it is an undeniable fact that 
their limited language skills impeded their access to not only government materials but also local 
materials, as they were written in either Korean or Chinese, especially in the 1960s.  
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Second, global data have recently highlighted the fact that the East Asian developmental states 
developed under conditions of Cold War geopolitics (Cumings 1984; Amsden 1989, 35-48; Woo 
1991; Glassman 2011; Glassman and Choi 2014). As Glassman and Choi (2014, 1162) rightly 
note, in the existing DST literature, there is ‘a deep and sometimes systemic neglect of specific 
geopolitical and transnational class influences on East Asian development’ due to 
methodological nationalism. To supplement this tenuous link, Glassman and Choi (2014) reveal 
the role of U.S. military offshore procurement and its strategic coupling with the large Korean 
conglomerate, the chaebol, in South Korean industrialization by exploring released national 
security files that are mostly located at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in 
Austin, Texas. In actuality, using U.S. government documents is not a new method in American 
social science (e.g., see Ekbladh 2002; Biggs 2006; Sneddon and Fox 2011). However, even 
though several East Asian scholars (Park 2007; Tadashi 2008) visited the U.S. to access 
documents about the link between the U.S. and South Korean industrialization, much of the data 
presumably remain buried in U.S. archives.  
 
Another way to obtain information is by accessing the Korean government’s documents. Gimm 
and Kim (2014) use documents from the Presidential Archives, such as correspondence between 
the former Eighth U.S. Army commander James A. Van Fleet and the Korean government; these 
documents revealed the global agent’s influence on the construction of a petroleum refinery 
plant. Similarly, Hwang and Park (2014) reveal a direct link between Korean-Japanese 
businessmen and President Park Jung-Hee regarding an industrial complex when they discovered 
documents signed by President Park. 
 
Finally, we must reconsider the value of national data. To avoid any misunderstanding, 
emphasizing a multi-scalar approach and problematizing a territorial trap do not mean that 
national data should be excluded from research. National data are significant in revealing multi-
scalar dynamics among various geographic scales. Again, it must be noted that epistemology is 
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closely connected with methodology. When territorially trapped DST scholars used national 
data, they immersed themselves in disclosing the state’s capacity while downplaying other 
interactions on different scales. Conversely, the multi-scalar approach-minded geographers 
viewed the same national data in relation to interactions among differently scaled actors and 
factors.  
 
In fact, national data serve as a rich repository for researchers. For instance, national statistics 
provided by the National Statistical Office (NSO) are used to show that the economic miracle of 
East Asia is a reality by referring in particular to the GDP index. However, when using the 
GRDP (gross regional domestic product) index, we ascertain that there was an uneven regional 
development pattern beneath the economic miracle that in fact brings into question the reality of 
this miracle that supposedly benefited the entire country (Park 2003; Gimm 2013).
15
 Not only 
should statistics be used to support or negate a premise, but one should also examine national 
scaled data published by the government apparatus or the chaebol. For example, although the 
history books celebrating the foundation of the public and private corporation (e.g., KWRC 
1994; Hyundai 1982) present a state-centered view, a multi-scalar approach using these books 
led researchers to locate information regarding interactions among various actors (Glassman and 
Choi 2014; Park and Choi 2014; Hwang forthcoming). 
 
Second, in general, the national newspaper is regarded as the voice of the nation. Contrary to this 
perception, however, many authors have used national newspaper articles to expose local and 
global actors and their influences on the government (Gimm 2013; Chang 2014; Choi 2014; 
Hwang and Park 2014). In particular, the Naver News Library (http://newslibrary.naver.com)
16
, 
                                                          
15 Although the NSO established the GRDP index in 1985, the index has only been publicized 
since 1993 because the government was concerned about public sentiment in underdeveloped 
regions (The Kyunghyang Shinmun 3 June 1994). 
16 The Naver News Library carries four major national newspapers, i.e., Dong-A Ilbo (1920-
1999), The Kyunghyang Shinmun (1946-1999), The Maeil Kyungjae Shinmun (1966-1999) and 
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which is a full-text Korean newspaper article database started in April 2011, marked a new epoch 
in Korean social sciences by drastically decreasing search time. In fact, when finding local 
agents who are hiding in local newspapers, without any previous knowledge, it would take a 
great deal of time to locate these individuals. In this sense, the Naver News Library can be 
defined as a compass for locating local agents. Based on the results of searches, such as the dates 
of key events, researchers can now more efficiently search local data by using the Library.                                         
 
1.4. Seeing the developmental states from the perspective of cultural political 
economy   
Because I am interested in identifying any possible synergy that might exist between the DST 
and CPE, I examine the relationship from the perspective of the CPE. I further contend that the 
CPE could be a useful approach to fundamentally rethink the DST, as the CPE perceives socio-
spatial phenomena as ‘the co-evolution of the semiotic and extra-semiotic aspects of the political 
economy’ (Jessop 2004, 159; Sum and Jessop 2013)17 without minimizing the hard orthodox 
economy or the soft cultural economy (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008). More specifically, 
according to Jessop: 
  
‘CPE is not only concerned with how texts produce meaning and thereby help to generate social 
structure but also how such production is constrained by emergent, non-semiotic features of 
social structure as well as by inherently semiotic factors. Although every social practice is 
semiotic (insofar as practices entail meaning), no social practice is reducible to semiosis. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The Hankyoreh (1988-1999) that were published between 1920 and 1999. By inserting the date 
and a keyword or by using an advanced search function, one can view the original version of 
each newspaper online. 
17  According to Jessop (2004, 161), semiosis includes ‘argumentation, narrativity, rhetoric, 
hermeneutics, identity, reflexivity, historicity, and discourse.’ However, the point is that semiosis 
needs to be seen in terms of ‘the intersubjective production of meaning’ (italics added) beyond 
each concept. 
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Semiosis is never a purely intra-semiotic matter without external reference and involves more 
than the play of differences among networks of signs’ (Jessop 2004, 163). 
 
Building on the CPE, I suggest that GDP, which is DST scholars’ and the World Bank’s shared 
fundamental criterion for substantiating the East Asian economic miracle, should be regarded as 
part of the co-evolution between semiotic and extra-semiotic aspects. The GDP growth rate is a 
numerical reflection of national economic growth. Thus, the figure appears to be obvious, 
objective proof of a nation’s economic development. However, GDP is not a purely objective 
outcome but rather a political ploy to legitimize a certain economic strategy selected by social 
force, which is referred to as ‘GDPism’ (Sum 2013). For example, the Park Jung-Hee regime 
exploited various figures, such as the GDP index and the amount of exports, when mobilizing the 
national population behind ‘the Modernization of the Fatherland’ movement (Gimm 2013; 
Hwang and Park 2014). As previously mentioned, GRDP and other figures that reflect uneven 
regional development patterns were not selected by the dominant social forces. Thus, as in the 
mainstream social sciences – economics, sociology and political science (Taylor 1996) – 
territorially trapped DST scholars who depend on the GDP index are naive to the fact that it is 
produced by dominant social forces such as national bureaucrats in the form of ‘the territory of 
knowledge’ (Häkli 2001). Additionally, GDPism assimilates not only economic issues but also 
broad social agendas by prioritizing economic value over other values such as environmental 
sustainability, basic human rights and democratic interests in decision-making processes in 
society (Brohman 1996, 123-127). In other words, there is a singular, territorially trapped 
economic image that marginalizes other scaled actors, tensions and appearances. In connection 
with the multi-scalar approach, the CPE may rescue these hidden actors and factors located at 
diverse scales from the shadow of the territorial trap. 
 
In conclusion, we fundamentally reconsider a taken-for-granted concept of the East Asian 
economic miracle. In other words, is East Asian economic growth really a miracle, or is it only a 
mirage? In breaking the spell created by the miracle, the CPE could be an important interlocutor 
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for gathering scholars of different backgrounds, including economics, geography, linguistics and 
cultural studies.          
 
1.5. Conclusion  
In this section, I aimed to extend the thinking about the territorial trap solely from the 
epistemological perspective to the methodological perspective by critically reviewing the extant 
DST literature, the multi-scalar informed critiques of the DST and the data used in the critiques 
and the literature.  
 
Although this section focuses on the issue of methodology, it would be difficult to suggest a new 
perspective without an epistemological turn. For example, during my five years as a master’s and 
doctoral student in Korea (2008-2012), I observed that Bae-Gyoon Park, a professor at Seoul 
National University and the person who introduced the concepts of local dependence (Cox and 
Mair 1988), the spatial interpretation of a strategic-relational approach to a state (Jessop 1990; 
Brenner 2004) and the multi-scalar approach (Park 2005) to Korean academia, taught his 
students the multi-scalar approach. With the multi-scalar approach in mind, his students began to 
apply this epistemology to the territorially trapped empirical world in their journal articles and in 
their master’s and doctoral theses. Conversely, without methodological progress, the multi-scalar 
approach-based research would have been substantially delayed, thus suggesting the 
complementarity of epistemology and methodology.  
 
Based on what has been discussed herein, this discussion will be concluded by proposing a future 
research agenda that might serve as a general starting point for exploiting the less territorially 
trapped DST research. 
 
First, there is a demand to accelerate the digitalization of governments’ paper documents. 
Currently, the National Archives of Korea (http://www.archives.go.kr) and the Presidential 
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Archives (http://www.pa.go.kr) provide online search engines. However, in many cases, it is 
difficult to view the full text and pictures of content online, with the exception of the title. To 
view non-digitized data, one must personally visit the institutions. Perhaps it is of some relief 
that governments have, to a great extent, effectively digitized national government data. 
However, most local data have been left idle, stored in warehouses. This situation urgently 
demands governmental support before the paper documents deteriorate. 
 
Second, it is necessary to gather interview data from the appropriate people and to build a 
requisite database. It is possible that a multi-scalar approach may nullify the recognition of 
differences in power among individual actors by referencing all actors that appear in the data 
(Hwang and Park 2014, 21). In other words, a certain fact should be cross-checked using sources 
that are as diverse as possible. To avoid excessive relativism, interviews can be considered an 
alternative method, and accordingly, several scholars have interviewed a variety of people, such 
as executives of a chaebol (Glassman and Choi 2014), members of a local growth coalition (Park 
and Choi 2014) and local residents whose houses were submerged by the construction of a multi-
purpose dam in the 1960s (Hwang forthcoming). Conducting interviews is perhaps a more urgent 
concern than the digitalization of paper documents because possible interviewees are advanced 
in age, which may distort their memories or may make interviews impossible due to death. 
  
Third, students in this field need to take a profound interest in strengthening the global 
interdisciplinary cooperation network beyond the writing of individual articles that suit each 
discipline’s taste. I believe that economist and political scientist-led DST research has both merit 
– the rediscovery of the role of the state against neoclassical economics – and demerits – the 
territorial trap. One way to remove this shortcoming of the territorial trap is to break the chronic 
‘disciplinary division of labor’ (Taylor 1996; Brenner 1999; Wimmer and Schiller 2002) by 
communicating not only with economists and political scientists but also with geographers, 
anthropologists, linguists, etc. For example, Jim Glassman and Jamie Peck organized the 
Geopolitical Economies of Development and Democratization in East Asia roundtable at the 
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University of British Columbia, Canada, in May 2015 (cf. http://geopolecon.pwias.ubc.ca). This 
event was unprecedented in that not only critical geographers but also a key DST scholar (Bruce 
Cumings) and CPE theorists (Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum) participated in the discussions. 
Based on the establishment of the ‘internationalism of scholars’ (Glassman 2009), we should 
examine the developmental states through both a microscope – empirical research on the ground 
– and a telescope – abstractions from individual findings. 
 
2. Research carried out before coming to Germany  
In general, it would be difficult for a Ph. D. student in the field of geography to complete his/her 
thesis in three years. During the last three years, from September 2012 to August 2015, as a Ph. 
D. student of the International Research Training Group TERRECO funded by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), I was able to finish my thesis without financial difficulty. 
Surely, my project was one of factors that made my work successful. Additionally, it should be 
mentioned that research carried out before I arrived in Germany significantly contributed to the 
completion of my work within a short time.     
 
2.1. Preceding theoretical literature review   
While I was a master and doctoral student in the Department of Geography Education, Seoul 
National University (2008-2012), I read the DST literature in earnest, although I had already read 
Kicking Away the Ladder (Chang 2002), which introduced the term “the role of the state” to me 
for the first time, during my military service (2004-2006). My master’s supervisor, Bae-Gyoon 
Park, was interested in a geographical interpretation of DST. During the master’s course (2008-
2010), he did not hold a seminar on DST. Instead, I got to understand his perspective on DST by 
reading his articles (Park 1998, 2006, 2008) and discussing DST with him and his students 
outside the seminar room, including in the pub. In addition, when writing my master’s thesis on 
global city formation in a Korean developmental state (Hwang 2010a), I had an opportunity to 
read the classic DST literature meticulously, such as Johnson (1982), Deyo (1987a), Amsden 
(1989), Wade (1990) and Woo-Cumings (1999). As mentioned in Section 2 of Chapter 3, Bae-
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Gyoon Park taught state theory, politics of local economic development and the multi-scalar 
approach in his graduate seminars. Using these theoretical resources, he tended to criticize DST 
while suggesting an alternative perspective in his research (e.g., Park 2008). After I became a Ph. 
D. student under the guidance of Bae-Gyoon Park based on his key research interests, I wrote 
journal articles on the right to the city (Hwang 2010b, 2011a), labor struggles (Hwang 2011b, 
2012), social movements (Hwang 2011c), the Singaporean global city strategy (Hwang and Park 
2012)
18
 and urban megaprojects (Hwang 2014). As my publication list shows, at that time I was 
not interested in DST as a key research theme for my Ph. D. thesis. Although I did not foresee 
that the above-mentioned theories would become key theoretical resources for my Ph. D. thesis, 
an increasing understanding of these theories eventually helped my conceptualization of the 
developmental state and its relationship with nature later.          
 
On the other hand, Bae-Gyoon Park paid little attention to political ecology. I had a thirst for 
such studies because I was interested in the 4 Rivers Project of the Lee Myung-Bak regime and 
global climate change at that time. Therefore, I started to study political ecology, including 
organizing a seminar group. In particular, the neoliberal nature debate, as in Castree (2008a, 
2008b) and Bakker (2010), was attractive to me. For a while, I tried to find commonalities and 
differences between the existing neoliberal nature literature and the East Asian experience by 
focusing on the role of the state, which contributed to the development of Chapter 7.        
         
2.2. Preceding data collection  
After completing Ph. D. course at the SNU, I became a research associate in my master 
supervisor’s research project titled “A Study on the State-Locality Relations in the Era of 
Developmentalism” funded by the National Research Foundation of Korea for one year 
(September 2011-Augst 2012). In this project, my mission was to collect basic data, such as 
news articles, government reports and related research articles, in order to reveal the dynamics of 
                                                          
18
 Exceptionally, this paper was conceived within the context of DST.  
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the relationship between the local and the state in national policies (i.e. industrial complexes, 
road and water policies, etc.). Regarding water resource policies, I read government documents 
(e.g., KWRC 1994) and news articles from the 1960s to the 1990s, using the Naver News 
Library. During that time, I got to understand the general history of Korean water resource 
policies. Most importantly, I made an Excel spreadsheet file of news articles on water resource 
policies between the 1960s and the 1990s.
19
 This broad database was very useful for explaining 
empirical questions in my Ph. D. thesis.
20
                 
 
Figure 3: The structure of an Excel spreadsheet file containing news articles. 
                                                          
19
 Each worksheet has the date of issue, title and a brief summary of the news article. The file is 
composed of seven worksheets by subject (i.e. “KWRC (수자원공사)”, “Four Major Rivers (4 대강)”, 
“Han River (한강)”, “Geum River (금강)”, “Yeongsan River (영산강)”, “Nakdong River (낙동강)” and 
“multi-purpose dam” (다목적댐)) (cf. Figure 3). If I want to read a full-text news article, I can directly 
access the original article in the Naver News Library by clicking on the title.    
20
 My master’s supervisor allowed the use of this Excel file.  
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2.3. Preceding fieldwork   
While I was a graduate student in Korea, the Lee Myung-Bak regime conflicted with civil 
society. In particular, many citizens came out on the streets to demonstrate against the 
government’s decisions, such as a Korea-USA Free Trade Agreement and the Four Major Rivers 
Project in the summer of 2008. As a citizen, I am also interested in the situation that surrounds 
government policy. I personally conducted several field investigations, including observations 
and informal chats at conferences, demonstrations and dam construction sites between January 
2008 and March 2011 (for details, see Chapter 7). This fieldwork supports the arguments 
presented in Chapter 7. Based on my preceding Ph. D. research work, I was quickly able to 
design a Ph. D. research plan in Germany as set out below.     
 
3. Ph. D. research after coming to Germany  
 
3.1. Theoretical literature review  
After arriving in Germany, the most urgent matter was to establish my theoretical perspective. 
Although I had studied DST in Korea, I had not thought much about the theoretical linkage 
between developmental states and nature, and there was no precedent study in academia. In this 
situation, I thought that I first needed to review the existing Korean environmental studies 
literature, such as on ecologism, the metabolic rift theory, the social construction of nature and 
the green state thesis, from the perspective of political ecology, and then to briefly suggest the 
conceptual usefulness of the concept of “state-nature” relationships. As a result, I published a 
review article with Bae-Gyoon Park in a Korean geography journal (Hwang and Park 2013). 
However, this review article was still insufficient for gaining a vivid perspective on state-nature 
relationships in developmental states; I needed to receive detailed comments on my hypothesis 
from experts in this field. My master’s supervisor, Bae-Gyoon Park, offered only limited 
opinions about my hypothesis, particularly in relation to political ecology. My Ph. D. supervisor, 
Detlef Müller-Mahn, specializes in development geography in East Africa. Although I 
acknowledge that my supervisors had achieved important goals in the field of geography, I 
67 
 
decided to prepare a journal article as a solution because I surmised that anonymous reviewers 
would judge whether my perspective was suitable or not. I therefore began to read critical hydro-
politics literature, such as Swyngedouw (1999, 2007) and Sneddon and Fox (2006, 2011), and I 
also reread DST literature to find any unveiled links between the DST and nature. In addition, 
when I was in Korea for my first fieldwork, between April and July 2013, I organized a seminar 
group to read The Nature of the State: Excavating the Political Ecologies of the Modern State 
(Whitehead et al. 2007), which suggested the concept of “state-nature” relationships, in order to 
obtain my colleagues’ feedback on my early version of the article before submission. As a result, 
the article was accepted for publication (Hwang forthcoming).   
 
 
3.2. Data collecting  
As a case study methodology, this thesis considers that discursive materials such as newspaper 
articles, speeches and maps, etc. are significant in detecting how certain hydro-scales are 
hegemonized by discursive factors (Swyngedouw 1999; Zimmerer 2000: 152-153; Harris and 
Alatout 2010: 149-150). When scrutinizing governmental actors, such as the MOC and MOE, 
official government texts (e.g., KWRA and KWRC (1997), MOCT (2001a, 2001b, 2006, 2007)) 
alone are clearly limited in revealing the interactions among social forces. Because of this limit, I 
more or less heavily use newspaper articles. At the least, I have attempted to cross-check 
different newspapers to guarantee the creditability of quotation used. Some might argue that 
using newspaper articles to analyze a period (Park Jung-Hee and Chun Doo-Hwan regimes) is 
problematic because these authoritarian regimes pursued strict forms of censorship. However, 
this historical fact does not mean that these authoritarian regimes successfully controlled all local 
voices, as revealed in the empirical parts below.     
 
Using the Naver News Library, I read online news articles from the 1960s to the 1990s, but it 
was difficult to access local newspapers. I focused on The Gangwon Ilbo, a local newspaper in 
Gangwon Province. The reason I selected The Gangwon Ilbo as a key local newspaper is that the 
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Soyang Dam, which was Asia’s largest multipurpose and rock-fill dam in 1973, is located in 
Gangwon Province (cf. Chapter 4). The Gangwon Ilbo is stored at the National Assembly 
Library in Seoul and the Kangwon National University Library in Chuncheon. At the National 
Assembly Library, news articles from the 1960s and 1970s are stored on microfilm. Because my 
parents’ home is in Seoul, I worked in the National Assembly Library from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 
p.m. for approximately two months; in general, it took one day to read a year’s worth of articles. 
Then, I visited the Kangwon National University Library to read articles from the 1980s and 
1990s. This library provides original newspaper articles. I also found government documents 
from the National Archives of Korea and the Presidential Archives, and I collected statistics 
from KOSIS (the Korean Statistical Information Service)
21
 and WAMIS (the Water Resources 
Management Information System), etc.
22
  
 
3.3. Fieldwork  
Because of data collecting, as explained above, I did not have much time to visit research sites. 
However, because my preceding fieldwork already covered several research sites such as the 
Four Major Rivers Project, I was able to focus on Gangwon Province, which is closely related to 
Chapter 4, as follows.    
 
It is undeniable that discursive materials alone are limited to the lived voices of local people not 
referenced in the text. Because of this limit, I conducted in-depth interviews that took 
approximately one to two hours in July 2013. To reveal local perceptions concerning dam 
construction, I met two people (a seventy-two-year-old man and a seventy-seven-year-old man) 
whose homes were submerged in the 1960s by the construction of the Soyang Dam in Gangwon 
Province, despite the fact that it is difficult today to find interviewees who have memories of 
submerged residences at that time. Although I conducted some interviews, I acknowledge that 
                                                          
21
 http://kostat.go.kr 
22
 http://www.wamis.go.kr 
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there are many persons, such as experts, stakeholders, etc., who could have been interviewed for 
my thesis. Therefore, in future research after this Ph. D. thesis, I intend to make up for this 
methodology weakness by conducting further interviews. Finally, in order to comprehend and 
feel the local situation on the ground, I visited the Soyang Dam (Figure 4), and a village where 
people live whose homes were submerged (Figure 5).   
 
 
 
Figure 4: A monument commemorating the completion of the Soyang Dam. The term 
“Soyang Lake (소양호)” is written by President Park Jung-Hee (11 January 2014). 
Source: Author’s own photograph 
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Figure 5: A view from a village where people live whose homes were submerged (10 July 
2013). 
Source: Author’s own photograph 
 
All these experiences became part of the research itself. They directed me firmly towards an 
understanding of “state-nature” relations in a developmental state as outlined in Chapter 2. The 
result of this process that concerns my understanding of the Korean water resource policy will be 
presented in the following four chapters.   
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IV. THE WATER RESOURCE POLICY OF THE PARK JUNG-HEE REGIME, 
1961-1979 
 
1. Introduction 
Along with the literature on “social construction of nature”, some scholars have recently 
emphasized the role of the state in the construction of nature by arguing that among various 
social forces and actors, the state plays a key role in making the discursive and material 
construction of nature. Based on this argument, and by focusing on the water resource policy of 
the Park Jung-Hee regime (1961-1979), this chapter aims to explore the ways in which the state-
nature relationship is materially and discursively produced by social forces that pursue their 
political and economic ends by acting in and through the state. Based on these analyses, this 
chapter emphasizes the significance of the state role in hydro-politics, and suggests to see hydro-
politics in terms of materially and discursively contested interactions among social forces acting 
in and through the state and nature. From the next section, I examine how local nature could be 
transformed into state-nature. Three stages are involved as follows. 
 
2. Stage 1: The centralization and nationalization of water as the outcome 
of contestation among social forces 
“Because a country’s physical and spatial characters cannot be changed or revised easily,  
such plans should not be influenced by the change of political perspective.”  
(Ministry of Construction 1969: 1, italic added)    
 
Water resource policies are not only a technical issue; they are socially and politically constituted 
through contestations, negotiations and alliances among various social forces acting in and 
through the state. In analyzing these processes, existing studies on critical hydro-politics tend to 
view global actors as more influential than national and local actors. For example, most scholars 
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in critical hydro-politics studies have believed that, after the Second World War, the U.S.-led 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) program, which emphasized the construction of 
multipurpose dams under the guidance of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, was a global project 
with significant influences on the modernization processes in many countries including South 
Korea (Cullather 2002; Ekbladh 2002; Klingensmith 2007; Sneddon and Fox 2011; KWRC 
1994).
23
  
 
However, I emphasize that the outcome of global projects is not homogeneous in all countries 
and regions. In particular, the global factor alone cannot explain how the Korean water resource 
policy was implemented.
24
 Shortly after the Korean War, various water resource development 
policies were pursued by national bureaucrats and politicians for the reconstruction of the ruined 
national territory because industrial and urban development rely heavily on water for industry 
and living (National Land Planning Study Group 1970; KWRC 1994; cf. footnote 31 in this 
thesis). In this vein, after Park Jung-Hee had seized control of the country in a military coup in 
1961, he pushed forward various water resource development plans under the name of 
‘Modernization of the Fatherland’. 
 
                                                          
23
 This does not mean that recent studies of hydro-politics epistemologically presupposed the power that 
global actors had on national or local actors in a top-down way. They are also sensitive to each 
geographical particularity and its interaction with global actors (cf. Sneddon and Fox 2011; Barry 2006). 
However, additional empirically and theoretically studies are needed about the dynamics of the state in 
relation to hydro-politics.  
24
 In this sense, a multi-scalar approach plays a meaningful role in breaking the global-local dichotomies 
in which epistemologically global actors, such as the World Bank and the U.S., which employ advanced 
technologies and skillful engineers for developing modern waterscapes, are depicted as strong actors at 
the global scale, whereas local actors are passive and tied to vernacular (or uncertain, irrational and 
unscientific) knowledge (for similar discussions, see Mitchell 2002; Barry 2006 248-250). Surely, I do 
not deny the fact that the modern Korean waterscape was influenced by the technological and financial 
support of global actors in the 1960s and 1970s (KWRC 1994: 113). 
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In 1965, the Korean state pursued the Ten-Year Water Resource Development Plan, as 
mentioned in the introduction. But, this plan was neither an outcome of global influences nor an 
invention of national bureaucrats with plan-rationality. Instead, it was strongly conditioned by 
socio-political contestations among different actors within and without the state. For instance, 
before establishing the Ten-Year Plan, there were fierce conflicts between the Ministry of 
Construction (MOC), which insisted on the expansion of multipurpose dams to produce 
electricity, and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI), which prioritized thermal power 
generation plants over multipurpose dams. Both ministries’ positions and interests related to a 
long-term national plan for electrical resource development. First, the MOC aimed for an 
integrated system of water resource development. In principle, this system included both 
electricity production and water management, claiming that “the construction of hydroelectric 
power stations, led by MOC, is a national benefit in terms of effective water resource 
development” (Kim 1995a: 85, italic added). On the other hand, the MCI established an 
integrated system of electric resource development. The MCI’s logic emphasized production of 
effective electricity, managing both thermal power generation plants and hydroelectric power 
stations in terms of “national benefit” (Kim 1995a: 85). The ministries’ conflict lasted from 1962 
to 1963 at the Meeting of Cabinet Ministers in charge of Economic Affairs. In the end, the 
Cabinet sided with the MOC because they preferred its comprehensive approach to water 
resource management. The political interests behind their official positions are also important. 
Prior to the conflict between the ministries, the MOC assumed management authority of 
Chuncheon Dam and Seomjin River Dam from the MCI in 1961 at the behest of the Park regime, 
although the MCI stubbornly tried to protect its authority. In the process of this transfer, the MCI 
had to yield its manpower and some assets to the MOC (KWRC 1994; KEPC 2001). In other 
words, conflict went beyond plan-rationality for national economic development and related in 
part to the political interests of each ministry and organizational survival of the ministry.   
   
After the Cabinet’s decision favoring the MOC, antagonism between the MOC and the MCI 
persisted. Both sides attempted to engage with pressures from other actors both within and 
without the state. First, the MCI took advantage of global actors. In March 1965, a research 
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group comprised of electrical engineers from the U.S. under the guidance of the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) published the Thomas Report for United States Operations 
Mission-Korea (USOM/K). This report describes the long-term plan for electric resource 
development in South Korea, 1965-1984. The plan is divided into two stages: the early part 
(1965-1974) and the later part (1975-1984). Early part planned construction of a half dozen 
thermal power generation plants (total 766,000 KW) and one hydroelectric power station (80,000 
KW). The later part proposed nine thermal power generation plants (total 2,400,000 KW) and 
three hydroelectric power stations (total 326,000 KW) (Kim 1995b: 79). This plan raised strong 
opposition from the MOC because the report was oriented toward a thermal power generation 
plant-centered system and downsized the share of hydroelectric power stations. The MCI greeted 
this report positively and started to curb the dam policy of the MOC. However, the MOC 
finished this episode by taking actions such as publishing the Review of Thomas Report 
(Economic Planning Board 1965: 892-929). Second, the MOC also tried to engage other 
domestic political actors. As mentioned above, although the MCI strove to extend its realm in the 
national electric resource policy, it failed several times. The MCI attempted to prevent the 
establishment of the Specific Multipurpose Dam Act, a fundamental law of the Ten-Year Water 
Resource Development Plan initiated by the MOC. Faced with dissent from the MCI, the MOC 
strategically selected legislation by assembly members, instead of the government’s legislation. 
Based on the actions of National Assembly members, the Specific Multipurpose Dam Act 
eventually was passed in April 1966 (An 2004).    
 
This example demonstrate that the South Korean water resource policy is not a product of pure 
plan-rationality, as developmental state theorists have argued, but instead is the product of 
political conflict, contestation and negotiation between different ministries, with global (e.g.,  
Thomas Report) and national actors (e.g., National Assembly members), within and without the 
state, although each ministry claimed to act in support of the ‘national benefit,’ corresponding 
with the Park regime’s ‘Modernization of the Fatherland’. In sum, these contestations could have 
altered the outcome of water resource policy in the national economic plan. In other words, the 
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‘political perspective’ had a significant influence on the policy-making, contrary to the 
suggestion of the MOC quotation at the beginning of this section. 
 
However, several of the state’s actions toward centralization and nationalization did not 
automatically advance water resource policy due to the possibility of social conflict from below. 
For example, initially, the government did not seriously direct the creation of state-nature. After 
their homes were submerged by the construction of the Uiam Dam, approximately 1,000 local 
people in Gangwon Province in 1965 demonstrated several times in the capital of South Korea, 
Seoul, saying “we will crush the dam” (The Gangwon Ilbo 28 July, 16 December 1965). The 
local newspaper, The Gangwon Ilbo, also supported the demonstrations and suggested that from 
the perspective of “democracy”, the dam violated the people’s rights. The newspaper also 
criticized “the Miracle of the Han River”25, which was based on dam-centered water resource 
policy (The Gangwon Ilbo 29 July, 31 July, 5 December 1965).
26
 Eventually, the government 
promised compensation for submersed homes (The Gangwon Ilbo 18 December 1965). This 
episode shows ‘scalar mismatch’ (Hwang 2014: 86) between local and national needs, which 
could threaten a new regime’s legitimacy. Therefore, various discursive and material actions on 
nature are required to impress on the people the need for water resource policy.              
 
3. Stage 2: Framing water as nationalized economic goods  
Before the 1960s, Korean water policy was mainly focused on flood control. Thus, at that time, 
epistemologically, water was not considered economic goods but public property and free goods. 
The concept of water as economic goods has been produced by social forces with a mediating 
                                                          
25
 The term ‘Miracle of the Han River’ was used to describe the Korean rapid industrialization during the 
Park regime. Originally, this phrase comes from the ‘Miracle of the Rhine River’ 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miracle_on_the_Han_River).    
26
 Interestingly, major national daily newspapers did not report the demonstrations at the time, which 
proves that theses newspapers indirectly supported the state’s water policy. 
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role by the state. The term ‘water resource (수자원: 水資源)’ did not exist in Korean society 
before 1960.
27
 Officially, the establishment of the Bureau of Water Resources under the MOC in 
September 1961 marked the first appearance of the term ‘water resource’.28 Through this fact, we 
know that the concept of water as economic goods was produced by national bureaucrats of the 
MOC. However, this idea did not only originate with Korean bureaucrats. In 1965, there was 
increased attention to the episteme that regards water as economic goods on the global scale, 
which also had an influence on the mentality of the bureaucrats. Among them, Kim Yeo-Taek, 
who participated in the creation of the Ten-Year Water Resource Development Plan, described 
the influence of global factors in the formative process of the plan as follows:   
 
When the Ministry of Construction was actively engaged in preparing the Ten-Year Water 
Resource Development Plan, there was increased awareness of water as a resource in the global 
village. It is true that this awakening about water resource development was a tailwind that 
pushed the establishment of our country’s water resource development (Kim 1995b: 82, italic 
added).  
 
Kim noted three sources for his ‘awakening’ about water resources. The first and second sources 
were cover pages of Newsweek magazine (23 August 1965) and Time magazine (1 October 1965) 
indicating the importance of both water management and water development (Figure 6). The last 
item was a speech by U.S. President Lyndon Johnson emphasizing the development of water and 
the rationalization of water management at the International Conference on Water for Peace in 
May 1967.  
                                                          
27
 According to Kim Yeo-Taek (1995a: 83), one of the key figures making the Korean water policy during 
the 1960s, the Korean people lacked awareness of water as a resource before the establishment of the 
Bureau of Water Resources in 1961. 
28
 An Kyoung-Mo, an official of the MOC, is the man who came up with the idea for this title (Kim 
1995a: 83). He became the president of the Korea Water Resource Development Corporation in 1967. 
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Figure 6: Water-related cover pages of Newsweek and Time. 
Source: Newsweek 23 August 1965 and Time 1 October 1965 
 
However, this global-scaled semiotic process, including discourse, pictures and statement, did 
not affect the bureaucrats’ thinking one-sidedly. Rather, national bureaucrats intentionally 
utilized unintentional global factors to gain legitimacy with the people for establishing the water 
resource development plan (see also The Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 15 July 1971
29
). After 1968, 
the state started to collect statistics in the Water Resource Development Annual Report indicating 
that water began to be viewed as a ‘national resource’. This statistics report was a territorial 
                                                          
29
 Domestic newspaper also used Johnson’s speech to legitimize the Korean state’s water resource policy. 
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strategy to control nature at the national scale.
30
 In other words, contrary to the hypothesis of 
neoclassical economics, the term ‘water resource’ is not a purely economic concept in Korean 
society. Instead, it was developed as a nationalized economic good under the strong influence of 
the state. In this vein, there were moves to conceptualize water as nationalized economic goods 
in Korean society beyond the realm of the MOC’s jurisdiction.    
 
 
First, mainstream newspapers developed certain discursive frameworks in which the water was 
viewed as nationalized economic goods (e.g., publishing a series of features on titled “the 
economics of water” in The Maeil Kyungje Shinmun in July 1971). For instance, an article in The 
Maeil Kyungje Shinmun on 16 September, 1969, introduced the MOC’s plan for water resource 
policy, including multipurpose dams. As revealed in Figure 7, headline was “Water resource (水
                                                          
30
 In fact, the term ‘statistics’ means “the science of the state” (Elden 2007: 567). 
Figure 7: Making the water as nationalized economic goods. 
Source: The Maeil Kyungje Shinmun on 16 September 1969 
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資源 ) development (개발) that will enrich the national territory (國土 )”. The article also 
includes a bird’s eye view of a multipurpose dam and a national map of potential dam 
arrangement. The composition of the article reflects the justification for and necessity of the 
water resource plan, including multipurpose dams, as a representation of national development. 
The map in the news article depicts the emergence of a national waterscape, erasing each locality 
for the episteme on water as nationalized economic goods. Second, schools textbook published 
by the Ministry of Education also disseminated a public perception of water as nationalized 
economic goods. For example, one elementary textbook includes a virtual travel essay about 
Soyang Dam. The characters, who are elementary school students, go to Soyang Dam and learn 
the importance of water as nationalized economic goods and the necessity of building 
multipurpose dams (Ministry of Education 1974: 73-79). According to previous studies, this 
indirect experience can effectively shape students’ consciousness (Oh 2003b; Hwang 2005).        
 
Thus, a type of state-nature relationship was produced through these persistent efforts to frame 
water as nationalized economic goods. The socially produced second nature was actively utilized 
in efforts to justify the nationalization of personal properties in the dam construction areas until 
the advent of the ‘Four Major Rivers’ hydro-scale in earnest. However, it was still far from 
suitable to initiate a stable water resource policy. The controversy over revision of the River Act 
in 1968 is a typical example. The MOC attempted to revise the River Act to accept money from 
water user in accordance with the benefit principle, which caused controversies from other 
ministries and the major news media (Dong-A Ilbo 28 May 1968). The Ministry of Home Affairs 
and other ministries strongly opposed the revision because local governments could no longer 
collect water use-related taxes from water user at the local scale, making local finance vulnerable 
(The Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 28 May 1968). However, despite opposition, the amendment 
passed on 13 December, 1968 (The Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 13 December 1968). This episode 
indicates that the state’s attempt to frame water as nationalized economic goods was still 
incomplete and required continuing framing practices. Interestingly, there were different 
opinions at that time about water among the media. Despite acknowledging water as economic 
goods, some media expressed annoyance about the perception of water as nationalized goods 
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because they considered water an ownerless commodity such as oxygen (Dong-A Ilbo 28 May, 1 
June 1968). That is, the perception of water as a nationalized economic good had a crack in it. 
Therefore, the ‘Four Major Rivers’ hydro-scale was invented to complete the framing of water as 
a nationalized economic good and drive the changed national economic development plan.                           
 
4. Stage 3: Constructing the ‘Four Major Rivers’ hydro-scale as a national 
scale  
“I will raise the curtain of the age of heavy and chemical industry and  
 reproduce the miracle of the Han River at the Four Major Rivers.”  
(President Park Jung-Hee’s inaugural address, 1 July 1971)  
 
By the early 1970s, to overcome the economic crisis stemming from the limits of import 
substitution industrialization in the 1960s, the Park regime had changed its accumulation strategy 
from import substitution industrialization, which focused on developing light industries, to 
export-oriented industrialization, emphasizing heavy and chemical industrialization (Tadashi 
2008). To push for heavy and chemical industrialization without conflict, it was necessary to 
guarantee the provision of abundant industrial water and electricity to industrial complexes 
(Figure 8).
31
 Although there had been several attempts to frame water as nationalized economic 
goods before 1970s, the change of the state’s accumulation strategy in the 1970s required more 
assertive measures to support the accumulation strategy. The production of the ‘Four Major 
Rivers’ hydro-scale is the representative example.       
 
                                                          
31 The first draft of the First National Physical Development Plan includes the bureaucrats’ forecast that 
“in the future … due to the rapid expansion of heavy and chemical industrialization … industrial water 
may be used in large quantities. … The shortage of industrial water may give a negative influence on our 
country’s industrial development” (National Land Planning Study Group 1970: 82). 
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Figure 8 Amount of industrial water use in South Korea, 1965-1979.  
Source: WAMIS, http://www.wamis.go.kr 
 
The term ‘Four Major Rivers’ did not exist in Korean society until the late 1960s. President Park 
Jung-Hee mentioned the ‘Four Major Rivers’ for the first time in a news conference about the 
Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1967-71) in 1967 (Dong-A Ilbo 18 April 1967). 
Two weeks later, President Park announced the Comprehensive Plan for Construction of 
National Territory, a prototype of the National Physical Development Plan, and regarded the 
Plan as a “basic design for the Modernization of the Fatherland” (The Kyunghyang Shinmun 2 
May 1967). Through the map (Figure 9) depicting the plan for the four major river basins (Han 
River, Nakdong River, Geum River and Yeongsan River) and the memorial stamp  (Figure 10)
32
, 
                                                          
32
 This stamp, made by the Korean Postal Service, indicates the relationship between the ‘Four Major 
Rivers Basin Development (4 대강유역개발)’ and ‘the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan 
(제 2차 경제개발 5개년계획)’. 
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we ascertain that the national economic development plan was intimately related to the ‘Four 
Major Rivers’ hydro-scale.     
 
Figure 9: Map of the Comprehensive Plan for Construction of National Territory.  
Source: The Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 20 July 1968, English words and dotted ovals added 
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Figure 10: The Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan memorial stamp.  
Source: Korean Postal Service
33
  
 
However, based on only several statements of President, citied at the beginning of this section, 
the plans for the project and geographical depictions (such as the map and stamp), the ‘Four 
Major Rivers’ hydro-scale could not have the durability to sustain its scale. The state needed 
persistent effort or performance of both materiality and discursivity of scale to maintain the 
scalar formation of the ‘Four Major Rivers’.     
  
From the late 1960s, the Korean state began to conduct pre-investment surveys of the four major 
rivers funded by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and Japan (KWRDC 1970). Although it is 
difficult to deny the role of global actors, who transplanted their technology, scientific 
knowledge and money into the four major rivers, in modernizing the Korean waterscape (KWRC 
1994), it was not a top-down process. In fact, in addition to receiving financial and technical 
support, the Korean state used global actors as the geographical ideal to justify the pre-
investment surveys. For example, the Minster of the Economic Planning Board Kim Hak-Yeol 
                                                          
33 http://stamp.epost.go.kr 
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said “the pre-investment surveys have been conducted by cooperating with authoritative 
international organization such as UNDP, International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and USAID for the development of the 
four major rivers” (The Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 21 October 1970, italics added). The front page 
headline of the same article that introduced Kim Hak-Yeol’s statement also included the terms ‘
世銀 (IBRD)’, ‘USAID’ and ‘ADB’, which reveals the episteme that made the relationship 
between the legitimacy of four major rivers development and global actors. In other words, the 
Korean state actively utilized foreign assistance to produce the ‘Four Major Rivers’ materially 
and discursively. Furthermore, the Korean state’s scalar politics entailed the dialectic 
relationship between materiality and discursivity of scale to sustain the ‘Four Major Rivers’ as a 
strategic hydro-scale for the national economic development.       
 
Based on pre-investment surveys of the four major rivers, the Committee for the Four Major 
Rivers Development was founded under the guidance of President Park Jung-Hee, and then the 
Four Major Rivers Development Plan (1971-81) was initiated (The Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 7 
August 1970). In accordance with the state’s heavy chemical industrialization plan, the Korea 
Water Resource Development Corporation (KWRDC) was renamed the Industrial Complex 
Development Corporation (ICDC) in 1974, and the renamed corporation was asked to supervise 
both water management and industrial estate development. It became the major institution that 
advanced the Four Major Rivers Development Plan.  
 
The production of the ‘Four Major Rivers’ hydro-scale, such as the creation of reservoirs by 
building multipurpose dams, entails vast natural, economic and social changes, which 
marginalized local interests near the sites of dam construction, such as the occurrence of 
submerged residences and the nationalization of private properties. Faced with potential social 
conflict from the local level, such as the Uiam Dam episode in 1965, the state needed more 
specific territorial strategies for transforming local nature into state-nature, such as the ‘Four 
Major Rivers’ hydro-scale, to secure justification of the plan from the national population and 
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exclude local people.
34
 For example, An Kyung-Mo, former president of KWRDC, had directly 
spread the episteme coupling ‘Four Major Rivers’ with ‘national economic development’ to the 
public through the media in interviews and opinion columns (The Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 18 
December 1970, 1 April 1975; An 1971). KWRDC also opened an industrial complex exhibition 
in Seoul and other major cities to “remind the people of the present condition of main industrial 
complexes and multipurpose dams” (The Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 28 March 1975) through the 
participation of the people during the years 1974-1975. One video clip, which was made in 1974 
and was provided by the National Archive of Korea, reveals that the people who participated in 
the exhibition could learn the generation of hydroelectric power works and see miniature dams 
and industrial complexes (National Archive of Korea 2012). The people’s participatory practice 
of exhibition was significant to connect the ‘Four Major Rivers’ hydro-scale with national 
economic development and sustain this scalar formation.  
    
In sum, the ‘Four Major Rivers’ was produced by the state’s scalar politics under the condition 
of ‘Modernization of the Fatherland’ and export-oriented industrialization. This illustrates that 
DST scholars, who do not mediate extensively on complex interactions between the state and 
nature, should focus on the natural world to better grasp mechanisms of economic growth in East 
Asia.     
 
5. Conclusion 
Empirically, this chapter has demonstrated that the Park Jung-Hee regime drove a water resource 
policy designed to build multipurpose dams and hierarchical water governance for fast and stable 
national economic development in the name of the ‘Modernization of the Fatherland’, which was 
conditioned by political contestations between the MOC and the MCI. For this policy, state 
                                                          
34 According to two interviewees, even people whose houses were submerged sympathized with building 
multipurpose dam because “this construction is for my country”, which indicates the success of the state’s 
nationalization strategy with the local people. 
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apparatuses (e.g., the KWRDC) and institutions, such as the Specific Multipurpose Dam Act, 
were established by the MOC. The MOC, along with the media, portrayed water as a 
nationalized economic good and constructed the ‘Four Major Rivers’ hydro-scale as a national 
scale. In the transformation of local nature into state-nature, it is significant that the production 
of state-nature blocked potential local and national conflicts while also strengthening the political 
legitimacy of the state’s water policy that connects constructed state-nature with national 
economic development.  
 
Influenced by the state-nature literature, I theoretically ascertained that DST scholars should 
consider the state-nature relationship in explaining the process of national economic 
development. DST scholars could consider this relationship by showing that the transformation 
of nature into a resource is more complex than the DST’s simplistic view suggests. In addition, 
from the multi-scalar perspective, I emphasized that certain state-nature relationships must be 
viewed as the product of political contestations among various social forces at multiple scales 
acting in and through the state to avoid territorial traps (i.e. regarding the role of the state or the 
national scale per se as only one imperative for producing a state-nature).  
 
In closing, I want to remind readers that this chapter helps us rethink the present developmental 
state vis-à-vis nature. President Park Jung-Hee was assassinated on 26 October 1979. However, 
the historical legacy of water resource policy of the Park regime still survives in the form of the 
Four Major Rivers Project established by the Lee Myung-Bak government (2008-2012) (cf. 
Chapter 7). Specters of the Park regime (e.g., the ‘Four Major Rivers’ hydro-scale, the existence 
of KWRDC, multipurpose dams and hierarchical water governance) have haunted Korea through 
the Four Rivers Project. The word ‘specters’ does not refer to a literal illusion. Rather, this 
specter is composed of the materiality and discursivity of the state-nature relationship of the 
Korean state, which reinforces the latter regime’s waterscape.   
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V. THE WATER RESOURCE POLICY OF THE CHUN DOO-HWAN REGIME, 
1980-1987 
 
1. Introduction   
In explaining the water resource policy in South Korea in the 1980s, the Chun Doo-Hwan 
regime’s vulnerable legitimacy, which stemmed from not only Chun’s military coup and the 
massacre of civilians
35
 but also structural constraints, such as uneven development across the 
region and repressive regulation of labor that resulted from the economic growth of the Korean 
developmental state in the 1960s and the 1970s, is key because the Chun regime actively used 
water resource policy as a solution, such as the “Ten Major Rivers” hydro-scale and the Peace 
Dam, to gain legitimacy from the people.
36
 
 
After President Park Jung-Hee was assassinated on 26 October 1979, South Korean civil society 
expected that a “Seoul Spring”37 would be soon coming (Sonn 2006: 350-351). After his death, 
there were active democratic movements that strongly demanded abolishing the Yushin 
                                                          
35
 As Poulantzas noted, the state is distinct because of its ‘monopoly of legitimate physical violence’ 
(Poulantzas 1978: 80; see also Weber 1946). In other words, without legitimacy using military power to 
the people directly mutilates the legitimacy of the state. 
36
 There are no attempts at linking water resource policy to the Chun regime’s hegemonic practices, which 
is at the heart of the argument of this section. Interestingly but exceptionally, when the Lee Myung-Bak 
regime (2008-2013) drove the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project to substantially re-engineer the 
country’s natural landscape and hydrological system, a government-run blog for promoting the project 
explained that ‘after the unexpected resignation of President Park Jung-Hee, the Chun Doo-Hwan regime, 
which had seized control of the country by a military coup led by a new military power, suffered from 
unconstitutionality and legitimacy disputes from its inception. The Chun regime had to find stronger ways 
to sustain the regime than did the Park regime to address this situation. Then, the regime promoted strong 
policy for the purpose of growth and social stability. The Chun regime’s flood control project according 
to the Basic Plan for the Long-Term Comprehensive Water Resources Development was one of them’ 
(Naver Blog 2010). Here, I aim to specifically explore the link between the water policy and the ‘stronger 
ways to sustaining the regime’. 
37
 The term ‘Seoul Spring’ is derived from the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968. 
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Constitution, which had neutralized the existing constitution by military power and allowed the 
president to freely use emergency measures between 1972 and 1979; these movements were led 
by students and civic groups during the period between October 1979 and May 1980. 
Unexpectedly, however, Chun Doo-Hwan, who was a commander of the Defense Security 
Command, seized control of the country in a military coup on 12 December 1979. Immediately 
following the coup, in Gwangju city, which is located in the southwest corner of Korea, Gwangju 
citizens who were labeled Bbalgengi (a red person who supports communism) by the regime, 
and who resisted the political intervention of Chun’s military, were the victims of extreme 
bloodshed under the guidance of General Chun on 18 May 1980 (Lee et al. 2014). The Korean 
Special Forces engaged in unprecedented state violence that left many Gwangju citizens dead or 
missing. As a result, at least 2,000 people perished in Gwangju (Suh 1982; Shin and Hwang 
2003; Katsiaficas and Na 2013). Eventually, despite the fact that the Chun regime was built on 
citizens’ blood, the possibility of a “Seoul Spring” ended after General Chun became the 
president of the fifth republic on August 1980.  
 
Meanwhile, the existing research on the Korean water resource policy in the 1980s may 
downplay the necessity of seeing the 1980s in a specific spatial-temporal context. These studies 
regard the 1980s simply as a “transition period” between the 1960s and 70s, which represents the 
foundation of state-led water resource policy, and the 1990s, when not only the central 
government but also diverse actors including civil society and local governments had significant 
impacts on the water policy in the context of democratization and globalization, in vivid contrast 
to the 1960s-70s (S.-H. Lee 2005; M.-H. Lee 2005). In particular, it is a serious problem that no 
existing literature has explored how the path-dependency of the previous regime was connected 
with the later one. In relation to this problem, existing perspectives on the Chun regime in 
Korean social science tend to view the Chun regime as “an imitator of the Yushin regime” (Jung 
2007: 92), which may establish an episteme that there is no difference between the regimes in 
terms of their same ‘authoritarian’ natures. At a glance, the 1980s remained a missing link 
between the 1970s and the 1990s. This chapter aims to supplement this missing link. 
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2. Research context: The Chun Doo-Hwan regime’s vulnerable legitimacy 
Before analyzing the water policy in earnest, I briefly discuss the character of the Chun regime to 
understand why the Chun regime actively attempted the production of new state-natures. 
Although there is a controversy regarding the legitimacy of Park Jung-Hee’s coup in Korean 
social science from the right wing to the left (for a review, see Cho 2005), recently, there is an 
increasingly shared perspective that the Park regime reconstructed the ruined territory after the 
Korean War and achieved significant economic development (e.g., Cho 2007). In the case of 
Chun’s coup, however, Chun had less justification than did President Park because under the 
Park regime, South Korea accomplished significant economic growth, and civil society was 
impatient for democratization as the next stage of economic growth at that time (Suh 1981; Sonn 
2006). 
 
However, I do not intend to imply that the Chun regime’s weak legitimacy stems completely 
from the Chun regime. Rather, structural constraints that existed during the former regime should 
be considered to fully grasp the causes of this weak legitimacy. Although the Park regime rebuilt 
the destroyed territory, this success was made possible by strong restrictions on labor and civil 
rights and uneven regional development between the southwestern, including Gwangju (광주), 
North Jeolla and South Jeolla, and southeastern, including Pusan (부산), Daegu (대구), North 
Kyongsang (birthplace of President Park), regions, as well as South Kyongsang, in accordance 
with the spatial selectivity of the state (cf. Figure 1). In other words, the Park regime selected the 
southeastern region as a location for state-led industrialization to receive political support from 
this region (Cho 2000; Park 2008). In the beginning, the Chun regime did not attempt to resolve 
these structural constraints. Rather, as illustrated by the Gwangju Massacre (also known as the 
Gwangju Uprising), another southeasterner-led military regime run by General Chun, a “son of 
Daegu”, worsened the political tension between both regions regarding the presidency. In this 
sense, the Chun regime’s accession to power, accompanied by the numerous casualties and 
structural constraints, was fatally vulnerable, which suggests the necessity of supplementing 
legitimacy during Chun’s tenure.        
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To acquire this legitimacy, welfare is an important hegemonic term and technique. President 
Chun mentioned the ‘democratic welfare state’ for the first time in a news conference to 
announce this ruling principle on 12 August 1980 (Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 12 August 1980). 
Subsequently, the Chun regime promoted this ruling principle (the “democratic welfare state”) 
and its national economic plan (“the Five-Year Economic and Social38 Development Plan”) to 
receive political legitimacy from the people. To acquire this legitimacy, the regime criticized the 
previous government’s development strategy, which had resulted in uneven regional 
development, and it suggested more balanced regional development actions such as the Growth 
Control and Management Law for the Capital Region (1982) and the establishment of rural 
industrial parks (1983) (Park 2008: 52-53). For instance, in the meeting with the MOC, President 
Chun said ‘economic feasibility is important in the comprehensive plan for land development 
such as road development and water resource development. However, the necessity of balanced 
development between regions should be considered in establishing the plan from now on 
(Kyunghyang Daily 22 September 1980). It can be explained in the aspect of the “politics of 
distribution” (Park 2013a). As shown below, the Chun regime’s logic of the politics of 
distribution was reflected well in its water resource policy.  
 
3. Contested water policy among social forces acting in and through the 
state  
In this section, I ascertain how the path-dependency of the Park regime was reflected in the water 
resource policy of the Chun regime. However, this path-dependency did not induce the same 
responses by social forces. Under the contingent politico-economic and ecological changes, there 
were contestations around the water policy among social forces that led to unexpected, path-
breaking momentum.  
                                                          
38 The Chun regime added the term ‘social’ to the plan to emphasize welfare and distribution compared 
with the former regime’s Five-Year Economic Development Plan, which resulted in uneven regional 
development. 
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According to the Chapter 4, the large-scale multipurpose dam orientation of the ICDC
39
, a 
national water resource policy agency, and the MOC-led hierarchical water governance were the 
key bases of the Park regime’s water policy. Emblematically, An Kyung-Mo, who was the 
President of ICDC under the Park regime, was reappointed under the new regime. In the 
Daechung Dam completion ceremony on 2 December 1980, President Chun highlighted the 
importance of multipurpose dams as below:  
  
In light of our economic development process toward becoming a highly industrialized state, it is 
expected that there is increasing importance in building multipurpose dams and developing 
natural resources in the future…By developing and effectively using water resources…we 
should realize the building of the democratic welfare state we hope for in the 1980s…I believe 
that because our country has the plentiful resource of 140 billion tons of water, if we develop this 
actively, we will promote our sustainable economic development without a hitch (Donga Ilbo 2 
December 1980, italics added).          
 
According to Chun’s speech, there is a close relationship between multipurpose dams and the 
‘democratic welfare state’ for a state’s sustainable economic growth. To support its policy 
orientation, the Chun regime followed a strategy similar to that of the Park regime, which 
discursively frame water as a vital resource and emphasizes the importance of building 
multipurpose dams. This is shown by a newspaper advertisement announcing the completion of 
Daechung Dam, a key part of the Four Major Rivers Development Plan under the Park regime 
(Figure 11). In this advertisement, the main title is “The completion of Daechung Dam that will 
                                                          
39
 The Korea Water Resource Development Corporation (KWRDC) was renamed the ICDC in 1974, and 
the renamed corporation was asked to supervise both water management and industrial estate 
development in accordance with the change in the accumulation strategy from import-substitution to 
export-oriented industrialization (cf. Chapter 4). 
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be the cradle of building the Welfare State (福祉國家 건설의 요람이 될 大淸多目的댐 竣工)”, 
and it shows a panorama of the dam and the names of the actors who built the dam (ICDC (産業
基地開發公社), Hyundai Engineering and Construction Corporation (現代建設株式會社) and 
the MOC (建設部)). The ad shows that multipurpose dams are significant in driving the national 
economic plan under the name of “Welfare State”.  
 
 
Figure 11: A newspaper advertisement announcing the completion of the Daechung Dam.  
Source: Donga Ilbo 2 December 1980 
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Figure 12: Memorial stamp celebrating 10 years of the Soyang Dam.  
Source: Korean Postal Service 
 
The memorial stamp plays a similar role (Figure 12). According to the Korean Postal Service, it 
published three million copies of “the special stamp for all people to recognize the importance of 
water resource development in celebration of 10 years of Soyang Dam, the nation’s largest 
multipurpose dam” (Korean Postal Service webpage). Taking a look at the stamp, we find that 
there are water drops and industries that need water within water drops, which iconographically 
shows the intimate relationship between water and national industry. Also, the name of the stamp 
is “Water Resource Special Stamp”, without mentioning “Soyang”. In other words, the Soyang 
Dam in itself represents the whole Korean water policy, and the Chun regime accepted the 
former policy by celebrating the former regime’s representative built environment. 
 
Thus, the MOC presented three multipurpose dams to be included in the Fifth Five-Year 
Economic and Social Development Plan (1982-1986) in March 1981. Subsequently, the Second 
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Comprehensive National Land Development Plan (1982-1991) contained plans for building ten 
multipurpose dams in the same year (Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 4 March 1981). Based on this fact, 
it could be explained that the path-dependency of the previous regime had a significant influence 
on the Chun regime’s water policy. However, the path-dependency of Park’s regime did not 
completely define the characteristics of water policy under Chun’s.         
 
The economic conditions in Korea from 1979 to 1981 were poor owing to political instability 
after the death of Park Jung-Hee, overinvestment in heavy and chemical industry and the Second 
Oil Shock (Suh 1982; Sonn 2006: 356-358). Under these conditions, the Economic Planning 
Board (EPB) selected to pursue a fiscal austerity program. The EPB, which was established in 
1967, had played the role of a control tower in driving Korean economic development by 
establishing, for example, the Five-Year Economic Development Plan (Haggard and Moon 
1990). In this vein, the EPB attempted an economic feasibility analysis of ongoing government-
led projects in 1980. As a result, multipurpose dams such as Imgye Dam were suspended (Maeil 
Kyungje Shinmun 17 July 1980). In the process of developing the water resource policy, the 
MOC as an initiator of water policy for nation building gained political power among 
government ministries under the Park regime (Chapter 4). Thus, the MOC preferred to sustain 
the path-dependency of the previous regime. In a newspaper article, the MOC expressed 
financial dissatisfaction in a roundabout way (Donga Ilbo 2 October 1982). Decisively, the EPB 
announced that it would be difficult to include in the budget the three planned dams, Imgye, 
Imha and Myungchun Dams, and only ongoing construction projects could be included (Maeil 
Kyungje Shinmun 24 April 1983). This inevitably pitted the EPB and the MOC against each 
other. Immediately following this announcement by the EPB, the MOC responded that the 
construction business was going to grow 15% every year, and seven multipurpose dams would 
be built earlier than scheduled (Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 28 April 1983). The tension between the 
EPB and the MOC shows that there were different perspectives on and interests regarding the 
water policy.                
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However, dam construction is not confined to state actions for the organizational survival of a 
ministry and that ministry’s interests because materially, dam construction per se requires a large 
amount of money and the people in the capital were also deeply involved in these projects.
40
 In 
other words, cancelling dam construction would harm the capital’s interests. In particular, as the 
Middle East Boom in the late 1970s was winding down, the large Korean conglomerate chaebol 
that owned overseas construction company became interested in the domestic market (Maeil 
Kyungje Shinmun 27 July 1983). Dam construction was important for chaebol’s interest. 
Therefore, after the MOC’s announcement on the dam plan, there was fierce competition for five 
of the dams, including Imgye, Imha and Myungchun Dams, among ten domestic construction 
companies, including Hyundai, Daewoo and Daerim (Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 2 June 1983). In 
addition, the government allowed the construction companies to bring their unused overseas 
heavy equipment to Korea and gave them tax benefits on the condition that the permitted 
equipment should be used only for building dams. This condition was imposed because the 
construction companies strongly demanded tax exemptions from the government (Maeil Kyungje 
Shinmun 19 July 1983). President Chun recognized that the growth of the construction sector 
was closely related to the national economy, especially after the Second Oil Shock, and he even 
held a reception for chaebol who owned an overseas construction company (Presidential 
Archives 1980). In this situation, it would have been difficult for the EPB to vehemently react 
against the MOC’s actions. It is possible that the EPB had already determined that they should 
defer to the MOC. For example, before the conflict between the EPB and the MOC in April, the 
EPB had declared their plan for fiscal austerity in March, but although the EPB had strongly 
emphasized “ultra-austerity” and “sound finance”, it later said that a highly motivated investment 
plan would be implemented in pursuit of “balanced development of national economy” and 
“social welfare”. Project examples included multipurpose dams as well as paving roads and 
building new housing (Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 30 March 1983). It could be explained that the 
EPB compromised with Chun’s policy orientation toward the politics of distribution. Eventually, 
                                                          
40
 According to one news article, the government financed half of the dam building with long-term low 
interest and management rights to the dams for the construction company following their construction. 
Furthermore, companies believed that dam construction was a profitable business because they would be 
able to secure a great deal of work in the long term (Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 2 June 1983). 
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in 1984, it was decided to construct five dams at the Ministerial Economic Meeting (Maeil 
Kyungje Shinmun 14 July 1983).  
 
From a SRA perspective, this case shows that water policy of the Chun regime was the outcome 
of political contestations among diverse social forces such as different state bureaucrats (EPD, 
MOC) and the capital (chaebol), which acted in and through the state. In addition, the SRA can 
be applied not only to state-society relationship but also to the state-society-nature relationships 
as follows.             
               
4. Contested water policy among social forces acting in and through the 
state and nature 
The Chun regime established the Basic Plan for Long-Term Comprehensive Water Resources 
Development (1981-2001) in 1980 as an extension of the Park regime’s Ten-Year Water 
Resources Development Plan (1966-1975). At a glance, based on the fact that both regimes 
established a long-term water resource plan, one may judge that the later plan had simply 
followed the previous one. However, we should look at the plans in detail. First, we observe the 
Ten-Year Plan (1966-1975). According to the plan, “water resource development is a 
prerequisite for the expansion of food production and industry enhancement” (MOC 1966: 1). 
Although the plan briefly addressed the need for flood control (MOC 1966: 12), the water policy 
leaned toward water utilization for economic aims. In contrast, the Basic Plan (1981-2001) 
emphasized both economic and non-economic purposes. On the first page of the plan, Minister 
of Construction Kim Ju-Nam devoted a major part of his preface to flood damage as a ‘social 
problem’ after he briefly mentioned the role of water resource development in economic growth. 
Then, he concludes that overcoming flood damage is closely connected with “building a 
democratic welfare society” (MOC 1980: ⅲ). The plan specifically explains the causes of flood 
damage, such as geomorphological features (e.g., approximately 70% of the area of South Korea 
consists of mountainous regions without extensive plains) (MOC 1980: 11). In addition, the plan 
describes that the “urbanization” in the 1960s and 70s “necessarily” downgraded the function of 
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flood control for urban rivers (MOC 1980: 13), which indicates that the state (and society) and 
nature influenced each other in the form of intensified flood damage in the urban regions (for a 
similar perspective, see Gandy 2008).  
 
As a result, the Basic Plan’s (1981-2001) main aims were 1) to build eight multipurpose dams, 
two water supply dams and two river estuary barrages to increase the water supply from 3,314 
million cubic meters to 12,753 million cubic meters by 2001, 2) to increase the river 
improvement rate
41
 from 30 % to 70 % by 2001, and 3) to increase hydro energy output from 
1,202 billion kw to 4,102 billion kw (MOC 1980: 13). The first and third aims were related to the 
multipurpose-dam-based national economic growth orientation, i.e., the path-dependency of the 
previous regime. However, the second aim shows the importance of flood control as a path-
breaking aspect in the face of contingent flood damage and people’s potential complaints about 
it.  
 
As shown in the Basic Plan’s (1981-2001) three aims, large-scale multipurpose dams (the first 
and third aims) and flood control policy (the second aim) coexisted each other. In other words, 
the Chun regime did not recognize that building large-scale dams per se could be a negative 
influence on flood control at that time. However, there was a sudden change in the regime’s 
episteme beginning in the mid-1980s. Namely, plans for the eight multipurpose dams in the 
Basic Plan (1981-2001) were canceled in 1985 (Donga Ilbo 24 September 1985). According to 
the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, a government-affiliated organization for 
national land planning:   
 
                                                          
41
 For instance, building an embankment along a river and dredging are included in river improvement 
projects. 
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While acknowledging that extant water resource development work, which was almost entirely 
large-scale projects to build multipurpose dams in the main streams of main rivers, significantly 
contributed to flood control and water utilization, several problems with building large-scale 
dams, including vast submerged districts, migration measures for people whose houses were 
submerged and great investment costs, arose, and the dams did not directly address water 
shortages and flood regulation capacity in the upper and middle stream areas and tributaries of 
the rivers. To solve these problems, water resource development moved toward building 
medium-scale multipurpose dams in small and mid-sized basins (KRIHS 1996: 891, italics 
added).    
        
The quotation summarizes two factors that changed the multipurpose-dam-based water policy. 
First, there was the political and economic burden of building large-scale dams. The second 
factor was the focus on primary river flow management and the resulting improper maintenance 
of small and mid-sized basins. First, I focus on the first factor.  
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Table 2: Expenditures for multipurpose dams. 
 
                    Unit: One hundred million won   
  Total cost 
Cost of 
construction 
Compensation 
expenditure 
Ratio of 
compensation 
expenditure 
in total cost 
(%) 
Maintenance 
cost  
Soyang 
Dam 
(1973) 321 211 78 24.0 32 
Andong 
Dam 
(1977) 404 190 138 34.0 75 
Daechung 
Dam 
(1981) 1557 657 781 50.0 120 
Chungju 
Dam 
(1986) 5551 2727 2744 49.0 81 
Source: KWRA and KWRC (1997: 134), revised by the author 
 
As shown in Table 2, the ratio of compensation expenditures to the total cost of dam construction 
increased exponentially. However, this was not solely an economic problem but also a political 
issue. Although the occurrence of submerged homes and districts did not lead to any mass 
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demonstrations or resistance that could have threatened the regime, dissenting voices, i.e. 
damages claims against building multipurpose dams, begin to appear at the local level.
42
 In 
addition, Donga Ilbo, an influential daily newspaper, published a special article between 11 and 
19 November 1981, titled ‘Dam, mixed light and shade: Task of modernization and nature 
protection’, that discussed the local damage caused by multipurpose dams. Additionally, a novel 
titled “Song of Water”, about the lives of people whose houses were submerged, was published 
in a literary magazine (Lee 1981). However, other related actions were not reduced to people 
whose houses were submerged or to submerging nature. There were also voices of place-
dependent actors such as local politicians and governments. These actors emphasized the 
negative connection between building multipurpose dams and local economies. For instance, the 
governor of North Chungcheong Province asked the Prime Minister, who was visiting Chungju 
Dam, to designate the area around the dam a national park in 1980 (Donga Ilbo 11 January 
1980). In the Andong area, local actors recognized that the decrease in the workforce after the 
construction of the Andong Dam had caused the crisis in the local economy and argued the  need 
for the “industrialization of Andong” (Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 19 April 1985).  
 
The second factor is that the existing water policy could not properly address floods and 
droughts. President Chun ordered that multipurpose dams be built in the main rivers to prevent 
water damage after the flood in the summer of 1981 (Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 13 July 1981). 
Following the 1981 flood, five multipurpose dams had to stop generating electricity and 
releasing water because of a drought in the spring and summer of 1982 (Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 
21 April, 7 August 1982). In addition to the 1981 and 1982 events, there were frequent floods 
and droughts in the small and mid-sized basins during the 1980s, which increased the need for 
mid-sized single-purpose dams (Kyunghyang Daily 29 July 1987). As a result, the twenty-sixth 
Council of Comprehensive Plans for Construction in the National Territory, which was presided 
over by the Prime Minister, decided to change the policy direction from large-scale multipurpose 
                                                          
42 For example, 39 farmers, who lived in the upper stream of Uiam Dam in Gwangwon Province sued the 
Korean Electronic Power Corporation for flood damage after the construction of the dam (Kyunghyang 
Daily 23 September 1982). 
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dams to mid-sized single-purpose dams on 8 December 1986 (Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 8 
December 1986). President Chun and the Prime Minister took the lead in the situation, which 
should fall under the authority of the MOC, was unprecedented and shows that the regime was 
very sensitive to possible social reactions, i.e. national expansion of Uiam Dam cases (cf. 
footnote 45).      
 
In summary, we find empirically that, in the third and fourth sections, 1) the path-dependency 
(e.g., the large multipurpose dam orientation) of the previous regime had an impact on the 
subsequent one; 2) however, at the same time, there was path-breaking momentum in the water 
policy owing to a number of factors such as the changed economic situation (EPB’s fiscal 
austerity orientation) as well as natural disasters and the resulting local society and state 
responses. Theoretically, I emphasize that perspectives on the Korean state in the 1980s (such as 
the DST) tend to downplay the dynamics between the state, society and nature under 
authoritarian regimes. Additionally, I identified that state-nature relationships are constructed by 
not only humans but also by nature in the form of natural disasters that are partly caused by 
human, which reflects that the relationship between the state and nature is dialectic, not one-
sided. However, this section could not fully explain the Chun regime’s water policy and its 
politics. As emphasized above, we should focus more attention on the ontological deficiency of 
the Chun regime, i.e., its insufficient political legitimacy. Because of this, the Chun regime 
attempted to actively construct a new state-nature to sustain Chun’s rule.                    
  
5. Making a new state-nature 1: Construction of the ‘Ten Major Rivers’ 
hydro-scale  
As previously confirmed, although the path-dependency of the previous regime in water policy 
was maintained, especially at the beginning of the Chun regime, there were also differences 
stemming from the vulnerability of its legitimacy following the Gwangju Massacre and structural 
constraints for which the previous regime was responsible. In this vein, in February 1986 after 
the Chun regime lost the 1985 general election, the opposition New Democratic Party promoted 
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the ‘Ten Million People’s Signature Campaign for a Constitutional Amendment’, which 
threatened the Chun regime (Jung 2007; C.-U. Lee 2013).
43
 This situation drove the state’s 
spatial strategy in earnest.  
 
In the context of the “democratic welfare state”, the Chun regime attempted to connect spatial 
policy with the logic of balanced regional development. President Chun often visited Jeolla 
Province, where the Gwangju Massacre occurred, and mentioned “balanced development” at the 
sites of regional development projects such as the expansion of the Honam railway line and 
expressway (Kyunghyang Daily 16 November 1985; Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 11 September 
1986), in order to obtain legitimacy from the region’s residents. This logic of the politics of 
distribution can also be applied to the water resource policy.  
 
The Chun regime constructed new hydro-scale projects that were similar to “Four Major Rivers” 
of the Park regime. However, both regimes’ main aim is different. The “Four Major Rivers” 
hydro-scale as a state-nature was constructed by the Park regime to promote the stable supply of 
water (Chapter 4). The Chun regime, on the other hand, has emphasized the aspect of distribution 
more. The Second Comprehensive National Land Development Revision Plan (1987-1991), 
which was announced on December 1986, presented the “Ten Major Rivers” hydro-scale project, 
which added another six rivers (Seomjin River (섬진강), Mankyung River (만경강), Hyungsan 
River (형산강), Dongjin River (동진강), Ansung Cheon (안성천) and Sapgyo Cheon (삽교천) 
as well as four major extant rivers (Han River (한강), Nakdong River (낙동강), Geum River 
(금강) and Yeongsan River (영산강)) (see Figure 13). Corresponding with the “democratic 
                                                          
43
 The reason a constitutional amendment was an essential agenda item for civil society was that in a 
single seven-year presidency, the Chun regime sought the long-term seizure of power (Jung 2007: 93). 
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welfare state”, the “Ten Major Rivers” hydro-scale was on a more balanced national scale that 
extended from the less balanced “Four Major Rivers” led by the Park regime (KRIHS 1986: 41).  
 
The episteme of the “Ten Major Rivers” hydro-scale was disseminated discursively through the 
mass media. For example, one news article that was established in Maeil Kyungje Shinmun on 8 
December 1986 and that introduced modifications of the Second Comprehensive National Land 
Development Revision Plan was titled ‘Water Resource Development Is Expanded to Ten 
Rivers’ to emphasize the water resource aspect of the plan; its subtitle was ‘Priority over inter-
Regional Balanced Development’. In an explanation of the announcement of the project, the 
article indicated that the basin zones were being expanded in order ‘to relieve the unequal 
distribution of water resources’ (italics added).  
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Figure 13: Map of the Second Comprehensive National Land Development Revision Plan. 
Source: Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 8 December 1986 
 
Additionally, the map that was published in the same article iconographically shows how the 
“Ten Major Rivers” project was closely related to the economic development plan. Readers of 
the news article expected that the surrounding areas around the six new rivers would be 
developed in the same way as the other four major rivers by visualizing the six rivers on a 
national scale. That is, the construction of the “Ten Major Rivers” hydro-scale as a new state-
nature was based on the politics of distribution.  
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6. Making a new state-nature 2: Construction of the Peace Dam  
This section explores the territorialization of nature aimed at preserving the Chun Doo-Hwan 
authoritarian regime using the case of the Peace Dam. As explained above, the legitimacy of the 
Chun regime was vulnerable because of factors such as his rise to power through military coup 
and the massacre of civilians. Even the Chun regime faced the situation that the politics of 
distribution had an obvious limit in providing legitimacy. In this situation, territorialization of 
nature could be effective in curbing potential resistance and integrating a people facing political 
crisis. The motive for building the Peace Dam was to defend the national territory from North 
Korea’s potential flooding threat because the Chun regime knew that North Korea was planning 
to construct the Geumgangsan Dam (金剛댐) at the headwaters of the Han River in the north 
(Figure 14). In the end, it was revealed that North Korea’s potential flooding threat and the 
necessity of the Peace Dam were part of a scheme by Chun to maintain political power through 
the territorialization of water, specifically, by setting North Korea as an external enemy and 
consolidating the South Korean people. In this sense, state territorialization of nature would be 
effective in addressing the case of the Peace Dam. 
 
6.1. The illegitimacy of the Chun regime and the necessity of anticommunism as a 
means of exclusion/inclusion  
Before analysing the Peace Dam, I briefly explain the relation between the Chun regime and 
anticommunism. Anticommunism was an important dominant ideology for the Korean 
government to control its people after liberation in 1945 under the geopolitical conditions of the 
Cold War (Cho 2000; Shin 2006).
44
 Since the Korean War armistice of 1953, the national-
territorial division between North and South Korea provided the government to routinely 
mobilize people as ‘us’ in South opposed to ‘them’ in North. Under this spatial demarcation, the 
Park Jung-Hee regime regarded all pro-democratic oppositions to the regime as pro-North 
Korean communism and a threat to national security. The regime did this through establishing an 
                                                          
44
 Along with anticommunism, developmentalism was also an important ruling ideology under the Park 
regime (Park 2001: 64). However, regarding the Peace Dam, this section focuses primarily on the effect 
of anticommunism as a ruling ideology. 
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Emergency Martial Law and the National Security Law
45
 (Lee et al. 2014: 565-660). Even the 
new Chun regime with less political legitimacy followed in the footsteps of the previous one. For 
example, one newspaper’s editorial shows the connection between the Gwangju Massacre and 
communism as follows:
46
 
 
When we think about the meaning of excessive collective actions and acts of destruction such as 
the Gwangju Incident that caused a state of anarchy, we feel our hair stand on end. … We have 
no doubt that the reason the armed forces for the defense of national territory participated in a 
martial law affair to preserve people’s right to live from not only external enemies but also 
internal auto-destructive factors. (Kyunghyang Daily 1981 italics added)    
 
This editorial justified the military actions in Gwangju by identifying ‘external enemies’ (North 
Korea) and ‘internal auto-destructive factors’ (Gwangju citizens), which reflects the 
territorializing logic that divides ‘us’ from ‘them’ and constructs a boundary between ‘inside’ 
and ‘outside’. As we can see later, this logic was applied to the territorialization of water by the 
Chun regime. 
 
6.2. The construction of the Peace Dam as a ‘barrier around the country’ 
On 30 October 1986, Minister of Construction Lee Gyu-hyo issued a statement to announce the 
construction of the Geumgangsan Dam, which is approximately 11 miles from the Korean 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), in North Korea. According to the statement, if the Geumgangsan 
                                                          
45
 As explained below, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), which crafted the Peace Dam 
plan, was the key organization for the National Security Law’s enforcement. In other words, the KCIA 
was the authoritarian regimes’ guard dog. 
46
 During the Chun regime, the media called ‘a sycophant to the government’ was strongly controlled by 
the state (Kang 2003). Thus, it is reasonable that newspaper articles represented the government’s 
opinion. 
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Dam (金剛댐) (according to the Chun regime, the dam’s height was 200 m, and its maximum 
pondage was 20 billion tons of water) were to collapse, the Seoul (서울) Metropolitan Region 
would be damaged (Figure 14). After one week, Minister of Defense Lee Ki-back argued in a 
press conference that 20 billion tons of water would flood Seoul with the power of a nuclear 
weapon within twenty-four hours and allow the North Korean army to penetrate South Korea. 
Maps had an important role in people’s recognition of the possible risk.              
  
 
Figure 14: Map of the location of the Geumgangsan Dam in North Korea (북한 金剛댐 
위치도.  
Source: Kyunghyang Daily 30 October 1986 
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In the department’s first statement, the Minister of Construction emphasized that ‘20 billion tons 
of water is seven times the capacity of Soyang Dam (29 hundred million tons)’ to make people 
afraid. Additionally, visualization of the risk was more effective than text. The map that was 
presented in the first statement depicted the Geumgangsan Dam’s reservoir as being much larger 
than that of the Soyang Dam (소양강댐, see Figure 14) and showed a river flowing across the 
border; this visualization caused people to intuitively fear that ‘the survival of the nation was 
being threatened’ and this was ‘the biggest crisis since the Korean War’ (Lee 2000: 51, 64), 
which highlights the transformation of water that is ‘aterritorial in essence’ (Whitehead et al. 
2007: 8) into a territorial substance.  
 
 
Figure 15: Seoul flood inundation map. 
Source: Kyunghyang Daily 6 November 1986 
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The second map, which was presented in the Minister of Defense’s statement, was a flood 
inundation map of Seoul (서울시 예상침수요도) that showed the effects of 20 m (i.e. the 
discharge of 9 hundred million tons (9 억톤방류시)) and 50 m (i.e. the discharge of 200 hundred 
million tons (200 억톤방류시)) increases in the water level (Figure 15). This map showed the 
main buildings of Seoul, including the National Assembly Building (국회의사당), the Integrated 
Government Complex (정부종합청사) and City Hall (시청), under water, which would lead to 
suspending the management of the state.
47
  
 
Based on this anxiety, large crowds amassed for anticommunist rallies against North Korea all 
around the country that began in Chuncheon, which is near the Soyang Dam (MBC 2001). 
People could also participate in building the Peace Dam by making a national donation. We can 
find the implication of a fund-raising campaign for the dam in an editorial entitled ‘A barrier 
around the country will be built with national donation’ as follows:  
 
Now we are joining in the national donation to keep peace. This is a fund-raising campaign for 
building the Peace Dam. … This is the people’s tacit resolution and agreement to safeguard the 
nation’s security and our right to live free from the threat of the North Korean puppet regime 
under any terms. At the same time, this campaign can be our stubborn anticommunist rally 
against North Korean communism (Kyunghyang Daily 3 December 1986).  
   
                                                          
47 In this sense, we can also find the territorializing logic of water in a poem by Minister of Culture and 
Information Chung Han Mo: ‘Hark, you outlaws who are going to abuse the peaceful river as a weapon 
of destruction and mass murder. Those who violate the law of nature shall meet nothing but ruination’ 
(The Washington Post 1988, italics added). 
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As reflected in the editorial, the fund-raising campaign was an action for ‘the nation’s security 
and our right to live’ and an ‘anticommunist rally’. In this territorialized atmosphere, it was 
difficult to raise opposing opinions such as the possibility that the threat and the potential water 
damage were being exaggerated. People who expressed different views on the national donation 
were regarded as being against ‘the nation’s security and our right to live’. In other words, those 
with different views became communist.
48
 As a result, the campaign raised sixty-five billion 
Korean won, one-tenth of the total construction cost, in a very short time.  
 
As previously mentioned, the threat of the Geumgangsan Dam was mere propaganda. Firstly, the 
amount ‘20 billion tons of water’ was calculated by a staff person at the Korean Electronic 
Power Corporation, who had limited information on the dam, in only eight hours (MBC 2001).
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Even though, using computer simulation, scientists from the Ministry of Science and Technology 
noted in a report that if the dam were to rise to a height of over 184 meters or its maximum 
pondage exceeded 16.8 billion tons of water, the water would flow northward (i.e. toward North 
Korea, not South Korea), the Chun regime refused to accept the report (MBC 2001). Meanwhile, 
the North Korean government criticized that the ‘South Korean puppet government had 
exaggerated the pondage of the dam and propagated an arbitrarily reduced economic effect’; 
large crowds held rallies around North Korea against South Korea’s distortion (MBC 2001). 
According to a scientist who escaped from North Korea and specialized in building dams, North 
Korea advertised that the Geumgangsan Dam was a ‘peaceful construction’, and although it 
would require a great deal of money, the construction began because of extreme electricity 
shortages (MBC 2001; Rodong Sinmun 1986).
50
 More crucially, North Korea presented a 
                                                          
48
 Kim Geun-tae, who was one of the most important democracy activists under the Chun regime and an 
influential politician after democratization, lamented that ‘no one dared to question the Peace Dam’ 
(MBC 2001). 
49
 According to one professor who does not believe government statements, at least three months are 
needed to input basic data for calculation into the computer (Kyunghyang Daily 18 June 1993). 
50
 The North Korean state’s newspaper (Rodong Sinmun 1986) introduced Kim Il-sung’s statement, i.e. 
“Let’s start promoting increased electricity production” and “A faster increase in electricity production 
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Geumgangsan power plant white paper on 25 December 1986. According to the white paper, 
Geumgangsan Dam was to be composed of four dams, not just one, and the total pondage of the 
four dams was to be 4.7 billion tons. In addition, Imnam Dam, which is called Geumgangsan 
Dam by the South Korean government, can store 2.6 billion tons of water, not 20 billion tons 
(MBC 2001). In other words, without knowing even basic information about the Geumgangsan 
Dam, such as the number of dams and the maximum pondage, the South Korean government 
simply announced the figure 20 billion tons of water. Thus, it is important to understand why the 
South Korean government attempted to pull off this scheme. For this understanding, we look to 
the director behind the scene: The director was the Agency for National Security Planning 
(ANSP), which was the new name for the KCIA.  
 
The ANSP began Geumgangsan Dam operations in July 1986. The statements by the two 
ministers were also premeditated by the ANSP. The ANSP established a team that opposed the 
Geumgangsan Dam: 1) a consulting group comprising water resource experts, among them Kim 
Yeo-Taek, who had participated in the creation of the water resource policy in the 1960s (cf. 
Chapter 4); 2) working-level meetings between bureau directors
51
; and 3) a coordinating 
committee to collect the donations, which shows that the government directly intervened in the 
fund-raising campaign.        
 
The reason the ANSP was so deeply involved in this scheme was the vulnerable legitimacy of 
the Chun regime. During Chun’s tenure, the democratization movement steadily problematized 
his regime’s legitimacy. In 1986, the opposition party, New Democratic Party, became nationally 
known, and there was strong demand for a constitutional amendment. Eight thousand police 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
improves production in all sectors and guarantees the seamless supply of power in response to the high 
future power demands”, which indicate the reality of the power shortage in North Korea. 
51
 A state bureaucrat, who gave a briefing on the Geumgangsan Dam, said ‘I am just an actor’, reflecting 
that the water policy was governed by the ANSP (MBC 2001). 
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officers were stationed at Konkuk University on the day the Minister of Construction made his 
statement about Geumgangsan Dam on 30 October 1986, and approximately a thousand 
university students were arrested on the same day (The New York Times 1986; Lee 2000: 49-50; 
C.-U. Lee 2013: 77-81).
52
 After construction of the Geumgangsan Dam had been halted because 
of its cost, the Chun regime still argued that the construction of the Peace Dam should be 
completed before the opening of the 1988 Olympic Games to maintain the regime’s power.53 
 
In summary, I have shown how existing inter-states territorial tension between North and South 
Korea was maintained and strengthened through territorialization of water closely coupled with 
anticommunism led by the Chun regime. Additionally, it is ascertained that territorialization of 
water took place in accordance with a political motivation to avoid legitimacy crisis, not the 
logics of nation-building or capitalist accumulation alone.            
 
6.3. After democratization, authoritarian regime’s territorialization of nature 
reloaded? 
In 1997, May 18 was declared an official memorial day and a law privileging bereaved families 
took effect in 2002. In 2011, 1980 Archives for the May 18th Democratic Uprising against the 
Chun regime located in Gwangju city hall were inscribed on the UNESCO Memory of the World 
Register. Regarding the Peace Dam, an inspection by the Kim Young Sam administration, the 
first truly democratic regime, revealed that Chun Doo-Hwan was a superb manager of the Peace 
Dam construction and the ANSP practically supported this plan. In addition, the inspection team 
                                                          
52 It is revealed that the ANSP and other state apparatuses were involved in causing the 1986 student 
uprising at Konkuk University. The Chun regime with less political legitimacy described students in this 
uprising as ‘pro-Communist’ by mobilizing the mass media despite the fact that there was no relation 
between students and North Korea (The New York Times 1986). 
53
 At a National Assembly hearing on 31 December 1989, former President Chun said “exaggerating the 
risk of Geumgangsan Dam was absolutely not to stay in power”. Paradoxically, his statement reveals a 
close relationship between the territorialization of water and his regime’s political aim by juxtaposing 
‘dam’ and ‘stay in power’, which would seem to be unrelated, in one sentence. 
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disclosed that there was no evidence that constructing the Geumgangsan Dam in North Korea 
would disturb the 1988 Olympic Games (Hankyoreh 1 September 1993). Ultimately, Chun was 
arrested for rebellion in 1995, although he was pardoned in 1997. 
 
Based on the aforementioned explanation, international readers may assume that, when South 
Korea became a democratized nation, the legacy of the authoritarian regimes was wiped out. 
However, material and discursive structures of the Peace Dam have still affected Korean society 
even after democratization. In 2002, South Korean conservative media created an air of anxiety 
about the Geumgangsan Dam failure, as did the Chun regime in 1986. Because of this, North 
Korea openly refutes conservative media reports and the North Korean government cancelled a 
prearranged inter-Korean economic cooperation meeting (Media Today 2002). In 2009, Chun 
and his subordinates, including the former Minister of Defense and the ANSP director, visited 
the Peace Dam. Dead power can still move living authority. An incumbent three-star general, the 
president of the KWRC, which is the managing body of the Peace Dam, and a provincial 
governor came out to greet Chun’s party. At the site of the dam, Chun said that “building the 
Peace Dam was positively necessary” (Sesame Tube 2009a). A staff member of the KWRC 
remarked in front of Chun that “the Peace Dam is the sole fulcrum that ensures the safety of the 
North Han River watershed and the Seoul Metropolitan Area against the North Korean flooding 
threat today” (Sesame Tube 2009b). In the same vein, more recently, an influential far-right wing 
commentator, Gab-Je Cho (2011), noted on the way back from the Peace Dam that “the 
argument that the Chun regime built an unnecessary Peace Dam, exaggerating the flooding threat 
of North Korea, is simply crap”.  
 
In other words, a legacy of state territorialization of nature (i.e. the Peace Dam) still affects the 
democratic regime and the geopolitical side of inter-Korean relations. It reminds us of the 
importance of exploring not only the rationale behind globalization and/or neoliberalization, but 
also the path-dependency of an authoritarian regime to better understand ‘democracy after 
democratization’ (J.-J. Choi 2002) in Korean society.  
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Interestingly, absurd history repeats itself. After the failure of the South Korean liberal-
progressive block in the 2007 presidential elections, the conservative candidate Lee Myung-Bak 
won the election (Doucette 2010). During an election, the Lee camp propagated the ‘747 plan’, a 
plan to achieve 7% annual economic growth, increase in the GDP per capita income to 
US$40,000 and to make the nation the 7th largest economy in the world. However, the Lee 
regime had to abandon the ‘747 plan’ in the face of societal conflicts such as the negotiation of a 
Korea-USA Free Trade Agreement in 2008 (Lee et al. 2010). Instead, the Lee regime promoted 
the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project, which costs approximately US$17.3 billion and 
aimed at dredging of river beds and constructing new sixteen dams to control floods and 
droughts, as a response to political crisis (cf. Chapter 7). Hence, the Peace Dam  of the Chun 
regime and the Four Rivers Project of the Lee regime resemble each other in that both regimes 
attempted an infrastructural political fix to avoid political crisis (see also Swyngedouw 2013a). 
Although I do not deny the fact that conjectural factors, such as the failure of the ‘747 plan’ and 
President Lee’s career as an ex-Hyundai construction CEO, affected the promotion of the Four 
Rivers Project, it is important to see old factors, such as involvement of the KWRC and the 
Ministry of Construction as leading actors in promoting the Peace Dam, and uneven 
development that leads to the politics of distribution, also played significant role.          
 
7. Conclusion  
This chapter focuses on the water resource policy of the Chun regime to reveal that because of a 
fatal shortage of political legitimacy stemming not only from his military coup and the massacre 
of civilians but also structural constraints that are the outcome of economic growth during the 
Park regime in the 1960s and the 1970s, such as uneven regional development, the Chun regime 
produced state-nature as a solution, such as the “Ten Major Rivers” hydro-scale and the Peace 
Dam, to gain legitimacy. The Chun regime’s new state-natures were a failure because President 
Chun could not extend his rule.  
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After the 1987 Democratization Movement, ‘Seoul Spring’ finally arrived in Korean society. 
Therefore, it would be easy to expect that Korean water policy would also be changed to be more 
democratized. However, we should observe the same phenomenon from another angle. As 
explained above, the path-dependency of Park Jung-Hee’s water policy had influenced the Chun 
regime. That is, without considering the path-dependency of the former, we could not fully 
understand the characteristic of the latter’s state actions. This view could be applied to the age of 
democratization in the 1990s. We should not easily downplay the possibility that the path-
dependency of the Chun regime could also have impacted the democratic regime. 
Democratization opened a window of opportunity (or a Pandora’s Box) that allowed not only the 
state bureaucrats but also diverse actors such as global and national NGOs and local stakeholders 
to become involved in the process of the state’s actions. Who will be President Chun and who 
will be the democratization movement groups in the age of democratization and globalization? It 
will be all more complicated. Thus next chapter should explore the years after the 1980s. 
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VI. CHANGING WATER RESOURCE POLICY AFTER POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION BETWEEN THE 1990S AND THE EARLY 
2000S 
 
1. Introduction  
Since the political liberalization of 1987, the Korean civil society movement has become active 
in the democratic nation. The wave of liberalization has also had a significant impact on the 
environmental movement. National environmental movement organizations such as the Korean 
Federation for Environmental Movement established in 1993 and the general public has broadly 
learned the importance of environmental issues (Koo 1996: 155-159).
54
 In addition, with the 
progress made towards local autonomy as an outcome of political liberalization, local 
community-based criticisms and environmental resistances have arisen against existing state-led 
projects such as large-scale multipurpose dams. In summary, it became imperative for the 
Korean state to change from its prior authoritarian and state-led model to a more democratic one 
(Lim and Tang 2002; Lee 2002). Based on the description thus far, the perspective of some 
scholars that declares “the decline of the developmental state” (Chang 1998; Kim 1999; Minns 
2001; Pirie 2005) appears useful for explaining this situation. In other words, in explaining the 
rise of the environmental movement and related NGOs activities, existing environmental studies 
also follow the perspective that democratization triggered the activation of civil society and the 
erosion of the developmental state (e.g., Lee 1993; Lim and Tang 2002). In my view, however, 
these studies are insufficient to explain the way in which the path-dependency of the 
authoritarian regime affected the democratic regime’s policy orientation.     
 
                                                          
54
 For example, a newspaper article titled “the popularity of accusatory books on environmental pollution” 
reported that because people recognized “the severity of environmental destruction resulting from the 
high rate of growth after the late 1980s” many accusatory books on environmental pollution were being 
published (The Kyunghyang Shinmun, 21 April 1990). Also, Green Review, the most influential 
bimonthly environment magazine at present, was first issued in October 1991. 
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As explained below, the path-dependency of the state-driven water resource policy under the 
former authoritarian regime did not disappear even after the democratization. It was difficult to 
transform the old authoritarian and hierarchical water governance to the newly democratic and 
environmentally-friendly one because the MOC, as a main actor in driving water policy under 
the authoritarian regimes (Chapter 4), did not give up its interest in a dam-based policy 
orientation, although it did partially accept institutional tools for democratic policy making, such 
as public hearings and the participation of civil society in the process of establishing the water 
policy plan. It also showed democratic and environment-friendly gestures using the rhetoric of 
“environmentalism” and “localization”. However, existing water policy-related studies of the 
1990s heavily concentrate on individual conflicts between a “monolithic” government and civil 
and local societies and do not grasp the inner dynamics of the state as a main unit of analysis.
55
 
Therefore, we should broaden our research scope to the political contestations surrounding water 
policy among diverse social forces acting in and through the state. 
 
In this chapter, I explore political contestations among social forces surrounding water policies. 
According to previous chapters, the water policy was driven largely by the MOC. Large scale 
multipurpose dam construction was an essential part of the MOC’s interest, and the KWRC was 
established successfully in 1974 under the MOC for the purpose of multipurpose dam 
construction (KWRC 1994). As shown in Figure 16, the KWRC’s main income source was water 
resource-related development, which mostly comprised the construction and management of 
multipurpose dams.
56
 After the 1987 democratization, veiled actors such as civil society and 
                                                          
55
 Based on the ubiquity of individual case studies on topics such as movements against dam construction 
(S.-H. Lee 2005; Oh 2003a), water pollution (Lee 2002, 2005) and water rights (Y.-H. Choi 2002; Lee 
2003; J.-C. Park 2007), it is apparent that the existing literature focuses mainly on the activities of 
environmental NGOs, local people and local governments against a “monolithic” national government, 
which masks the complexity and polymorphism of the state and its interactions with social forces. 
56 Although other studies have criticized the Korean state’s dam construction-oriented tendency, such 
criticisms were not proven empirically (Hong 2005; Park 2011). For my research, I acquired financial 
statements from 1969 to 1987 by asking the KWRC. Figure 1 shows the historical process of the Korean 
dam construction orientation. 
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local populations more actively took part in problematizing existing MOC and KWRC-led water 
policies. 
 
 
Figure 16: Profit structure of the KWRC, 1969-1987. 
Source: KWRC 
 
The chapter is composed of four parts. First, I ascertain political contestations between the MOC 
that has long dominated existing water policy, and the Ministry of Environment (MOE) that 
attempted to draw down the MOC’s water-related works. Second, I trace conflicts between the 
MOC and civil society over the revision of the Specific Multipurpose Dam Act, which supported 
extant multipurpose dam-based water policy during the past authoritarian regimes and the 
formation of a new act. Third, I trace how the long-term water resource plan, established by the 
MOC, became the point of contestation for various actors acting in their own interest. Finally, I 
explore the South Korean ‘water scarcity state’ thesis was materially and discursively created by 
influential social forces such as the MOC and KWRC to gain legitimacy for continuing dam 
construction.  
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2. Case 1: An integrated system for water management 
As mentioned above, there had been increasing attention paid to environment issues in Korean 
civil society during the 1990s. This reflected the extent to which accumulated environmental 
pollution, a by-product of “compressed modernization” (Chang 2010), had significantly affected 
society and the regime. The democratic state subsequently had to solve this problem as soon as 
possible. In particular, after the 1987 democratization, the seriousness of water pollution 
(representatively, the phenol spills in the Nakdong River in 1991
57
) made the policy’s primary 
focus change from quantity of water to quality of water, which raised the necessity of an 
integrated system for water management. However, the policy was still insufficient to actually 
establish such an integrated system.  
 
Although the Environment Administration (EA) was established in 1980 under the Chun Doo-
Hwan authoritarian regime, water quality improved insignificantly during the 1980s. One of the 
leading causes of this situation was the relative power of the EA. The EA’s opinion did not 
substantially impact development-oriented ministries, which had a high possibility for 
contributing to pollution, because the EA’s administrative status was lower than that of other 
ministries such as the MOC.
58
 Second, following from the first point, the EA alone could not 
drive an integrated system for water management because water resource-related works were 
dispersed into different ministries (especially, MOC). Third, the quantity of water pollution 
emission was excessive in comparison to the existing capacity to handle polluted water, which 
                                                          
57
 Due to a pipe rupture in the Doosan electronic factory located at Gumi, North Kyungsang Province, 30 
tons of phenol spilled into the Nakdong River on 14 March 1991. Subsequently, in the same factory, 1.5 
tons of phenol again flowed into the same streams. After the incident, the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s minister and vice-minister and the President of Doosan group stepped down. The incident 
caused the public to pay increased attention to the importance of water and government to establish an act 
on special measures for environmental crimes (S.-H. Lee 2005; Wikipedia 2014). 
58
 For example, the Minister of the Environmental Protection Agency, Cho Kyung-Sik, stated “I heard 
from staff in the ministry that it was difficult to converse with other ministries on an even ground before 
the Environment Administration was elevated to the Environmental Protection Agency” (The 
Kyunghyang Shinmun, 28 December 1989a). 
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was low due to the minimal investment of the government in water quality improvement (The 
Kyunghyang Shinmun 1 July 1988).
59
 
 
Despite this sluggish condition of the EA, the phenol spills in the Nakdong River drastically 
changed the stalemate. Given the situation in which democratic and environmental discourse and 
aspiration had come to dominate in society, the regime could not ignore water issues. In fact, as 
shown in Figure 17, several major rivers in addition to the Nakdong River had significantly 
deteriorated in their water quality even before the phenol spills occurred. Thus, there was 
increasingly intense public outcry in people’s everyday living spaces about the government’s 
performance.
60
 Eventually, the Roh Tae-Woo government and the ruling party considered the 
elevation of the status of the EA from an administration level to a ministry level to strengthen 
environment policy. The EA was thus elevated in January 1990 (The Kyunghyang Shinmun, 7 
September 1989).
61
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 According to statistics, 4,869 of 25,624 businesses equipped with waste-water disposal plants either did 
not operate the plants or operated them infrequently, which contributed to water pollution (Dong-A Ilbo 
10 August 1989). 
60
 There occurred a so-called “tap water shock” in which heavy metals and carcinogens were detected in 
the water of the Han River in the summer of 1989 and 1990 (Dong-A Ilbo 3 July 1990). The fact that 
national bureaucrats who were affiliated with the MOC, the MOE and the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs participated as panelists in a televised debate titled “Can we drink the tap water?” demonstrates 
the extent of the government concern regarding the public opinion on the polluted water at that time 
(Hankyoreh 13 July 1990). 
61
 After the elevation, the number of staffs increased from 783 to 1,216, and several new sections was 
established (The Kyunghyang Shinmun 27 December 1989). 
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Figure 17: Changes in the BOD (Biochemical Oxygen Demand) concentrations in the four 
major rivers, 1985-2004.  
Source: Kim et al. (2007: 9) 
 
After the head of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) became a state minister, news 
media forecasted that “the minister of the EPA will suggest urgent policy goals and resolve 
differences among different ministries in cabinet meetings” (The Kyunghyang Shinmun 28 
December 1989b). At the same time, the EPA urgently needed to work on unification of the 
dispersed environment-related work of other ministries to realise its goals effectively. However, 
contrary to the expectations of the media, each ministry, such as the MOC and Ministry of Home 
Affairs, regarded business transfer as the deprivation of their material interests that had been 
long accumulated, and reacted strongly against business transfer (Dong-A Ilbo 26 December 
1989). Hence, contrary to the regime’s general stance that apparently aimed for an integrated 
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system for water management, powerful ministries such as the MOC blocked unification work to 
sustain their own interests.
62
 The EPA’s elevation thus appeared to be largely nominal. This 
situation proves that influential ministries, which had grown under the past authoritarian regimes, 
did not want to abandon their interests and even took actions against the trend of democratization 
by making plan-rationalistic statements such as “Ministry of Home Affairs is more effective than 
the EPA” (Dong-A Ilbo 26 December 1989, italics added).    
 
Finally, the national cabinet came to an alternative decision that the EPA could coordinate the 
environment-related work of other ministries by strengthening the role of the Environmental 
Conservation Commission to promote “a comprehensive environment policy”, rather than by 
transferring business (Dong-A Ilbo 8 June 1990).
63
 However, despite several institutional 
improvements, other ministries were still uncooperative with the EPA. For instance, the MOC 
unilaterally announced relaxation of regulations on the greenbelt, and the Seoul Metropolitan 
Government started subway construction without pre-environmental impact assessment (The 
Kyunghyang Shinmun 22 November 1990, 20 July 1991).  
 
The conflict over the business affairs related to water management among ministries continued 
even in the Kim Young-Sam regime, the first civilian government after the 1987 
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 In fact, the logic of organizational survival can be also applied to the EPA. One news article reported 
the anxiety of the EPA staff regarding organizational change after the elevation of status, quoting “We 
hope that at least one of staff members within EPA will be appointed to a vice-minister position. We are 
greatly concerned that strong ministries such as the Ministry of Home Affairs or the Ministry of Health 
and Social Affairs may push in new chief positions” (Dong-A Ilbo 18 November 1989). 
63
 The Environmental Conservation Commission is composed of the Prime Minister (as the chairman of 
the commission), ministers who are involved in environment work and civilian committee members. 
Decisions of the commission have the same force as those of the cabinet. The minister of the EPA is 
appointed to the chairmanship of the administrative works committee, and the EPA has the right to adjust 
business (Dong-A Ilbo 8 June 1990). Although other ministries opposed the commission’s functional 
intent, the minister of the EPA strongly advised the Prime Minister to strengthen the commission in spite 
of opposition (Dong-A Ilbo 9 June 1990). 
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democratization. In particular, as mentioned above, the phenol spills in the Nakdong River 
aroused the necessity for an integrated system for water management as well as other 
environmental management systems ahead of the presidential election (Dong-A Ilbo 22 March, 
26 March 1991). Recognising the accident as “a matter of survival”, citizens and environmental 
NGOs in Daegu and Busan, which are adjacent to the Nakdong River, condemned not only the 
Doosan electronics factory but also the government, claiming that the person in charge should be 
punished (The Kyunghyang Shinmun 23 March 1991; Hankyoreh 23 March 1991). Although the 
MOC still opposed EPA-led water management, water conservation and wastewater treatment 
were transferred from the MOC to the EPA (MLTMA 2011: 21). In 1994, as President Kim said 
“I will streamline dispersed operational processes related to environmental and public health 
problems, including water quality, to clarify where the responsibility lies”, the government began 
to discuss the elevation of the status of the EPA to a ministry level (Hankyoreh 31 August 
1993).
64
 The fact that the opposition party also announced a comprehensive water management 
plan (including EPA’s elevation and an integrated system for water management) at 
approximately the same time demonstrates the importance of water quality issues at that time 
(Hankyoreh 18 January 1994).  
 
The EPA requested the Presidential Transition Team to raise the status of the EPA before Kim’s 
inauguration (The Kyunghyang Shinmun 14 January 1993). After six months, the ruling party 
started to discuss the elevation of the EPA to “strengthen the comprehensive coordination and 
functioning of environmental tasks” and the EPA was raised to the status of a ministry in 
December 1994 (The Kyunghyang Shinmun 30 June 1994). However, except for official 
elevation, there was no change in EPA’s material condition, such as the creation of new sections 
or increasing of staff numbers. At approximately the same time, however, the MOC established 
new sections such as the director general for water resources and the Gyeongin (Seoul-Incheon) 
                                                          
64
 Although the head of EPA held the rank of a minister, the EPA was administratively under the Prime 
Minister’s office. After the elevation, the MOC was enlisted under the President. 
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Canal section
65
 in 1994 (Seo 2002). This shows that the MOC still had greater material power 
than the MOE.   
 
In summary, we have ascertained that after the democratization, the activation of local 
communities and civil society made water quality a hot button issue. In this vein, the elevation of 
the EPA’s status could be explained as the response of the state that recognised the seriousness 
of environmental problems to its statecraft. However, as shown by the conflict over water 
management among ministries, despite the environment-oriented public opinion, development-
oriented ministries strongly resisted possible deprivation of their material base. Put simply, the 
path-dependency of water resource policy under the authoritarian regimes lingered even after the 
democratization. In the next section, I explore how the MOC secured its position through the 
revision of the Specific Multipurpose Dam Act.   
 
3. Case 2: The revision of the Specific Multipurpose Dam Act and the 
establishment of the Act on Dam Construction and Assistance to 
Neighborhood Areas  
It the early 1960s, the Korean state needed a stable supply of water for industry and living to 
support reconstruction of the ruined national territory (cf. Chapter 4). For this purpose, it 
urgently needed large-scale multipurpose dams that could provide hydroelectric power, industrial 
water for factories, agricultural water and residential water at the same time. However, the extant 
River Act could not adequately support the construction of large-scale dams in time. Therefore, 
the government established the Specific Multipurpose Dam Act in 1967, a special law aimed at 
making the process of dam construction smoother and more efficient (cf. Chapter 4). Based on 
the act, the government built important dams that contributed to the nation’s economic growth. 
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 The Gyeongin Canal Project aimed to construct an 18-kilometer-long canal linking Seoul with the 
western port city of Incheon. Although it emerged that this project was not economically viable, but rather 
environmentally harmful, the construction work was completed in 2011. 
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At the same time, the act gave rise to the occurrence of vast areas of submerged residences. As 
local sites accumulated more damage related to dams, this issue came under the spotlight in the 
1980s, and many local community-based resistance movements arose at local sites in the 1990s 
(S.-H. Lee 2005). This emergence of a local voice affected the water policy of the government. 
For instance, a report in 1992 made by the Economic Planning Board, a control tower for 
promoting Korean economic development, stated that “dam constructions are delayed on account 
of many complaints from local residents’ resistance groups and compensation problems” (Dong-
A Ilbo 28 March 1992).             
 
In this situation, the MOC attempted to revise the Specific Multipurpose Dam Act to increase 
support for people whose houses were submerged (including provisions that part of the 
electricity and water generation revenue would be transferred to support local welfare projects in 
the neighborhood of a dam) (Hankyoreh 13 August 1994).
66
 Article 1 of the revised act included 
new “support for people whose houses were submerged”.67 It could be argued that the revision 
of the act occurred to better address the concerns of local residents. However, this does not mean 
that the increasing support provisioned to local people was tantamount to a retraction of the 
existing dam-based policy orientation. In 1996, the government announced that the MOC would 
prepare a new bill to boost dam construction, surpassing the Specific Multipurpose Dam Act. 
 
“From now on, people whose houses were submerged, along with local government, can set up a 
tourist complex or amusement park in the neighborhood of a dam with the purpose of supporting 
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 The revision of the Specific Multipurpose Dam Act in 1993 was the second revision since 1981. The 
first revision in 1981 was to guarantee government investment institutions to join in the dam management 
institutionally (Ministry of Government Legislation homepage, http://www.moleg.go.kr). 
67
 The full Article 1 states that “the purpose of this act is to contribute to the development of the national 
economy through the rational development and utilization of water resources by providing for the 
construction and management of dams, with special options regarding the River Act, the reuse of 
construction costs and the support for people whose houses were submerged” (italics added). 
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their livelihoods. … Compensation includes not only direct compensation but also indirect 
compensation, including reparation for diseases to crops and decreases in their productivity due 
to metrological change. … Given that there has been an increase in the number of cases wherein 
dam construction was halted due to friction between the government and local residents, the 
tentatively named “Law for Accelerating Dam Construction” will be established before the end 
of the year” (The Kyunghyang Shinmun 11 May 1996, italics added). 
 
As a MOC bureaucrat said, the new act was needed for continuing dam construction.  According 
to a previous chapter, dam construction was materially and discursively significant to sustain the 
MOC as a powerful ministry among government ministries because people regarded dam 
construction activity as part of nation building and growth of the national economy, one which 
needed significant financial investment in the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Figure 16). Dam construction 
per se was the raison d'être for the MOC, whereas compensation for local residents was not 
particularly a priority for the MOC. Figuratively, the fact that the tentative name of the new act 
was “Law for Accelerating Dam Construction” proves that the purpose of the compensation 
expansion provision was to gain legitimacy for continuing dam construction.    
 
Therefore, the MOC delivered an establishment bill titled “Act on Dam Construction and 
Assistance to Neighborhood Areas” to the National Assembly in November 1997. After the 
submission, 36 environmental and citizen’s organizations launched the People’s Preparatory 
Committee for Stopping Indiscriminate Dam Construction and Damage Countermeasures on 6 
November 1997.
68
 At the same time, 100 leading public intellectuals in Korean society declared 
their “opposition to indiscriminate dam construction that destroys environment, culture, history, 
life and landscape” to pressure the National Assembly (Hankyoreh 7 November 1997). The 
participation of not only environmental organizations but also other citizen groups in the dam 
                                                          
68
 The committee members included the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement, Green Korea 
United, Korean Birds Association, Professors for Democracy, Lawyers for a Democratic Society and 
others. 
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issue can be attributed to its high profile at that time due to ongoing controversies about several 
dam construction sites at the local level (Hankyoreh 7 November 1997; for a summary, Lim and 
Tang 2002: 568-570).   
 
Despite its clear development-orientation, the MOC’s establishment bill could be interpreted as 
an environmentally friendly development in that the term “environment” appeared very often in 
the bill (Hankyoreh 14 November 1997).
69
 However, in contrast to this rhetoric, the main cause 
of civil society’s criticism remained that the bill intended to simplify dam construction 
procedures. More specifically, when a basic plan for dam construction or implementing plan was 
founded, the Specific Multipurpose Dam Act specified that mayors and governors’ opinion 
should be taken into consideration. However, in case of the new act, with the obligation gone, 
there was no longer a means to officially communicate with the local public (Hankyoreh 14 
November 1997). In addition, the MOC’s push for bill passage created conflict with the MOE. 
Although the MOE asked the MOC to accept a clause stating that “the MOC should confer with 
the MOE before approval of implementing plans”, the MOC rejected adoption of this clause 
(Hankyoreh 11 November 1997). In the end, the Construction and Transportation Committee of 
the National Assembly tentatively deferred its decision because there was no public consensus 
(Hankyoreh 14 November 1997).   
 
In summary, the MOC was having a hard time sustaining the existing dam-based water policy 
due to the growing voice of local communities and civil society after the democratization and the 
establishment of the local autonomy system. Using the rhetoric of “environment”, the MOC 
attempted to establish a new act to replace the Specific Multipurpose Dam Act to overcome its 
organizational crisis. In this process, the MOC clashed with civil society and the MOE, which 
blocked the progress of the new act. Through this case, we confirm that there were political 
                                                          
69
 For example, “environment countermeasures parallel to the construction of dams” is included in Article 
1 of the bill. 
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contestations among diverse social forces related to establishing a water policy-related act. 
However, despite fierce opposition, after several years, citing a “water scarcity state”70, the MOC 
continued pursuing passage of the new act and ultimately succeeded. The new act came into 
effect in March 2000. Based on the new act, the MOC achieved a foothold in the future water 
policy (Dong-A Ilbo 17 November 1997; The Kyunghyang Shinmun 14 December 1999).  
 
4. Case 3: Long-term water resource plans  
Seemingly, the long-term plan for water resources could be regarded as the product of plan-
rationality of national bureaucrats to provide stable water and electricity for long-term economic 
growth. However, as seen above, there were fierce competitions among diverse social forces in 
establishing water resource policies such as the multipurpose dam act. In the same vein, the plan 
per se could be the site of political contestation and its outcome. After the 1987 democratization, 
the Long-Term Comprehensive Water Resources Development Plan (1991-2001) was 
established in 1990, particularly due to the increasing demand for clean water.
71 Before 2000, the 
main water issues were conflicts over an integrated system for water management and the 
revision of the Specific Multipurpose Dam Act, as previously mentioned, rather than the long-
term plan itself. However, after 2000, political contestations took place over the establishment 
process of the plan.           
 
                                                          
70
 The MOC claimed “it is expected that the water shortage will deepen in the future”. Therefore, the 
MOC stated that along with the three dams currently under construction at the time, it would pursue the 
construction of about 20 dams through 2011 to protect against water shortage (Dong-A Ilbo 17 November 
1997). This discourse on the water shortage was to legitimatize the new act (cf. Section 4 of Chapter 6).  
71
 More specifically, this was planned under the goals of 1) establishment of a stable supply of water 2) 
prevention of flood damage 3) establishment of a society for new water resource utilization 4) hydraulic 
energy development and 5) comprehensive development of water resources by watershed units (KWRA 
and KWRC 1997: 29). 
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Under the influence of the Korean democratization, the emergence of the local autonomy system 
and the increased attention paid to environmental pollution by civil society, not only several of 
the old actors, such as the MOC, but also newly unveiled actors (e.g., local residents, local 
governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the MOE) could now actively 
engage in water resource policy formation. However, this does not mean that the path-
dependency of the former authoritarian regimes totally vanished after the democratization. We 
will see that old actors actively coped with the new actors so as to protect their interests in the 
process of water resource-related plan formulation.    
 
According to the complete revision of the River Act in 1999
72
, the long-term plan for water 
resource became the first statutory plan
73
 as the “upper-level plan for utilization, development, 
and reservation of water resources at the national level” (MOCT 2001a: 3).74 The Long-Term 
Comprehensive Water Resource Plan (2001-2020), so called Water Vision, based on the revision 
of the River Act, was established to realize “a stable supply of clean water” as mentioned in the 
Fourth National Physical Development Plan (MOCT 2001a: 3). The plan’s specific strategies 
were divided into three parts: 1) promotion of projects that are suited to the characteristics and 
                                                          
72
 Reasons for the complete revision of the River Act were “to supplement and improve on several 
imperfections, such as the River Management Committee’s role in adjusting conflicts over river 
utilization, relaxation of regulations on the riverside and procedural simplification of river conservation 
work, under the current system (Ministry of Governmental Legislation homepage). The main reason why 
the Specific Multipurpose Dam Act was established is that the River Act, which mainly focused on water 
management, could not institutionally support the construction of multi-purpose dams in the 1960s (cf. 
Chapter 4). Although the River Act was the highest-level law regarding rivers, it did not create direct 
conflicts with stakeholders. 
73
 Although a long-term water resources plan existed from the Park Jung-Hee regime, the River Act was 
the first in regard to the water resources plan being considered as a statutory plan. This demonstrates the 
increasing importance of water resources at that time. 
74
 According to section 1 of clause 11 in the revised River Act, “the Minister of Construction and 
Transportation shall formulate a ten-year unit water resources plan (hereinafter referred to as the “long-
term water resources plan”) for the securing of stable water resources and efficient management of rivers, 
as prescribed by the Presidential Decree.” 
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environment of local areas, 2) promotion of projects cooperatively between the national 
government, local governments and local communities and 3) promotion of projects based on 
information sharing on water resources (MOCT 2001a: 14). It is noteworthy that the terms 
“local”, “community”, “cooperation” and “sharing” were seemingly included as value 
orientations of the plan. This was a significant departure from the existing nationally based long-
term water resource plan initiated by the MOC. More specifically, the Water Vision includes a 
statement recognizing that “it is difficult to promote dam-based water resource development 
because of the public’s raised consciousness regarding the environment, the occurrence of vast 
areas of submerged residences, the changes to ecosystems, the limits of large-scale development 
and the insufficiency of land development” (MOCT 2001a: 22). In addition, through the 
organization of unprecedented public hearings, the government attempted to incorporate public 
opinion, and environmental NGOs could partly participate in the decision-making process for the 
plan (MOCT 2001a: 129, 131). It could be said that the active local movements against dam 
construction in the 1990s led to these changes in the government’s mode of operation (S.-H. Lee 
2005). However, these changes did not mean that the state’s water policy orientation was 
completely transformed into a democratic and environmental one. 
 
Although the Water Vision includes self-reflection on the existing multipurpose dam-based 
policy orientation while emphasizing democratic governance that includes local residents and 
civil society, as opposed to the previous plan, the same plan also argues the necessity of medium- 
and small-sized dams in accordance with the logic of a “water scarcity state” for which more 
dams were needed to store more water in case of water shortages (MOCT 2001a: 10, 64). In 
addition, the Long-Term Plan on Dam Construction, the action plan of the Water Vision, 
proposed 12 new midsized and small dam construction sites (MOCT 2001b: 26). The proposal 
brought about local, national and global
75
 opposition to the plan, even though the plan suggested 
new concepts such as the construction of “environmentally-friendly midsized and small dams” 
                                                          
75 For example, from IRN (International Rivers Network) and RWESA (Rivers Watch East and Southeast 
Asia) (C.-J. Lee 2013).  
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(MOCT 2001a: 64) and “environmentally-friendly local area around dams” (MOCT 2001b: 18), 
in contrast with existing perceptions that dams that had adverse effects on local environments 
and economies.
76
 In this situation, capitalists revealed their interests in dam construction in the 
face of possible cancellation of projects. For instance, the Korea Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, the nation’s largest private economic organization, submitted reports arguing the 
necessity of the dam construction to the government twice times between 2002 and 2003 (i.e. 
after the public controversy over the 12 proposed dam construction sites) (KCCI 2002, 2003). 
Through these tensions that surrounded the long-term plan, we can observe how it functioned as 
the point of contestation between various actors with their own interests.           
 
In 2006, upon completion of a feasibility review required of the plan every five years, the revised 
Long-Term Comprehensive Water Resources Development Plan (2006-2020) was established. 
According to the plan (MOCT 2006), there were two reasons why it was revised. First, after the 
establishment of the 2001 plan, there were an increasing number of natural disasters such as 
droughts and floods.
77
 The plan reflected a change in the national understanding of floods by 
arguing “it is impossible for structural tools [such as river banks and dams] alone to prevent a 
flash flood” (MOCT 2006, 104). This signifies that the government accepted the limitations of 
multipurpose dam-based flood control. Environmental NGOs’ participation in the plan revision 
                                                          
76
 Media played key role in diffusing the episteme that dams were good for local economies and local 
environments. For instance, civil engineers suggested that the dams were integral to sustainable 
development in the opinion section of a newspaper (Dong-A Ilbo 16 March, 14 August 1998). In addition, 
one editorial writer noted “[If an environmentally-friendly comprehensive leisure complex is constructed 
in the neighbourhood of a dam], local residents who live in the area will actively support dam 
construction because they will enjoy economic growth, rather than damage” (Financial News 10 
September 2002). 
77
 Natural disasters include the 2001 drought (in which 93,615 households suffered from water 
restriction), the 2002 drought (in which 27,678 households suffered from water restriction), typhoon Rusa 
(2002) that left 63,085 people homeless, and typhoon Maemi (2003) that left 61,844 people homeless. 
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also affected the change in the government’s perception (C.-J. Lee 2013). 78  Second, the 
government regarded that it was necessary that the new water resource plan should accept 
various public opinions (MOCT 2006: 5). As mentioned above, after a fierce opposition to new 
dam construction, local residents at the proposed dam sites, environmental NGOs and specialists 
on water policy together began to study the water resource policy’s problems. These activities 
eventually allowed civil society to participate in the revision process for the Long-Term 
Comprehensive Water Resources Development Plan (2006-2020) from 2005 onwards (C.-J. Lee 
2013; Ohmynews 4 August 2011). After one year, the Long-Term Plan on Dam Construction 
(2007-2011), the action plan of the Long-Term Comprehensive Water Resources Development 
Plan (2006-2020), mentioned that planned midsized and small dam construction projects would 
be “reconsidered”, i.e. effectively cancelled (MOCT 2007: 17; Ohmynews 4 August 2011).  
 
Here, we should avoid the romanticized discourse regarding localization as the outcome of 
democratization. Localization should be seen as not only the output of democratization but also 
part of the old dominant actors’ astute strategy to guard their interests. As shown by the case of 
the Water Vision, the plan was the contested outcome between old and new actors. Although the 
Long-Term Comprehensive Water Resources Development Plan (2006-2020) drastically 
accepted the democratic actions that were required by local communities and civil society, this 
plan also reflected the old social forces’ intentions. The same plan states that when new dam 
construction needs occur, “considering local government and local residents’ views, the 
government would push the project forward, including conducting surveys, design and basic 
planning stage by stage” (MOCT 2006: 49). In other words, the plan secured the legitimacy of 
dam construction not from national bureaucrats but from the local public by adding a condition 
that “dams will be constructed for local people who want the dams” (MOCT 2006: 51, italics 
                                                          
78 An activist from the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement stated that “this was the 
first time that the government came recognize that flooding was as natural part of the river 
system. Until then, the government had tried to prevent flooding only by using structures like 
dams and river banks” (Hankyoreh 24 May 2013). 
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added). At the same time, the plan showed an attempt to reframe the reason of existence of dams 
from supporting the national economy to supporting the local economy and local environment by 
suggesting that the midsized and small dam model better fit local requirements (MOCT 2006: 
94). More specifically, the Long-Term Plan on Dam Construction (2007-2011) included 
mentions of “midsized and small familiar dams that consider local character”, “dam projects that 
improve the lives of local residents” and “dam projects that are at one with nature” (MOCT 
2007: 38, 39, italics added).
79
 Interestingly, the Cheonggyecheon Restoration Project, which 
aimed to restore a 8.4km covered stream that runs through the heart of Seoul (cf. Chapter 7), was 
presented as an ideal dam development model for supporting a local economy and environment 
in the plan, even accompanied by a photo of the stream (MOCT 2007: 7), even though the 
Cheonggyecheon project involved no dam construction.      
 
5. Case 4: The creation of a water scarcity state as a state-nature in South 
Korea  
 
5.1. Introduction  
This section explores why and through what processes the South Korean state has been 
constructed as a ‘water scarcity state’ during the last two decades. After the 1987 
democratization movement, it became difficult for the Korean government to construct 
multipurpose dams due to the strong opposition of local communities and civil society.  
Therefore, the MOC and KWRC created a ‘water scarcity state’ thesis as a state-nature to gain 
legitimacy for continuing dam construction.   
 
                                                          
79
 This plan proposed nine “sustainable environmentally-friendly midsized and small dams” (MOCT 
2007: 13). Among suggested dam sites, there was strong opposition against dam construction for reasons 
of ecological damage at three of the sites (Yeonhap News 21 June 2004; Maeil Shinmun 3 October 2006), 
demonstrating that the notion of the environmentally-friendly dam was disputable. 
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Water scarcity indicates that the volume of water that people need exceeds the volume of water 
available. Water scarcity could be regarded as a ‘pure’ physical phenomenon because areas with 
little rainfall are likely to experience water scarcity. However, water scarcity can also depend on 
the condition of water-related facilities, such as dams and reservoirs, and institutions that work to 
reduce water scarcity. In addition to physical elements, discursive elements are also significant to 
construct certain natural phenomena because people perceive natural phenomena through media 
such as television news, newspapers and politician and expert’s talks, rather than directly 
observing the phenomena.  Thus, water scarcity should be seen as a socio-natural phenomenon 
(Alatout 2000; Kaika 2003; Giglioli and Swyngedouw 2008; Reis 2014).  
 
The section makes four arguments. First, I argue that there were physical and discursive 
symptoms of water scarcity in South Korea after intense drought and flood before the ‘water 
scarcity state’ thesis appeared. Second, the ‘water scarcity state’ thesis was created by dominant 
social forces, such as the MOC and KWRC, to continue dam-based water policies. Third, the 
‘water scarcity state’ thesis can be analysed in terms of spatial-temporal dimensions to 
understand the way in which people are persuaded of the necessity of dam construction. Fourth, 
the ‘water scarcity state’ thesis could be cracked by the political confrontations between 
dominant social forces and less powerful groups such as the local community and civil society. 
Verifying the South Korean case study is expected to supplement the lack of empirical research 
by revealing the dynamics among various social forces including less powerful groups in (de-) 
constructing the ‘water scarcity state’ thesis.  
 
5.2. Symptoms of water scarcity in South Korea 
The term ‘water scarcity state (mul bujok guk-ga)’ began to circulate in earnest in 1995. 
Although the term ‘water scarcity’ sparsely appeared in governmental reports in the 1960s and 
the 1970s under the Park Jung-Hee regime (Chapter 4), the appearance of this term outside of 
government circles had significantly increased by the 1990s. Representatively, in 1990, the 
government designated July 1st as Water Day – a decision suggested by the KWRC to remind 
people of the importance of water (Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 8 April 1991). Water scarcity and 
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water pollution
80
 are the main reasons for the creation of Water Day, which periodically diffused 
and sustained water-related discourse as a crucial social agenda. Although it is an undeniable fact 
that water pollution was serious, it is important to note that the government emphasizes water 
scarcity as a main motive for establishing Water Day. As discussed below, the government 
actively mobilized the ‘water scarcity state’ thesis every Water Day.    
 
Similarly, in their cooperative newspaper advertisement on the completion of the Juam 
multipurpose Dam, the MOC and KWRC said, ‘precipitation per capita in our country is lower 
than in other countries. Thus, dams such as the Juam Dam should be constructed every year to 
meet the increasing water supply needs that have grown to 4 million tons of water annually’ 
(Kyunghyang Daily 8 May 1992). This advertisement explicitly emphasizes the necessity of 
multipurpose dam construction to solve water scarcity. Not surprisingly, in a newspaper column 
written by the chairman of the KWRC, the opposition of the local community against dam 
construction was denounced as ‘NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard)’; according to the chairman of 
the KWRC, local opposition only hinders dam construction, which worsens the water scarcity 
crisis (Kyunghyang Daily 25 January 1993).  
 
By coupling above mentioned discursive elements with material events, ‘water scarcity’ becomes 
a reality. The 1994 nationwide drought that lasted from summer to winter eventually convinced 
the people that the threat of water scarcity was a reality, not just rhetoric. According to 
newspaper articles describing the draught damage, people had difficulties in cultivation, 
electricity production and factory operation due to limited water and electric power (Dong-A 
Ilbo, 21 July, 25 September 1994; Kyunghyang Daily 26 July 1994, 29 December 1994).  
                                                          
80
 Water pollution became a critical issue in Korean society after the ‘tap water shock’ in which heavy 
metals and carcinogens were founded in the Han River in the summer of 1989 and 1990 and the phenol 
spills in the Nakdong River in 1991 (Dong-A Ilbo 2 July 1990; S.-H. Lee 2005).   
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Figure 18 (18-1, 18-2): Tables indicating water crisis.  
Sources: Dong-A Ilbo, 16 July 1994 (left) and Kyunghyang Daily, 29 December 1994 (right) 
 
Figure 18 shows each dam’s poor accommodation capacity, which implicitly emphasizes the 
need for more dam construction to avoid a ‘national crisis’. More specifically, Figure 18-1 
indicates that the total amount of electricity generation from multipurpose dams (‘다목적 댐 
발전량’) between June 1 and July 13, 1994 is 363 kWh, i.e. 39.1% of the figure from the 
previous year. In the same manner, Figure 18-2 shows the status of multipurpose dams’ water 
reserve (‘다목적댐 저수현황’) in December 1994, which was 55.6% of the figure from the 
previous year. By suggesting the use of these tables, these articles try to convince readers of the 
situation of water scarcity. Through interviews, the chairman of the KWRC argued that 
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multipurpose dams should be constructed for a stable water supply.
81
 Additionally, through 
editorials, the media noted that ‘the way to secure a stable water resource is that multipurpose 
dams and middle- and small-sized dams should be continually constructed’ (Kyunghyang Daily 
14 January 1995).
82
 In other words, the government actively utilizes natural phenomenon as the 
basis for dam construction. 
 
Eventually, given a situation in which a water scarcity phenomenon has materialized as a reality, 
the MOC could claim legitimacy for a water resource action plan including additional 
construction of approximately eight dams (Hankyoreh 8 February 1995).
83
   
 
5.3. The creation of a water scarcity state in South Korea  
As mentioned in the previous section, the term ‘water scarcity’ was actively circulated in society 
during the early 1990s. In this section, I ascertain that how the term ‘state’ as a specific 
geographical entity is attached to the term ‘water scarcity’.  
 
 
 
                                                          
81
 In an interview, the Chairman of the KWRC, Lee Yunsik, said “Now, we should not spend water like 
water”’ (Kyunghyang Daily 1 August 1994). Also, in an interview, the Chairman of the KWRC, Lee 
Taehyung, said “If we save water, we could endure until June”’ Dong-A Ilbo 16 February 1995). 
82
 Kyunghyang Daily, in cooperation with the KWRC, published a series of features titled “Water is not 
enough” arguing that “additional construction of dams is needed to wisely overcome the crisis of water 
scarcity” (Kyunghyang Daily 28 February; 6 March; 13 March; 20 March 1995).     
83
 However, after the 1995 flood, the MOC utilized flood events as the basis of dam construction for flood 
prevention (See Maeil Kyungje Shinmun 27 August 1995; Dong-A Ilbo 27 August 1995; Hankyoreh 29 
August 1995), which shows how the MOC quickly and smartly mobilized natural phenomena for its 
interest.  
138 
 
Table 3: Types of states by per capita water use. 
Above 1700 tons 1700 – 1000 tons Below 1000 tons  
Water-abundant country Water-stressed country Water-scarce country 
Source: Engelman and LeRoy (1993: 48) 
 
The term ‘water scarcity state’ officially appeared on the March 22 Water Day in 1995.84 At that 
time, referring to the classification standard
85
 for water-scarce countries
86
 published by 
Population Action International (PAI), which is a non-governmental organization (NGO) based 
in the U.S. with a mission of promoting slow population growth to enhance quality of life, the 
Korean government declared that South Korea is ranked at a ‘water-scarce country’ level 
(Engelman and LeRoy 1993 48; see Table 3). Since that day, the government and media have 
continually used the phrase ‘South Korea is a water scarcity state’ every Water Day (Dong-A 
Ilbo 23 March 1995). Among media reports, particular attention should be paid to the most 
influential newspaper Chosun Daily’s a report on water scarcity:  
 
According to the UN PAI report, the total amount of fresh water in South Korea is 630 million 
tons. By dividing the total fresh water by the total population, the per capita water use in 1955 is 
calculated as 2,941 tons. However, due to increasing population growth, per capita water use 
decreased by 1,470 tons in 1990. According to the classification standard for a ‘water-scarce 
country (mul bujok guk-ga),’ if per capita water use is below 2,000 tons, then that country is a 
                                                          
84
 As mentioned before, the Korean government established July 1 as Water Day in 1990. After the Rio 
Earth Summit in 1992, the UN made March 22 World Water Day beginning in 1993. Based on the 
recommendation of the UN, the Korean government has observed World Water Day since 1995.  
85
 Per capita water use is a nation’s total fresh water use divided by the total population.  
86
 Here, I use the terms ‘country’ and ‘state’ interchangeably. When I mention a PAI report, I use the 
terminology of water scarcity ‘country’ that is used by PAI. However, outside of PAI reports, I prefer to 
use water scarcity ‘state (국가, 國家)’ to emphasize the characteristics of state apparatus and governmental 
organization. 
139 
 
water-scarce country. Thus, our country has moved into the realm of a water-scarce country 
since 1990. Our country’s annual precipitation is 1,274 mm, which is higher than the global 
average of 973 mm. However, due to a high population density, the total fresh water is 11%, i.e. 
2,900 tons, of the global average of 26,800 tons, which means that the amount of water resources 
is classified as a very small amount (Chosun Daily 10 March 1999).         
 
After the report in the Chosun Daily, the article was reproduced by several other newspapers, 
which initiated a particular discourse on water scarcity that influenced people’s consciousness. 
Let me unpack the content of the Chosun Daily article in more detail. First, the article introduced 
the PAI as being part of the UN to emphasize that PAI is a reputable organization. However, the 
PAI is non-governmental organization, unrelated to the UN, even though UN organizations such 
as UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) quoted PAI’s reports (UNEP 2002). 
Second, in PAI’s original text, South Korea was ranked as a ‘water-stressed country,’ not a 
‘water-scarce country.’ Put simply, the original meaning of ‘water-stressed country’ that the PAI 
established was changed to a ‘water-scarce country (mul bujok guk-ga)’ in the process of 
translation from English into Korean (Munhwa Ilbo 21 March 2006). In fact, the meaning of the 
Korean term ‘bujok’ is similar to ‘scarcity’ or ‘shortage.’ The term ‘water-stressed country’ does 
not indicate that there is not enough water. Rather, it means that the situation surrounding water 
is getting worse (Naeil Shinmun 14 September 2005). Thus, the Chosun Daily article seems to 
have intended to overstate the situation. Third, the article is incorrect to introduce criteria for 
water-abundant countries and water-stressed countries, i.e. ‘2,000 tons’ is false and ‘1,700 tons’ 
is true, as shown in Table 3. Additionally, PAI’s criteria are not always reliable. PAI’s 
classification standard for water scarcity country differs from that of ‘suitable’ water use 
suggested by other hydrologists. Indeed, PAI mentioned the differing opinion in the report: some 
hydrologists regard 1,000 tons as suitable per capita water use (Engelman and LeRoy 1993: 
19).
87
 Based on the hydrologists’ opinion, it might be an exaggeration to classify South Korea as 
                                                          
87
 Calculating a ‘suitable’ amount of water use is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, it is an important 
fact that the amount of suitable water use is disputable and changeable.  
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a water-scarce country. Last but not least, it is worth noting the organization’s name - Population 
Action International: their expertise lies in population issues, rather than water issues.
88
 
Therefore, a possible explanation is that PAI suggested a more ‘strict’ standard to alert people 
that they could be trapped in an area of water scarcity if they do not consider population growth 
(Engelman and LeRoy 1993: 19; Yeom 2003). 
 
However, regardless of what the original meaning was, after the Chosun Daily’s report was 
published, Korean society no doubt accepted the scarcity thesis – ‘South Korea is a water 
scarcity state designated by the UN’ become common knowledge in society. Since this report, 
the term ‘PAI’ gradually disappeared from the press. Eventually, the term ‘UN’ alone was 
mentioned by the media. In my view, based on the Korean people’s consciousness that the UN is 
a reliable international organization, the Korean media selected ‘UN’ as a signifier without fact-
checking, even though the UN hardly has anything to do with the evaluation of water scarcity 
countries. Until the ‘water scarcity state’ thesis faced societal criticism in 2003, the phrase, 
‘water scarcity state designated by the UN’ was quoted not only by national bureaucrats and 
experts such as the MOC and KWRC but also by ordinary people (Kookmin Ilbo 21 March 2004; 
Hankyoreh 22 August 2004; Dong-A Ilbo 18 March 2005). The ‘water scarcity state’ thesis 
gradually spread to the public and the experts alike,
89
 and eventually was used to justify dam 
construction. Such legitimization is clearly shown in the Long-Term Water Resource Plan (2001-
                                                          
88
 The PAI report notes that “as populations have grown, fresh water has become increasingly less 
available where and when it is needed” (Engelman and LeRoy 1993: 13). In other words, this report 
follows the neo-Malthusian perspective.   
89
 President Kim Dae-Jung noted that ‘the water problem is serious based on the fact that our country is 
designated as a water scarcity state by the UN’ (Money Today 5 February 2001). In addition, the Minister 
and the bureaucrats of the MOC and even elementary school students repeated a phrase that ‘South Korea 
is a water scarcity state designated by the UN’ (Hankook Ilbo 21 March 2001; Kyunghyang Daily 25 
March 1999; Sonyeon Hankook Ilbo 20 July 2005). This logic is also identified in many newspaper 
editorials arguing for dam construction. See Maeil Kyungje 12 July, 5 June 2001, 8 January 2002; 
Kyunghyang Daily 21 March 2003; Dong-A Ilbo 5 June 2001; Hankook Kyungje 12 July 2001.   
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2020), which includes plans for the construction of middle- and small-sized dams (MOCT: 
2001a: 10, 64).    
 
5.4. Dissecting the spatial-temporal dimensions of a water scarcity state  
In this section, I dissect the spatial-temporal dimensions of a ‘water scarcity state’ thesis to 
analyse how this thesis is concretely hegemonized in society. First, I will examine the temporal 
aspect of the thesis.
90
 The thesis is based on anxiety about an uncertain future. We have a limited 
amount of time to defuse the water scarcity bomb before it explodes. Anxiety about an uncertain 
future legitimizes current actions for a better future (Swyngedouw 2010; Hulme 2008; Müller-
Mahn 2007). Certain legitimized actions could marginalize other voices that question a particular 
action. For example, by describing uncertain future climate effects as ‘catastrophe, danger and 
collapse,’ many media outlets and politicians intend to control the present in the name of making 
the future safe (Swyngedouw 2010). Similarly, the media, national bureaucrats and experts threw 
various time bombs to the public (see Table 4).    
 
Table 4: News articles about the water scarcity state 
Date of 
issue 
Media  Contributor  Article title  Main argument  
8 February 
1996 
Kyunghyang 
Daily 
Senior staff 
of KWRC  
After 5 years, 
a water 
scarcity 
situation will 
occur.  
 
Even though the planned dams 
will be completed in 2001, it 
will be difficult to tackle 
increasing water demand, 
which will bring about a water 
scarcity of 2.5 billion tons in 
                                                          
90
 Although divided into spatial and discursive parts conceptually, the two mechanisms actually 
are intermingled.  
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 2011 and 3.3 billion tons in 
2012.      
22 March 
1999 
Maeil 
Kyungje 
Minister of 
MOC  
Without new 
water 
resources, 
restricting the 
water supply 
will be 
inevitable in 
2005.  
If we do not secure new water 
resources, building permits for 
apartments and factories will be 
difficult to obtain and 
restricting the water supply will 
be inevitable by 2005.   
19 February 
2001 
Maeil 
Kyungje 
Director of 
KIST 
(Korea 
Institute of 
Science and 
Technology
) 
 
The ‘water 
war’ is not 
someone 
else’s 
business.   
Our country is forecasted to 
have an annual water scarcity 
of 400 million tons in 2006 and 
2 billion tons in 2011.  
21 March 
2001 
Yeonhap 
News 
Editorial   Time bomb: 
world water 
scarcity 
Our country’s water scarcity 
situation is dire. In only five 
years, in 2006, it is estimated 
that we will have an annual 
water scarcity of 400 million 
tons. The water problem is our 
time bomb that threatens us.  
21 March 
2001  
 
Hankook 
Ilbo 
News story  Nationwide 
water scarcity 
situation in 
2004  
According to the MOC, due to 
increasing water demand 
stemming from population 
growth, the expansion of water 
supply facilities and economic 
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growth, a nationwide water 
scarcity situation will begin to 
occur in 2004. Although all 
water resources facilities 
currently being built will be 
completed in 2011, water 
scarcity of approximately 2 
billion tons will occur.  
14 March 
2005  
 
Seoul 
Kyungje 
News story  Water scarcity 
of 4 billion 
tons in 2011  
 
 
According to the KWRC, water 
demand will exceed water 
supply in excess of 1.7 billion 
tons in the next year. After that, 
it is estimated that the amount 
of water scarcity will increase 
(4 billion tons in 2011; 4.5 
billion tons in 2016; 4.9 billion 
tons in 2020).  
 
 
Table 5: The projection of the water supply (unit: 1 million m
3
). 
Year Demand Supply 
2006 36,338 34,626 
2011 39,217 35,162 
2016 39,709 35,169 
2020 40,103 35,158 
Source: Seoul Kyungje 14 March 2005, provided by KWRC 
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As shown in Table 4, MOC, KWRC and science experts from KIST warn that a ‘water scarcity 
situation’ or ‘water war’ will occur in the near future (after ‘5 years’ or ‘10 years’). Additionally, 
by seeing the projection of the water supply provided by the KWRC, readers had to wait the year 
‘2006,’ ‘2011,’ ‘2016’ or ‘2020’ before the ‘water scarcity bomb’ would explode (see Table 5). 
 
In addition, World Water Day has played a key role in sustaining the sense of temporality about 
the water scarcity bomb in society. At every World Water Day from 2004 until 2005, the MOC 
and the KWRC published their joint report, Water for the Future (MOCT and KWRC 2004, 
2005), emphasizing the importance of water. They also organized commemorative events such as 
poster contests and commemorative stamps and postcards for World Water Day. For instance, 
postcard messages include ‘We need to prepare for water scarcity now (물 부족, 지금 준비해야 
합니다)’ and ‘Environment-friendly dam construction will solve problems for a bright future 
without anxiety about water (물걱정 없는 밝은 미래, 친환경댐 건설로 해결하겠습니다)’ 
(Figure 19).
91
 In the same manner, the 12th World Water Day memorial stamp reminds Koreans 
that ‘Precipitation per capita in our country is just 10% of the global average, i.e. we are a water-
scarce country’ (Figure 20) (Korean Postal Service webpage). Through these materials, people 
continue to be exposed to discourse on water scarcity.  
 
                                                          
91
 On a postcard, ‘건설교통부’ means the MOCT and ‘한국수자원공사’ indicates the KWRC. ‘3 월 
22일은 세계 물의 날’ means that 22 March is World Water Day.   
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Figure 19: The 9th and 10th World Water Day commemorative postcards. 
Source: Korean Postal Service 
 
 
Figure 20: The 12th World Water Day memorial stamp. 
Source: Korean Postal Service 
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The media informed readers of Water Day events and of the content of the Water and the Future 
report. Interestingly, according to a public opinion research poll of 1,000 adults across the 
country, 77.9% of the respondents agreed that “a water scarcity phenomenon will occur in the 
future” (Yeonhap News 28 January 2003). This finding shows that people are seriously 
concerned about the uncertain future of water.
92
 Finally, this situation makes people look to the 
state as a savior against an uncertain future.     
 
Secondly, there is also a spatial aspect of this thesis. The state and its spatial scale are regarded 
as a specific alternative against the uncertain future of water. Dominant social forces can spread 
a nationalistic idea about water scarcity to the people. Statistics or geographical representations 
are effective to promote this idea (Whitehead et al. 2007). As mentioned above, water projection 
figures were different in each newspaper (cf. Table 4). Despite such differences, in 1996, the 
MOC coherently noted ‘1.8 billion tons’ or ‘2 billion tons’ as the estimated amount of water 
scarcity. This estimate is combined with the successfully settled belief that ‘South Korea is a 
water scarcity state designated by the UN’.93  
 
In fact, depending on geomorphologic and socio-economic characteristics of individual rivers 
and streams, each region’s water scarcity situation is different. In other words, Seoul, the capital 
city of South Korea, is less vulnerable to water scarcity shock compared to other underdeveloped 
regions of the country (cf. Chapter 5). However, the government only suggests ‘1.8 billion tons’ 
or ‘2 billion tons’ as total amounts on a national scale. Such loose statements not only mask each 
region’s particular situation, but create a geographic image that water scarcity will occur 
throughout our whole national territory.  
                                                          
92
 In fact, this research poll was commissioned by the KWRC in commemoration of Water Day 2003. So, 
we should not totally trust the results of the research and survey methods.  
93
 In other words, ‘South Korea, which is a water scarcity state designated by the UN, will have water 
scarcity of 1.8 billion tons or 2 billion tons’. 
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This imagined national territory regarding water scarcity is also strengthened by the spatial 
perception on inter-national relations. The Water for the Future report is organized into several 
parts (MOCT and KWRC 2004): First, the report introduces the global water situation by 
situating water conflicts on a world map (MOCT and KWRC 2004: 21). Second, the report only 
mentions the Korean situation after first introducing global situations, especially water conflicts 
on the global scale. Then, knowing the global situation, people may think that Korea could 
become one of the global water conflict cases. The media encourage this spatial perception. A 
column titled ‘After oil, it is water war’ written by an environmental engineer, states:         
                
The countries that experienced water conflicts said that the probability of a water war is higher 
than the probability of an oil war because water is directly connected to people’s lives. There are 
substitutes for oil. However, there is no alternative for water, which supports people’s lives. 
Mankind lived for a hundred thousand years without oil. Even now, there are places unconnected 
to oil. However, because no state could endure without water, water easily could cause war. 
Regarding the water crisis, the Korean Peninsula is no exception (S.-S. Park 2003).               
 
This column highlights the possibility of ‘inter-state’ conflicts about water by using the popular 
geopolitical terms ‘oil’, ‘war’ and ‘people’s lives’ that are often used to represent the Middle 
East (Khatib 2006). Then, the author notes that South Korea is ‘no exception’ to this danger. In 
other words, by transferring a narrative of inter-state conflicts to the South Korean situation, 
people may be led to think that as common soldiers they have to save their country as in 
wartime, which strengthens a perspective of the state as a knight that controls common soldiers 
against a possible water war.  
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5.5. Cracking the ‘water scarcity state’ thesis  
In the above section, by ascertaining the spatial-temporal dimensions of the ‘water scarcity state’ 
thesis, I revealed that this thesis could significantly influence people’s consciousness to 
recognize fictional water scarcity as a reality. However, once a certain socio-natural phenomenon 
has been hegemonized, it is not necessarily impossible to change or even overturn this calcified 
formation.  
 
After the 1987 democratization movement, the Korean environmental movement sharply rose 
against state-led water policies emphasizing multipurpose dam construction (Koo 1996). In 
particular, the cancellation of the Youngwol Dam project, which could have destroyed the 
ecology of the Tong River, was the outcome of the local community and civil society’s 
environmental movement against the government in 2000 (Lim and Tang 2002; Oh 2003a). 
However, before the early 2000s, environmental NGOs could not recognize that the MOC and 
KWRC’s ‘water shortage state’ thesis was intended to justify the continuation of dam 
construction. Thus, without a doubt, the Long-Term Water Resource Plan (2001-2020) accepted 
the ‘water scarcity state’ thesis (MOCT 2001a: 129, 131).   
 
In 2003, however, the Korean Federation of Environmental Movement raised a question about 
the thesis (Yeom 2003).
94
 Political liberalization enabled citizens to actively participate in the 
decision-making process for the Long-Term Plan for Water Resources (2006-2020) (MOCT 
2001a). Thus, a council was established to evaluate existing estimates of water demand and the 
amount of water scarcity calculated by the government. In addition to governmental ministries 
                                                          
94
 At this time, the reason why environmental NGOs began to question the ‘water scarcity state’ thesis is 
that the amount of water scarcity suggested by the MOC, ‘1.8 billion tons’ or ‘2 billion tons,’ in 1996 did 
not change until 2003. In terms of demand, the MOE had been continuously promoting 2.2 billion tons of 
water-saving plans since 1996. Even in terms of supply, the cancellation of dam constructions projects 
including the Youngwol Dam would bring about water scarcity of ‘1.5 billion tons’ according to the 
MOC’s estimates. However, the existing amount of water scarcity did not reflect these estimates 
(Hankyoreh 1 April 2003).  
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(MOC and MOE), national environmental NGOs (KFEM (Korean Federation for Environmental 
Movement), Environmental Justice and Green Future) also joined the council (MOCT 2006).
95
 
Eventually, due to societal pressure, the ‘water scarcity state thesis’ officially disappeared from 
the next long-term plan, which was established in 2006. Instead the term ‘water-scarce country,’ 
the term ‘water-stressed country’ is used in the plan (MOCT 2006). As a result, the MOC and 
KWRC had to delete the ‘water scarcity state’ thesis from the Water for the Future report of 
2006 (MOCT and KWRC 2006; C.-J. Lee 2013).
96
          
 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the way in which South Korean water policies, such as an integrated 
system for water management (Section 2), the revision of the Specific Multipurpose Dam Act 
(Section 3), long-term water resource plans (Section 4) and the creation of a water scarcity state 
(Section 5), have been dynamically (re-)constructed by continuing political contestations among 
diverse social forces acting in and through the state in the face of political and economic 
liberalization. This study is theoretically meaningful for empowering DST scholars to go beyond 
the two sides of the same coin of debate on the change in the Korean developmental state that 
occurred between the 1980s and the early 2000s (i.e. either “the continuance of developmental 
                                                          
95
 One newspaper article states that ‘Yeom Hyungchul, who is an activist of KFEM, and Roh Jaehwa, 
who is a bureaucrat of MOC, have acted as coordinators of a council, which makes promotion processes 
and information objective and transparent’ (Ohmynews 4 August 2011). In addition, an bureaucrat of 
MOE noted that ‘when revising the long-term water resource plan in 2006, domestic experts have attend 
and reviewed the plan together and they concluded that because the amount of water supply in our 
country does not exceed the amount of water demand, it has been decided not to use the term ‘water 
scarcity state’’ (Weekly Dong-A 1 April 2009). Even The Long-Term Plan on Dam Construction, 2007-
2011, the plan says, “by considering changed socio-economic conditions that emphasize social consensus, 
water demand was re-estimated to resolve misunderstandings about exaggerating the amount of water 
demand” (MOCT 2007: 37).  
96
 An anonymous bureaucrat of MOC admitted that “the term ‘water-scarce country’ would not be used 
this year because the UN did not designate South Korea as a water-scarce country and estimates of 
whether or not there is water scarcity are different under different criteria” (Munhwa Ilbo 21 March 
2006).  
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state” or the “decline of the developmental state”) (cf. Section 5 of Chapter 2). Also, the South 
Korean ‘water scarcity state’ thesis was materially and discursively created by influential social 
forces such as the MOC and KWRC to gain legitimacy for continuing dam construction, 
demonstrating that water scarcity is a socio-natural phenomenon. Additionally, this study 
demonstrates that less powerful individuals and groups could crack the hegemonized ‘water 
scarcity state’ thesis that reflects influential interests of societal forces. As a result, I argue that 
the state that produces certain socio-natural phenomena should be seen as the site of the political 
contestations among various social forces, rather than viewing the monolithic state a priori. 
 
In closing, the reason why I focused on the period between the late 1980s and the early 2000s is 
so that this research could help explain the contemporary situation of South Korea. The Lee 
Myung-Bak regime (2008-2013) drove the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project forward as a 
“neoliberalized developmental state-nature” (cf. Chapter 7). Korean social scientists tend to 
emphasize the career of President Lee, who was the former CEO of Hyundai Engineering and 
Construction Corporation, in explaining the development of the project. In other words, they 
regard this situation as very “exceptional” after democratization, largely due to President Lee’s 
personality (for a summary, cf. Park 2011). However, from the perspective of the SRA, we 
should detach the president from his administration in our consideration, even though it is an 
undeniable fact that the president can legally command and control the administration. In other 
words, it does not necessarily follow that each ministry was fully aligned with the president’s 
intention. As revealed in this chapter, the MOC, which originated and matured under the past 
authoritarian regimes, took actions to save its own interests even under the democratic regimes. 
In fact, in justifying the project to the local public, the Lee regime resurrected the dead ‘water 
scarcity state’ thesis, despite the fact that this thesis was proven to be false. Thus, next chapter 
should explore the Lee regime’s water resource policy.   
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VII. NEOLIBERALIZED DEVELOPMENTAL STATE-NATURE: THE FOUR 
MAJOR RIVERS RESTORATION PROJECT OF THE LEE MYUNG-BAK 
REGIME (2008-2013) 
 
1. Introduction: The fountainheads of the developmental neoliberalization 
of water in South Korea  
In this chapter, I attempt to locate the fountainheads of the developmental neoliberalization of 
water before arriving at the junction of the Lee Myung-Bak regime to understand the path-
dependency of Korea’s water resource policy. 
  
The Park Jung-Hee regime in the 1960s and 1970s attempted to discursively and materially 
produce a state-nature relationship by reframing water from being a free good to being a 
nationalized economic good and constructing the “Four Major Rivers” hydro-scale as a national 
project in the name of the “Modernization of the Fatherland”, blocking potential local and 
national opposition and legitimizing large-scale multipurpose dam construction that entailed vast 
natural, economic and social changes at local levels (cf. Chapter 4). Multipurpose dam 
construction was an essential part of the MOC
97
 and the KWRC, which was established in 1974 
under the MOC for the purposes of this construction (KWRC 1994).  
 
More specifically, Figure 16 indicates the profit structure of KWRC from 1969 to 1987. It 
indicates that KWRC’s main source of income was water resource-related development. We 
should also keep in mind the fact that urban development counted for above 30% of total profit 
in 1969. It is because KWRC prosecuted a development of land in Seoul. Based on this 
                                                          
97
 The name of the MOC has changed a number of times; it has been the Ministry of Construction and 
Transportation (1994–2008), the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs (2009–2013) and the 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (2013–present). To avoid confusion, I consistently use the 
term MOC in this thesis.    
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experience, KWRC could participate in developing the Gumi Industrial Complex (An 2004). In 
particular, as the state’s accumulation strategy changed from import substitution industrialization 
to export-oriented industrialization which requires abundant industrial water, the profit structure 
of KWRC also changed. After 1973, more than half of KWRC’s profits stemmed from industrial 
complex development through various industrial estates, such as the Gumi Industrial Complex 
(1969-1982), Yeochun Overall Chemical Industrial Complex (1974-96) and Changwon Overall 
Machinery Industrial Complex (1974-2001) (KWRC 1994).
98
 At the same time, massive 
multipurpose dams, from Andong Dam (1976) to Chungju Dam (1986), key projects of the Four 
Major Rivers Development Plan, were completed. Additionally, from the late 1970s to the mid-
1980s, the KWRC embarked on the constructing new towns such as Ansan New Town, the first 
planned city in Korea (see the urban development section in Figure 16; KWRC 1994). Through 
this experience, a construction alliance that included not only national MOC bureaucrats and 
state-owned enterprises such as the KWRC but also large construction companies in the large 
Korean chaebol conglomerate grew significantly, which strengthened the construction-oriented 
policy orientation in Korea’s economy.99 As will be explained below, this construction alliance 
has been deeply involved in promoting the 4 Rivers Project. Therefore, even after the 1987 
democratization, as main state-nature creators, the MOC and KWRC did not want to abandon 
their interests, although they partially adopted institutional tools for democratic policy making 
and environment-friendly gestures, citing rhetoric such as “environmentalism” and 
“localization”, in the face of the increasing demand for democratization surrounding water 
policy. Given a situation in which they had difficulty continuing to construct large-scale dams 
because of strong local and national opposition, the MOC invented the logic of a “water scarcity 
state” as a new state-nature for which more dams were needed to store more water in case of 
future water shortages. Based on the “water scarcity state” thesis, the MOC suggested new 
concepts such as constructing “environmentally friendly midsized and small dams” (MOCT 
                                                          
98 According to An Kyung-Mo, former president of KWRC, due to the experience of making the Gumi 
Industrial Complex, KWRC could drive development of other industrial estates (An 2004). 
99
 Some Korean critical scholars have used the term “the construction-oriented state” (Park 2011; Hong 
2005) when explaining this phenomenon.   
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2001a: 64) and “dam projects that improve the lives of local residents” (MOCT 2007: 38-39), in 
contrast with the existing perception that dams had adverse effects on local environments and 
economies, to guard their interests under the liberal-democratic regimes from the 1990s to the 
early 2000s.  
 
In the following three sections, I will show how the inherited developmentalist water policy and 
emergent stream of neoliberalism met at the junction of the Lee Myung-Bak regime. The three 
stages are as follows.                    
 
2. Stage 1: The Korean Peninsula Grand Waterway Project as an extension 
of Lee Myung-Bak’s persona? 
 
As a key pledge in the 2007 presidential elections, the Korean Peninsula Grand Waterway 
Project (hereafter, the canal project) was suggested as the “brainchild” of President Lee Myung-
Bak, nicknamed “the bulldozer” from his time as former CEO of the Hyundai Engineering and 
Construction Corporation (BBC News 2008). This project was composed of four canals (i.e. the 
Gyeongbu Canal, the Gyeongin Canal connecting Seoul with the western port city of Incheon, 
the Honam Canal linking the Geum River with Yeongsan River and the North Korea Canal). The 
key canal of the project was the 540-kilometer-long Gyeongbu Canal linking the port city of 
Busan with the capital, Seoul. According to Lee, the Gyeongbu Canal would flow across the 
country to connect the Han River, which flows through Seoul into the Yellow Sea, to 
the Nakdong River, which flows through Busan into the Korea Strait, which would significantly 
decrease logistical costs, create 300,000 jobs and revitalize depressed local economies (The New 
York Times 2008). Linking the Han River and Nakdong River required challenging engineering 
works, such as a 21-kilometer tunnel through a mountain, because of the height difference 
between the two rivers (The New York Times 2008), and this problem was a key argument 
against the project. In fact, the Gyeongbu Canal project was first proposed by the Sejong 
Institution, a university research institute, in 1995. Then, Lee Myung-Bak, who was a member of 
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the National Assembly, suggested the canal plan during an interpellation time in 1996.
100
 After 
the KRIHS (Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements)—a government-affiliated 
organization for national land planning—estimated that the Gyeongbu Canal would not be 
economically viable in 1998, attention was drawn away from the project (M.-R. Cho 2007: 111-
112).  
 
However, because, during his term as mayor of Seoul (2002–2006), Lee Myung-Bak restored the 
8.4 km Cheonggye Stream that runs through the heart of Seoul to attract foreign tourists and 
foreign capital, he became a strong presidential candidate from the major conservative party (M.-
R. Cho 2010; Hwang 2014).
101
 In the process of restoration, there was a fierce debate on the lack 
of ecological and historical authenticity
102
, the undemocratic procedures and the excessive 
commercial re-development of the surroundings between the Seoul City government and a 
coalition of NGOs (M.-R. Cho 2010). Despite this strife, Time Asia magazine chose Lee Myung-
Bak as one of its “Heroes of the Environment” because of the restoration of Cheonggye Stream 
in 2007, and people began to recognize that “the bulldozer went green” (Time Asia 2007). Here, 
it is outlined how contrasting developmentalism and neoliberalism coupled with each other in 
restoring the Cheonggye Stream. Many Seoul citizens supported the Cheonggye Stream project 
in spite of a fierce debate because they thought that if the economy were revitalized, they could 
readily accept excluding others such as street vendors, instrumentalizing nature, and not 
recovering it ecologically as appurtenances of urban spectacle and commercializing pubic space 
in the name of attracting foreign capital and tourists. In other words, there was the commonality 
of both ideologies’ prioritizing economic value over other values. Based on a halo effect of the 
                                                          
100
 Based on personal experience in Germany, Yu Woo-ik, one of Lee Myung-Bak’s closest allies and a 
Seoul National University geography professor, also suggested the canal plan to Lee (Korea Joongang 
Daily 1 January 2008).        
101
 For the Cheonggye Stream Project, 1,500 street vendors were forcibly relocated from the restoration 
area to a neighboring stadium (Hwang 2014).   
102
 Representatively, 120,000 tons of pumped water from the Han River every day is needed to maintain 
the Cheonggye Stream as a water-friendly space (M.-R. Cho 2010).    
155 
 
Cheonggye Stream, the canal project was resurrected as an important national agenda item (Cho 
2007).
103
 
 
To support Lee Myung-Bak and his pledge, the Korean Peninsula Grand Waterway Study Group 
(KPGWSG), which was composed of roughly one hundred professors, was established as a 
policy advisory group. Lee publicized his canal project as his flagship campaign promise at a 
KPGWSG-sponsored symposium on 13 December 2006. In his congratulatory address, 
commenting on the restoration of Cheonggye Stream as his achievement, Lee argued that the 
canal project would unify the people and solve uneven regional development and that it would be 
environmentally friendly. His address intended to instill the perception that the success of the 
Cheonggye Stream model would be diffused throughout the “Korean Peninsula” to the people 
(i.e. voters). Iconographically, Figure 21, which was widely published in the press, shows Lee’s 
intentions by articulating his thoughts with discursive arrangements such as rose-tinted 
spectacles that show part of the completed canal project, similar to the Cheonggye Stream 
blueprint, and tantalizing texts (i.e., “the Korean Peninsula Grand Waterway (한반도대운하)” 
and “the prosperity of a nation (국운융성)”). As Lee Myung-Bak’s closest personal abide said, 
Lee would love the idea of “remodeling the peninsula” (Korea Joongang Daily 1 January 2008). 
 
 
  
                                                          
103
 In an interview with the media, Lee Myung-Bak reemphasized the necessity of the canal project before 
the Cheonggye Stream Project completion ceremony (Cho 2007).  
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Figure 21: Lee Myung-Bak at the KPGWSG-sponsored symposium.  
Source: Ohmynews 
 
It could be explained that Lee Myung-Bak and his followers attempted to discursively construct 
the “Korean Peninsula Grand Waterway” as a state-nature to win the election. As Lee said, there 
was no difference between the Cheonggye Stream project and the canal project from the 
perspective of developmental neoliberalism.
104
 Thus, although they estimated environmental 
destruction at the local level, local-dependent actors might have positively attempted to attract 
the canal project for their local economies in accordance with the logic of developmental 
neoliberalism as follows: 
                                                          
104
 For example, in an interview with the media, Lee Myung-Bak said: “Personally, I think that the 
construction of Gyeongbu Canal would be easier than the Cheonggye Stream project that was carried out 
at the center of the city” (Hankyoreh 2005, italics added). This statement intended to instigate local-
dependent actors’ desire for local development.     
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Until now, we saw no future, no way to turn around our economy … Talk about possible 
environmental damage the canal might cause doesn’t mean that much to me. I think more about 
all the engineers who will come in and eat at my place once construction starts (a local restaurant 
owner it the area around the Gyeongbu Canal, The New York Times 2008).  
  
However, developmental neoliberalism is not confined to the realm of discourse, and we should 
avoid misdiagnosing Lee Myung-Bak’s mind as the sole cause of the canal project. The 
activation of developmental neoliberalism is the assemblage of discursivity and materiality at 
diverse geographical scales (cf. Hill et al. 2012). As mentioned above, at the national level, a 
construction alliance benefited from multipurpose dam-based water policy for many years. Even 
faced with democratization in the 1990s, they attempted to adapt to the changed situation by 
transplanting rhetoric such as “localization” and “environmentalism” in the water policy. Once 
Lee was elected, five large chaebol construction companies (Hyundai, Daewoo, Samsung, GS 
and Daelim) met with the chief of the task force to manage the canal project affiliated with the 
presidential transition team on 28 December 2008. At that time, then CEO of the Hyundai 
Engineering and Construction Corporation Jongsu Lee announced that the five major 
construction companies would organize a joint task force for the canal project and that each 
company would soon establish an individual task force for the project on 3 January 2008 without 
worrying about competition for contracts with foreign companies (Hankyoreh 3 January 
2008).
105
 The pace of business was rapid in that each company’s task force chief was appointed 
in a short period of time (Hankyoreh 13 January 2008). In particular, among five large 
companies, one Hyundai executive who was responsible for the Cheonggye Stream project was 
                                                          
105
 In an interview with a radio program, Chu Boo-gil, one of Lee Myung-Bak’s closest allies, said that 
although a number of foreign companies had informed the presidential transition team that they would bid 
for the canal project, Lee Myung-Bak hoped that domestic rather than foreign companies could 
participate in the project (SBS News 2008).    
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reassigned to be the task force chief (Hankyoreh 3 January 2008).
106
 Additionally, at the local 
level, there were vigorous actions by local-dependent actors, such as local governments, local 
chambers of commerce, local newspapers, local construction companies and local politicians to 
attract the canal project shortly after the election (Hwang and Koh 2008). For instance, local 
governments established task forces for the project. In particular, it is interesting that although 
the Honam-based dominant opposition Democratic Party strongly criticized the canal project at 
the national level during the presidential election, a provincial governor from the Honam region 
who was affiliated with the same Democratic Party was favorable to the project (Hwang and Koh 
2008). Namely, there was a “scalar mismatch” (Hwang 2014: 86) between local and national 
needs within the same political party surrounding the canal project.         
 
In summary, these nimble actions show that not only Lee Myung-Bak’s persona for his “political 
inspiration” (Cho 2007) but also a national-scaled construction alliance and local-dependent 
actors had strong influence on the canal project.   
 
3. Stage 2: The conditions for producing the ‘Four Major Rivers’ hydro-
scale: Dividing the Korean Peninsula waterway into territorialized 
regional hydro-scales  
 
In this section, we identify common mechanisms at different local levels. That is, using a 
territorializing strategy at the local level, local-dependent actors attempted to divide the state-
                                                          
106
 Originally, the Gyeongin Canal was a floodway construction plan because its surrounding area had 
been badly hit by flooding during the 1980s. Although the plan was changed to the canal plan during the 
1990s by the KWRC, the construction was delayed because of opposition by local communities and 
environmental NGOs. Hyundai is a contractor for the Gyeongin Canal. Thus, it is assumed that Hyundai 
wanted to begin the delayed construction of the Gyeongin Canal as part of the Korean Peninsula 
Waterway Project (Seo 2002; Hankyoreh 3 January 2008). Eventually, the construction work was 
completed in 2011. 
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nature into local natures in the face of the possible failure of the canal project. This situation 
provided the conditions for producing the “Four Major Rivers” hydro-scale as an alternative 
state-nature. 
 
After Lee Myung-Bak’s inauguration, there was a stronger likelihood than ever that the canal 
project would be started, which triggered the emergence of opposing forces for various reasons 
such as environmental destruction, fraudulent economic goals, etc. On 31 January 2008, a 
conference on the critical review of the canal project at Seoul National University, organized by 
a group of Seoul National University professors, had a key role in increasing publicity about the 
issue.
107
 Before long, the Professors’ Group for Opposing the River and Waterway Project, 
which approximately 1,800 professors across the country attended, had organized to campaign 
against the project on 25 March 2008. Additionally, Buddhist religious groups also participated 
in the opposing forces because they felt that their temples would be disturbed by nearby canal 
construction sites (Buddhist Channel TV 2008). Leading up to the April general elections that 
had followed the Presidential election in December, members of the ruling party were afraid that 
the canal project as a main general election pledge could damage the ruling party’s National 
Assembly seats (Nature 2008). Eventually, faced with continuing opposition such as candlelight 
protests in the summer of 2008, the Lee Myung-Bak regime promised to drop the canal project 
on 19 June 2008 (Lee et al. 2010; Hwang 2011c).
108109
 However, this does not mean that the 
                                                          
107
 I attended in this conference as an audience member. Despite the constraints of time (Monday, 14:00-
17:00 p.m.) and place (the southern end of Seoul), roughly two hundred people including reporters filled 
the conference room. The fact that many professors’ visible opposition to the government policy had been 
rare before this conference showed the gravity of the situation.       
108
 I observed the candlelight protest at the center of Seoul during the summer. In addition to the canal 
project, the Lee regime’s other neoliberal agenda items, such as privatizing public enterprises and a 
Korea-USA Free Trade Agreement, especially in relation to importing American beef, caused strong 
repulsion in civil society. On the street, I could see printed materials and chants on these issues (cf. Lee et 
al. 2010; Hwang 2011c).      
109 At a press conference, President Lee said, “I made a pledge to construct the Korean Peninsula Grand 
Waterway. However, if the people object to it, I will not push it” (Korea Joongang Daily 23 June 2008).  
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canal project completely stopped. Although the project originated from Lee’s presidential 
aspirations, it was out of his hands after the election. Instead, territorial local politics began to 
emerge to attract the canal project, regardless of the president’s statements. Next, let us look at 
what happened at the local level.  
 
As was mentioned briefly, local-dependent actors actively supported the Korean Peninsula 
Waterway Project, which was composed of a canal in each region, as a new state-nature. Before 
the general elections, the Democratic Party officially opposed the Lee regime’s canal project.110 
However, local politicians affiliated with the Democratic Party took different actions in contrast 
to the central party’s official stance. At the site of the Honam Canal, local politicians objected to 
the Korean Peninsula Waterway Project while advocating the necessity to construct the “Honam 
Canal”, “Geum River Canal” and “Yeongsan River Canal”. According to their logic, 
the former was entirely different from the latter three. Affected by fierce criticism from civil 
society, the ruling party omitted the canal project in its list of general election pledges. However, 
local politicians at the site of the Gyeongbu Canal argued that the “Gyeongbu Canal” and 
“Nakdong River Canal” were dissimilar to the Korean Peninsula Waterway Project. Similar to 
the sites of the Honam Canal and Gyeongbu Canal, the opposition and ruling parties’ candidates 
around the Gyeongin Canal advertised the canal’s construction as a main pledge that was 
completely different from the Korean Peninsula Waterway Project (Hwang and Koh 2008, 219-
236).
111
 In addition to local politicians’ using each local canal’s name as a territorial term, local-
dependent actors attempted to territorialize their local natures to divide between “us” (the local 
canal supporters) and “them” (the local canal opponents). For example, one could see a roadside 
banner with a slogan (“If you oppose the canal, you are not one of us”) at Yeoju, a section of the 
Gyeongbu Canal (The New York Times 21 February 2008; Park 2011: 201). Additionally, when I 
                                                          
110
 During the general election, the Democratic Party issued 136 comments about the canal project, and its 
think tank published a 65-page-long critical report on the project (Hwang and Koh 2008: 220).     
111
 In an area of the Gyeongin Canal (close to Seoul), both political parties are competitive in every 
elections because both parties’ political support is based on each Honam and Yeongnam, as explained 
later.   
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visited the construction site of the Gyeongin Canal on 28 August 2008, shortly after President 
Lee’s declaration calling off the canal project in June 2008, the canal was under construction in 
the name of “floodway construction”112 (see Figure 22-1). Near the construction site, I saw an 
office of the “Local Council for the Gyeongin Canal (경인운하지역협의회)”, which was a 
group of local-dependent actors operating to attract the canal project (see Figure 22-2).         
 
 
Figure 22 (22-1: Left) (22-2: Right): Gyeongin Canal construction site.  
Source: Author’s own photograph 
 
Until now, we have ascertained that there were territorialized local politics around the canal 
project. However, this knowledge is still insufficient to answer how and why local-dependent 
actors were so active in territorializing local nature, even despite the fact that the opposition 
party opposed the canal project and that President Lee had backed away from his pledge. Here, 
we should recognize that territorialized local politics is not new in Korea. To better grasp the 
mechanisms of the emergence of territorial politics, a brief history of Korea’s regionalist politics 
should be explained.  
                                                          
112
 Refer to footnote 106 in this article.  
162 
 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Yeongnam (a southeastern region composed of Busan, Daegu, North 
Gyeongsang and South Gyeongsang) was sharply industrialized, whereas Honam (a 
southwestern region composed of Gwangju, North Jeolla and South Jeolla) was underdeveloped 
because of the Park Jung-Hee regime’s spatial selectivity, which was inherent in the state’s 
industrial and regional policies toward the southeastern region (B.-G. Park 2003; cf. Figure 1).
113
 
Korea’s regionalist politics has been reproduced mainly in this spatial tension between Honam 
and Yeongnam. In particular, transportation infrastructure is important for regional development 
in Korea (Park 2011: 198). As a representative example, the completion of the Gyeongbu (Seoul-
Busan) Expressway in 1970 was the starting point of a striking spatial division between 
economic growth in Yeongnam and economic decline in Honam. Therefore, the Honam-based 
local actors have long demanded the construction and expansion of the Honam railway line and 
expressway (Gimm 2013: 1160-1161). In this sense, in the name “Honam Canal”, “Honam” is 
not simply a regional name but a social construction (Gimm 2013), and thus, when local-
dependent actors utilized “Honam” as a territorial ideology, it was more effective to territorialize 
this region. After 1990, as Park (2008: 52-53) reveals, the spatial disparity between the Seoul 
Metropolitan Area and less prosperous regions including not only Honam but also other regions 
such as Youngnam  intensified because of the change in the accumulation strategy from heavy 
and chemical industrialization to information-based and technology-intensive industrialization, 
such as semiconductors and computers. Therefore, in the remainder of the Seoul Metropolitan 
Area, territorialized local politics to attract state-supported infrastructure projects became 
commonplace.  
                                                          
113
 The key reason the Park regime heavily supported and depended on Yeongnam is that this area was a 
foundation of its political support. Park Jung-Hee had seized control of the country in a military coup, 
which continuingly threatened the regime’s political legitimacy. In this situation, the regime had to recruit 
national bureaucrats and politicians from this area and financially support this area to guarantee stable 
political support (B.-G. Park 2003). Under this context, Lee Myung-Bak emphasized the Gyeongbu Canal 
from among the four canals because his regime’s political support was also based in Yeongnam, even 
though he mentioned the necessity of other canals in the name of “resolving uneven regional 
development”.          
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The intimacy between territorial local politics and state-led infrastructure development as well as 
the construction-oriented tendency of the Korean state led to an impetus to resurrect the canal 
project in a new form called “the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project.”             
 
4. Stage 3: The ‘Four Major Rivers’ hydro-scale redux?: The Four Major 
Rivers Restoration Project of the Lee Myung-Bak regime       
 
4.1. Various rationales behind the 4 Rivers Project  
After the summer of the 2008 candlelight protest, President Lee suggested the concept of Green 
Growth as a new paradigm on August 15, 2008, National Liberation Day. The Green Growth 
strategy was based on the concept of utilizing the environment to pursue further growth and at 
the same time to respond to climate change, the energy crisis and the economic crisis (Yun 
2009). To realize this strategy, the government established an agenda for a National Strategy for 
Green Growth and a Five-Year Plan for Green Growth in 2008 (Hwang et al. 2013). Why did the 
Lee regime bustle to suggest a new growth paradigm?  
 
Before President Lee’s inauguration, the South Korean liberal-progressive block had seized 
power over ten years (1997–2007). One of the main reasons for their defeat in that election was 
that the liberal-progressive block could not realize economic growth for the people while 
promoting economic liberalization such as the proposed Korea-USA Free Trade Agreement 
under the Roh Moo Hyun regime (2002–2007). Thus, many people selected a conservative 
candidate, Lee Myung-Bak, who propagated pragmatic politics and the so-called “747” plan, a 
plan to achieve 7% annual economic growth, increase the GDP per capita income to US$ 40,000 
and make the nation the 7th largest economy in the world (Doucette 2010). However, and in 
contrast to the people’s hopes, even Lee’s regime could not set an alternative path for economic 
growth because of its neoliberal orientation and the 2008 financial crisis in the USA. In other 
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words, the Lee regime faced not only a political but also an economic crisis at the same time. In 
this situation, the regime urgently needed a political-economic fix.            
 
Figure 23: Four Major Rivers Restoration Project 
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At that moment, it could be estimated that the Green Growth strategy would discard the 
traditional construction-based economy that had prevented new economic strategies and would 
support a new field for growth, such as renewable energy, greening the smokestack industry or 
developing greenhouse gas emission technology.
114
 However, the Green Growth strategy is close 
to green washing in that in reality, its main project was the 4 Rivers Project (Hwang et al. 2013), 
which would give a substantial boost to the national construction industry. In other words, the 
path-dependency of the construction-oriented tendency of the Korean developmental state 
significantly affected the current economic system.    
 
According to the government, the first purpose of the 4 Rivers Project was to secure 1.3 billion 
m
3 
of water
 
to respond to future water scarcity caused by climate change (MLTMA 2009).
115
 In 
fact, the “water scarcity state” thesis was designed to legitimize dam construction by 
construction alliances such as the MOC, the KWRC and the mainstream media between the 
1990s and the early 2000s. The thesis officially disappeared in the national water policy after 
2006 because it was proven to be false by a council composed of national bureaucrats, civil 
society and experts who had evaluated the existing water demand that had been calculated by the 
government. The Lee government calculated that 1.02 billion m
3
 of water (80% of 1.3 billion m
3
) 
                                                          
114
 A number of international journal articles (Mathew 2012; Jänicke 2012) introduced Korea’s Green 
Growth strategy as an ideal action for combating climate change to an international audience without 
exploring domestic political conflicts and academic debates around the strategy.    
115
 There was a fierce debate about whether the 4 Rivers Project was a detour for the canal project (C.-K. 
Park 2009; Hankyoreh 2010). One researcher at the state-funded Korea Institute of Construction 
Technology claimed early on that the 4 Rivers Project was nothing more than the canal project on a 
popular online discussion board—Daum Agora—in May 2008. After the newly elected government of 
President Park Geun-Hye, the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea (BAIK) audited the 4 Rivers 
Project. According to the BAIK’s report, when the MOC submitted an early version of the master plan for 
the 4 Rivers Project to the Blue House, the Blue House insisted on dredging 6 m of the four rivers, not the 
2.5 m the MOC had suggested. Six meters was considered the basic condition for the canal. Eventually, in 
accordance with the Blue House’s direction, the new master plan included dredging 6 m (Hankyoreh 14 
July 2013), although former President Lee still argued that the 4 Rivers Project is completely unrelated to 
the canal project in his latest book of memoirs (Lee 2015). Here, the point is that regardless of original 
intention, these projects were designed in the interests of a construction alliance.            
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needed to be secured in the Nakdong River (MLTMA 2009). However, according to a civil 
engineering professor whose calculations included existing data published by the government 
(MOCT 2006), 11 million m
3
 would remain as a surplus in 2011, and even in 2026, the water 
shortage would be 21 million m
3
 before building eight dams and dredging sediments in the 
Nakdong River to secure 0.67 billion m
3
 (C.-K. Park 2009; cf. Figure 23). In other words, the 
government overestimated the amount of water scarcity. It could be assumed that a construction 
alliance would attempt to resurrect the dead water scarcity state thesis to encourage the dam’s 
construction.   
 
 
Figure 24: Trends for domestic construction contracts, 2000–2012.  
Source: KOSIS 
 
Figure 24 shows the trends in domestic construction contracts between 2000 and 2012. In this 
figure, we can verify that with 2007 as the peak, construction contracts in the private sector 
decreased, whereas contracts in the public sector increased exponentially until they peaked in 
2009. That is, the government invested money in the construction industry, especially in the 4 
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Rivers Project, as a short-term economic stimulus plan.
116
 Additionally, the Lee regime ignored 
existing regulatory frameworks, such as the long-term water resource plan, environment impact 
assessments, cultural heritage surveys, etc., because these would have prevented the timely 
promotion of the project (i.e., during a presidential term).
117
 In particular, the Long-Term Water 
Resource Plan is a top-level plan for water resource policy from the 1960s (cf. Chapter 4). In this 
plan (2006–2020), there is no plan for sixteen dams on four major rivers (MOCT 2006). In this 
situation, it would have been difficult to begin the Master Plan for the 4 Rivers Project. Thus, the 
Lee regime intentionally delayed announcing the Long-Term Plan Water Resource Plan (2011–
2020) and revised the plan in accordance with the regime’s aim (MLTMA 2011).118  
 
In summary, we have confirmed that the regime’s political and economic crises, construction 
alliance situation and territorialized local politics conditioned by uneven regional development 
made the Four Rivers Project the political and economic fix. In the next part, I reveal the ways in 
which the “Four Major Rivers” hydro-scale was materially and discursively (re-)produced as an 
alternative state-nature by social forces acting within and through the state and nature.    
                                                          
116
 When introducing the canal project, President Lee said that half of the total construction cost would be 
covered by private investment and half from selling gravel recovered from the project. Additionally, the 
related website stated: “Not a dime of taxpayer’s money will be spent” (Nature 2008). However, after the 
completion of the 4 Rivers Project using 100% public funding, the KWRC went into serious debt, from 
two trillion won in 2008 to fourteen trillion won in 2014. Chaebol construction companies were selected 
as contractors for the project and they colluded in bid rigging for contracts, which demonstrates that the 4 
Rivers Project was merely a means to fast money for a construction alliance (Korea Times 2014). Despite 
this problem, President Lee advocated chaebol by stating that “Some NGOs are hindering efforts by 
Korean companies to obtain orders, but their acts are unpatriotic and go against our country’s interests” 
(The Kyunghyang Shinmun 18 January 2013).    
117
 One of the task executives for the 4 Rivers Project said, “If we followed all procedures, it would be 
difficult to complete the project within the target date” (Weekly Kyunghyang 2009).   
118
 Although the long-term water resource plan is hierarchically above the master plan, the plan (2011–
2020) quotes the master plan for the 4 Rivers Project (MLTMA 2009) in legitimizing the need to secure 
the estimated water and to build sixteen dams on four major rivers, similar to a tail wagging a dog 
(MLTMA 2011, 40). 
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4.2. The Production of the ‘Four Major Rivers’ hydro-scale as an alternative state-
nature  
In promoting the 4 Rivers Project, we should be sensitive to the emergence of the term “Four 
Major Rivers” hydro-scale. According to the media, President Lee accepted the term “Four 
Major Rivers” by chance from a national ruling party’s assemblyman’s suggestion on May 2008 
in the face of continuing opposition such as the candlelight protest (Hankyoreh 2009). In 
comparison with the “Korean Peninsula” Waterway Project, which includes both South and 
North Korea, the “Four Major Rivers” is more geographically specific to the people because it 
comprises only the Han River, Geum River, Yeongsan River and Nakdong River, which match 
the sum of the spaces of each territorialized local politics. In terms of hegemonic strategy, the 
project can be viewed as an alternative state-nature for resolving the abovementioned crises. 
More specifically, the production of the “Four Major Rivers” hydro-scale could be analyzed at 
the national and local levels.      
 
At the national level, the Lee regime attempted to discursively frame the “Four Major Rivers” as 
a state-nature for national economic growth by referring to the “thesis of remodeling the land 
(강산개조론: 江山改造論 )” 119 , which was suggested by a renowned popular Korean 
independence activist, An Chang-ho (1878–1938) (Y. H. Park 2009). As introduced above, the 
nationalizing mechanism around the “Four Major Rivers” was similar that for the “Korean 
Peninsula” Waterway Project. However, the difference between them is that the “Four Major 
Rivers” hydro-scale is not new; in the 1970s, the Park Jung-Hee regime attempted to produce 
this same hydro-scale as a state-nature to push for export-oriented industrialization and to realize 
the “Modernization of the Fatherland” (cf. Chapter 4). Although President Lee adopted the term 
“Four Major Rivers” by accident, his regime intentionally reused this established state-nature to 
legitimize the project because the people had recognized “Four Major Rivers” as a legacy of 
miraculous economic growth. For instance, Weekly Gonggam, a magazine for advertising 
government policy to the people, reported the fact that former President Park Jung-Hee had 
                                                          
119
 In essence, “江山” indicates river (江) and mountain (山), and “江山” means national land.  
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pushed ahead with the Four Major Rivers Basin Development by introducing an interview with 
former Vice Minister of Unification Dong Hoon, of the Park regime, and an authentic letter from 
Mr. Park that Mr. Dong owned (Weekly Gonggam 2009).
120
 Even in his book of memoirs, Lee 
Myung-Bak mentioned the names Park Jung-Hee and An Chang-ho to rationalize the 4 Rivers 
Project (Lee 2015).             
 
Next, we should give an eye to the ways in which concrete local nature transformed into abstract 
state-nature at the local level. As mentioned above, there were supporters and opponents around 
the canal project at the local sites, and thus, the Lee regime needed more assertive measures to 
promote the project stably. One of the key arguments against the project was the possibility of 
local environmental destruction. In response to this, the regime designed the concept of “water-
friendly space (친수공간: 親水空間)” in promoting the 4 Rivers Project.121 This concept was 
very effective in appealing to local people in that the existing water policy mainly focused on 
flood control and water utilization for national economic development while downplaying local 
residents’ lives (cf. Chapter 4). Specifically, the new concept configured the episteme that 
developing “water-friendly space” was not only for the national economy but also for local 
economies and local people’s lives. The Special Act on the Utilization of Waterfronts122, which 
was proposed by the ruling party’s assemblymen, was enacted for developing “water-friendly 
space”. This special act guaranteed the development of “residential, commercial, industrial, 
cultural, sightseeing and leisure functions” (Article 2) “within two kilometers of both banks from 
                                                          
120
 In an interview, Dong Hoon said, “the starting point of the 4 Rivers Project is connected with former 
President Park’s Four Major Rivers Basin Development” (Weekly Gonggam 2009). The article also shows 
a photo of President Park’s handwriting that magnifies the text “四大江流域開發” (i.e. the Four Major 
Rivers Basin Development). The article was introduced by conservative media (Dailian 2009; New Daily 
2009).  
121
 In fact, the term “water-friendly space” began to sparsely appear in the late 1990s, but the Lee regime 
used the concept in earnest.  
122 Although the Special Act on Water-Friendly Areas is closer to the Korean original than the Special Act 
on the Utilization of Waterfronts, I follow the government’s translation.  
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the boundaries of the river basin of a national river” (Article 2) “in preference to other Acts” 
(Article 3, italics added), such as the River Act and the National Land Planning Utilization 
Act.
123
 
 
Figure 25: 25-1 (Left): Busan Eco Delta City Project (Source: KWRC); 25-2 (Right): The 
Four Major Rivers Restoration Project memorial stamp (Source: Korean Postal Service) 
 
As shown in Figures 25-1 and 25-2, by utilizing environmentally-friendly and apolitical images 
and rhetoric such as “water-friendly space”, “green growth” and “river restoration”, local 
opposition was lessened, although there was still the strong opinion that green growth was green 
washing. When I visited the construction site of the Gongju Dam (cf. Figure 25-2) on 30 March 
2011, I found that there were activities by a small number of local opponents, such as local 
media reporters and local NGOs, against the construction. From the view of the project’s 
supporters, local people’s opinions needed to be eliminated in order to promote the project 
smoothly.  
 
                                                          
123
 Representatively, based on the Special Act on the Utilization of Waterfronts, the KWRC and the 
Busan City Government pushed ahead with the Busan Eco Delta City Project (see Figure 25-1). Without a 
preliminary feasibility test, the project aims to construct high-rise apartment complexes on the world-
famous bird sanctuary located at the Nakdong River estuary. The KWRC anticipates that the restitution of 
the development gain from the Busan Eco Delta City Project will offset the debt from the 4 Rivers Project 
(Hwankyung Ilbo 2013).  
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In sum, we ascertained thorough collusion among diverse actors, including the MOC, KWRC, 
chaebol construction companies and local-dependent actors, around the state’s active role in (re- 
and/or de-)regulating and commodifying local nature in the form of the “Four Major Rivers” 
hydro-scale.  
 
5. Conclusion  
Using the canal project and the 4 Rivers Project as case studies, this work has demonstrate that 
the state’s role is very decisive in promoting neoliberal nature projects. More specifically, we 
confirmed that diverse social forces such as the MOC, KWRC and local-dependent actors as well 
as President Lee, at multiple scales, attempted to (re-)produce the “Four Major Rivers” hydro-
scale by acting within and through the state and nature in the face of political and economic 
crises, which is referred to as the “neoliberalized developmental state-nature.”   
 
Then, does the “Four Major Rivers” hydro-scale become a hegemonic state-nature after the 
project’s completion? A certain state-nature relationship does not mean that the state and human 
actors affect nature one-sidedly within human expectations. Nature may produce unexpected 
outcomes beyond human control in the dialectic process of state-nature relationships (Whitehead 
et al. 2007; Braun 2015). The “Four Major Rivers” hydro-scale as a hegemonic state-nature had 
a flaw. Crucially, because the speed of the four major rivers decreased considerably after the 
dams were constructed, the severity of algae blooms, which did not exist before, has been 
increasing even in the winter (Nature 2012). When criticizing the phenomenon of algae blooms, 
the people and the mass media coined the term “green algae latte” because the Korean 
expression for “algae bloom (녹조)” is very similar to that for “green tea (녹차)” (Hankyoreh 3 
August 2013). This coined word encompasses people’s anxiety about their drinking water, their 
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distrust of the government and their mockery about the 4 Rivers Project (Todayhumor 2008; 
Ddanzi Ilbo 2008).
124
 
 
 
Figure 26: 26-1 (Left): The Chilgok Dam (14 June 2012); 26-2 (Right): The appearance of 
algal brooms at the same site (15 June 2013)  
Source: Wetlands and Birds Korea (https://www.flickr.com/photos/sos4river) 
 
In addition, and in contrast to the Lee regime’s promise, the rose-tinted economic effects of the 4 
Rivers Project—such as creating 340,000 jobs—were revealed to be a fraudulent: It never rains 
but it pours. It is possible that the KWRC owes an enormous debt that will be paid by the people 
in the near future (The Kyunghyang Shinmun 20 June 2013). Even for local construction 
companies, the 4 Rivers Project was futile except for chaebol construction companies 
(Hankyoreh 21 May 2013). For example, in a gathering at the National Assembly on May 20 
2013, Head of the Daegu and North Gyeongsang Province chapter of the Korean Federation of 
Construction Industry Trade Unions said:  
 
                                                          
124
 For example, “the green algae latte” became a subject matter for satire in a popular Korean comedy 
program called Gag Concert (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tML82Rw38lA, last accessed 20 
January 2015).    
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We are sorry that we were the ones who dug out the rivers for the 4 Rivers Project with our 
excavators and hauled away the dirt in our dump trucks. … People think that the companies that 
were employed in the project made a lot of money, but the project was awful for us as well. … 
Contractors had to deal with late payment on virtually every site that was part of the project. 
Illegal fuel was rampant, along with illegal equipment repairs and illegal invoices. If it wasn’t 
illegal, it wasn’t happening. While the large construction companies probably made some profits 
on the project, the construction workers who were actually doing the work on site are even now 
struggling as they wait to get paid (Hankyoreh 21 May 2013). 
 
Under the Lee regime, newly elected provincial governors directly conflicted with the regime by 
halting work on construction sites on the Geum River and Nakdong River, and the Busan High 
Court declared that the 4 Rivers Project was illegal, although the Lee regime eventually 
completed the construction of the project (The Economist 2010). In this situation, after the 
inauguration of President Park Geun-Hye, the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea audited 
the project. Seemingly, it could be assumed that the “Four Major Rivers” hydro-scale as a 
hegemonic state-nature is collapsing. However, we need to read ordinary people’s mentalités of 
ordinary people as follows:   
 
He [Lee Myung-Bak] was a hero to people [of] my [own] age. … He was in charge of the 
Gyeongbu Expressway and he restored the Cheonggye Stream. So when I heard that he was 
going to try and build that canal, I thought, why not. … People at least want to believe that more 
jobs will be available once the canal project starts (a housewife in her 50s, Korea Joongang 
Daily 1 January 2008).    
 
It appears that people will continue to long for the second 4 Rivers Project to gratify their desire 
in the name of development or growth, and a construction alliance will encourage people’s greed 
by producing various forms of neoliberalized developmental state-nature such as the “Four 
Major Rivers” to sustain their interest. In this sense, finding alternative pathways to 
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developmental neoliberalism is rocky. However, although I could not provide a panacea to 
change the current system, it is imperative that we take the state as a main unit of analysis. 
Penciling the state’s role into Castree (2008a)’s map has not only contributed to the realm of 
theory but also closely relates to the political implications. In particular, given the situation in 
which some progressive scholars and activists have often been reluctant to regard the state as a 
foothold for a “socioecological transformation” (Braun 2015) (cf. Hardt and Negri 2001; 
Holloway 2005), it would be more difficult to locate cracks that could cause socioecological 
transformations in the present and near future systems without exploring the state as a unit of 
analysis and a site of political contestation (Smith 2010; Parenti 2014). 
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VIII. Conclusion 
It is time to conclude this analysis of state-nature relations in a developmental state focusing on 
water resource policies in South Korea. This last chapter will summarize the main results of the 
investigations. Finally, future challenges for research will be formulated.     
  
1. Summary 
In this thesis, I have attempted to theoretically connect the SRA with state-nature literature, in 
order to clearly show the links between nature and concrete social forces acting in and through 
the state. Using a case study of Korean water resource policies, I have also emphasized that DST 
studies should consider the SRA and state-nature literature in order to avoid the territorial trap 
that tends to emphasize the role of the state per se and to better explain East Asian economic 
development. By answering the research questions formulated in the introduction, the 
implications of the thesis can be summarized as follows.  
 
1.1. Revisiting question A:  What were the state’s intentions in advocating a certain 
water resource policy? 
Although it is difficult to deny that developmental states have the characteristics of general 
capitalist states, such as a capital accumulation orientation, emphasizing only the capitalist 
imperative and its resultant economic development as the main motivation of a developmental 
state’s practice is very limited in revealing the diverse purposes of the water resource policy of 
each regime. In this sense, different to the existing DST literature, the concept of plan rationality 
is much too blunt as an instrument for extracting various rationales behind policy decisions, such 
as organizational survival of the ministry. It is clear that each regime had different intentions as 
well as similar intentions, as follows.   
 
The Park Jung-Hee regime promoted a particular water resource policy for the purpose of 
reconstructing the ruined territory after the Korean War in the name of “Modernization of the 
Fatherland.” Chun Doo-Hwan utilized water policy as a means of extending his rule. After 
democratization in 1987, during the 1990s and the early 2000s, democratic regimes were more 
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concerned with democratic and environmentally friendly actions, such as civil society’s 
participation in the process of making a national water policy plan. Lastly, the Lee Myung-Bak 
conservative regime (2008-2013) used water policy to avoid an economic, and especially a 
political, crisis through the 4 Rivers Project in a way similar to that of the Chun regime.  
 
However, understanding the intentions of each regime at this level may make the mistake of 
generalization. As revealed in the above chapters, even under the same regime, there were 
entangled conflicts among social forces having different interests, such as the competition and 
contestation between the MOC and MCI surrounding plans for constructing hydroelectric power 
stations and thermal power generation plants (Chapter 4), the EPB and MOC regarding EPB’s 
fiscal austerity program (Chapter 5), the MOC and EPA surrounding an integrated system for 
water management (Chapter 6) and the MOC and civil society regarding the 4 Rivers Project 
(Chapter 7). In other words, we should recognize not only each regime’s intention, but also that 
each intention was the contingent outcome of political contestations among various social forces.      
 
1.2. Revisiting question B: How was the relationship between the state and nature  
constructed?  
In this thesis, we have ascertained that state-nature relations are constructed by social forces that 
pursue their own political and economic ends by acting in and through the state and nature. More 
specifically, under the Park regime, water became a nationalized economic good and the “Four 
Major Rivers” hydro-scale was produced. Under the Chun regime, the “Ten Major Rivers” 
hydro-scale was crafted as an alternative to the “Four Major Rivers”. Under democratic regimes, 
the MOC and others attempted to construct the “water scarcity state” thesis. Finally, the Lee 
regime promoted the Korean Peninsula Grand Waterway and the 4 Rivers Project. In all these 
cases, three mechanisms are at work, framing, centralization and especially territorialization, as 
suggested in Whitehead et al. (2007).  
 
Although this empirical study shows the active role of the state in constructing certain state-
nature relations, it does not mean that the state can control or conquer all of nature and society 
and correctly estimate effect and direction of state-nature and state-society relations. Here, a 
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multi-scalar approach is significant. As shown in Chapter 4, the reason why the Park regime 
produced the “Four Major Rivers” hydro-scale is that local opposition to multipurpose dams may 
threaten national policy. Because of this “scalar mismatch” (cf. Section 4 of Chapter 2) between 
local and national needs, dominant social forces attempted to produce certain state-nature 
interactions to curb possible local and national opposition. Additionally, natural phenomena, 
such as flooding under the Chun regime (Chapter 5), or water pollution and water scarcity after 
democratization (Chapters 6 and 7), caused great or small changes in existing water policy 
orientations. In other words, the state, society and nature interact with each other dialectically in 
the (re-)construction process of state-nature relations. This contextualized understanding of state-
nature relations may help DST scholars to avoid fetishizing the role of the state per se.   
 
1.3. Revisiting question C: How did the former regime’s state-nature relationship 
impact the latter regime, and what changed this relationship under the latter 
regime? 
Existing DST literature tends to see the developmental state as an ahistorical and timeless object 
by defining it as a state that possesses a high degree of autonomy and is insulated from private 
interests (cf. Section 5 of Chapter 2). Depending on this unchangeable definition, DST scholars 
accept or reject the concept of the developmental state to suit their personal convictions, in 
particular in explaining the change of developmental states after globalization. Although my 
critical stance is not new in social science, I argue that existing DST research has not paid 
sufficient attention to the dynamic relationship between the path-dependency and path-breaking 
moment of developmental states.  
 
While both were authoritarian regimes, the Park regime produced the “Four Major Rivers” 
hydro-scale for capital accumulation, whereas the later Chun regime crafted the “Ten Major 
Rivers” hydro-scale in accordance with the politics of distribution to avoid an immediate 
political crisis. After political and economic liberalization, under democratic regimes, the legacy 
of the past authoritarian regimes significantly affected water resource policies, guarding the 
interests of influential actors who benefited from the extant developmental state system. 
Decisively, contrary to the dominant neoliberal dogma that the minimal state is a prerequisite for 
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invigorating neoliberalism, the active role of the state was crucial to promoting a neoliberal 
nature project such as the 4 Rivers Project under the Lee regime. Without considering its path-
dependency and its interactions with emerging institutional property, it is difficult to more fully 
explain the present phenomena. Consequently, this thesis espouses pleads for a more 
contextualized analytical perspective that can detect the path-dependency that motivated the 
present developmental neoliberalism.  
 
1.4. Revisiting question D: How does this perspective help us rethink the 
developmental state vis-à-vis nature? 
As ascertained in the above three research questions, this thesis has tried to theoretically and 
empirically excavate veiled relationships between the developmental state and nature. This 
attempt is meaningful because despite its importance, the natural world has received little 
attention in DST research. Some might argue that this is simply putting a variable into the 
unchangeable DST. In other words, it could be regarded as one of examples that support “the 
role of the state” in East Asian economic development. In my view, this perspective only looks at 
one side of things. The main purpose of this dissertation is not to repeat the stylized 
developmental state thesis emphasizing the role of the state per se described by existing DST 
scholars. As briefly mentioned in Section 1 of Chapter 3, I suggest that we need to fundamentally 
reconsider a taken-for-granted concept of the East Asian economic miracle. Namely, did the 
miracle really happen? As revealed in the production process of state-nature relations, these 
relations are very important to promote economic growth. From the perspective of national 
bureaucrats, high GDP means economic prosperity, which continually legitimizes the necessity 
of state-nature. However, at the same time, I found that the production of state-nature involves 
nationalizing local nature and marginalizing local residents’ interests. As a result, there is uneven 
regional development today. In this sense, high GDP is futile from the local people’s angle. What 
is worse, “GDPism” (Sum 2013) shadows this negative aspect of reality beneath the miracle.  
 
This epistemological problem is not confined to East Asia but also affects emerging countries. 
For example, African policy makers and scholars have recently tried to import the East Asian 
developmental state model into their countries (Mkandawire 2001; Zenawi n.d.). It is highly 
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possible, depending on the concepts and experience of East Asian developmental states, that the 
African governments may legitimize certain economic policies and state-nature projects that 
involve uneven regional development and marginalization of local nature and residents. 
Therefore, rethinking the developmental state vis-à-vis nature is meaningful for future 
developmental states beyond East Asia.   
 
2. Outlook: Future directions of research  
In this thesis, the main chapters do not mention the water policy of the recently-established Park 
Keun-Hye regime (2013-2018), which is dominated by the same conservative party as that of the 
former President Lee Myung-Bak. Because it is ongoing, it is difficult to evaluate the current 
Park regime in depth. However, I have outlined several noticeable movements. Despite the fact 
that the former regime faced fierce opposition to the 4 Rivers Project, the MOC has produced 14 
new dam construction plans under the new regime (Hankyoreh 6 July 2013), which show strong 
path-dependency of a construction alliance including the MOC and the chaebol. Therefore, we 
need to pay attention to the Park regime in future research.    
 
At the same time, influenced by the Lee regime’s 4 Rivers Project, the Thai government made a 
contract with the KWRC on June 2013 to establish a large-scale water management project after 
the September 2001 flood. However, because of a new military regime, which seized control of 
the country via a coup in May 2014, it is uncertain whether the KWRC will continue to maintain 
the contract (Yeonhap News 27 October 2014). Beyond the Korean and Thai cases, there are an 
increasing number of large-scale dam constructions and related conflicts in Asia in the face of 
climate change (The New York Times 30 September 2011). Recently, international organizations 
and meetings such as the UNESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific), World Economic Forum and Asian Development Bank began to pay attention to 
water shortages in Asia in the context of climate change (World Economic Forum 2008; 
UNESCAP 2013; ADB 2013). I hypothesize that it is highly possible that certain Asian countries 
could mobilize discourse on climate change and its related socio-natural phenomena such as 
water shortage in promoting mega-projects such as multipurpose dams in their countries for the 
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dominant class’ interest (Aiken and Leigh 2015; The New York Times 30 September 2011; 
Yeonhap News 27 October 2014). Therefore, evaluating Asian cases is not only theoretically but 
also politically significant. However, specific studies are still rare in critical hydro-politics 
literature, though we have already witnessed several cases worldwide, such as in Egypt 
(Mitchell, 2002), India (Klingensmith, 2007) and Israel (Harris and Alatout, 2010). In the future, 
more empirical studies in Asia beyond South Korea are required to ‘abstract and/or 
contextualize’ (Castree 2008b) the cases of Asian countries.        
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